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Abstract:
This  thesis  contains  three  papers  on  the  economic  study  of  domestic  terrorism. 
Domestic  terrorism is  the most prevalent  form of terrorism,  yet,  when compared to 
transnational terrorism, is understudied in the literature.  This thesis makes two game 
theoretic and one econometric contribution to this literature.  Chapter 3 presents a model 
of  how  a  revolutionary  terrorist  interacts  with  both  governments  and  members  of 
society. This model shows that societies adverse to violence can incentivise reductions 
in terrorism but can also induce escalations of violence and lax government responses. 
Chapter 4 contributes to the signalling literature, by painting a revolutionary terrorist 
that has both political and militant wings.  The leadership of this organisation favours 
one wing over the other and attempts to signal this preference to its rivals.  This model 
shows that terrorist organisations are more likely to signal their true type to adversaries 
who  have  access  to  similar  levels  of  resources.   Finally,  Chapter  5  uses  duration 
modelling to test  the interaction of rival terrorist  organisations operating during The 
Troubles  in  Northern  Ireland  in  the  late-20th century,  showing  that  both  the  main 
Republican and Loyalist players deviated from their local and temporal strategies to 
interact with each other.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
The literature in  the field of  the economics of  terrorism has  a  long and impressive 
history that  stretches as far back as the seminal  work presented in Schelling's  “The 
Strategy of Conflict” in 1960, with other early theoretical contributions sketched as an 
adaption of Becker's (1968) “Crime and Punishment” theory.  Landes (1978) builds on 
this theoretical framework and introduces a statistical analysis of US skyjackings, for 
example.  Despite the length of this history, however, even the quickest glance at the 
literature reveals that a disproportionately large majority of this work has been carried 
out in the last ten years.  
In a comprehensive review of the literature by Schneider, Brück and Meierrieks (2010), 
for  example,  only 10% of  in  excess of  250 cited papers  were written before 2000. 
Whilst impossible to suggest this review is a perfect barometer of the distribution of the 
literature, it is revealing to see that such a significant proportion of the cited literature is 
comparatively recent.  
This is not to say that valuable contributions were not made before the millennium. 
Sandler, Tschirhart and Cauley (1983) present a rational actor model of the negotiation 
process between the government and terrorists in hostage situations for example.  Other 
important  contributions include;  Atkinson,  Sandler  and Tschirhart  (1987),  Rappoport 
(1992) and Hoffman (1998) but  the  degree and scope of  the literature has changed 
significantly  in  recent  years.   The  literature  has  matured  from  early  attempts  to 
rationalise terrorist action to a wide array of related topics.   
To the casual observer, this  recent and rapid expansion of the literature may not be 
surprising.  In recent years a spate of large-scale attacks has occurred that have, no 
doubt, heightened the awareness of terrorism and raised the profile of such events in the 
media.   Whilst  the  attacks  in  New  York,  Pennsylvania  and  Washington  D.C.  on 
September 11, 2001 tend to provide an accepted reference point in the literature, such 
attacks can better be traced back to the attacks against American embassies in Nairobi, 
Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, which killed 223 people in 1998. 
Within  ten  years  of  these  attacks,  transnational  organisations  were  responsible  for 
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further high-profile, high-casualty incidents in Bali (2002), Madrid (2004) and London 
(2007) in addition to the 9/11 attacks.  This is not to mention a number of extensively 
reported but largely failed attacks, including further attacks on London and Glasgow in 
2007 and attempted attacks  on aircraft  with  bombs hidden in shoes  (Richard  Reid, 
2001) and underpants (Umar Abdulmutallab, 2009).  
Indeed, even as I write these overtures, a number of conflicts and terrorist threats are 
regular features in the international news sections of many popular press publications. 
Boko Haram has perpetrated a number of domestic terrorist attacks in Nigeria in recent 
months, whilst concern continues to grow over the operation of al-Shabaab in Somalia. 
When coupled with the insurgencies and conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, the return of 
low-intensity conflict in Northern Ireland, the 2011 attacks in Norway and 2012 attacks 
in France, a casual observer could be forgiven for believing that terrorism, or action 
rationalised as such, has never posed such an extreme threat.
Despite this media coverage, a quick search of data stored on the Global Terrorism 
Database  (GTD),  START (2011)  reveals  that  significantly  more  terrorist  incidents 
occurred  between 1980 & 1989  and  1990  & 1999 than  have occurred  since  2000. 
Whilst some of this increased profile can be explained by the increased risk of injury 
and fatality from terrorist incidents – another quick search of the GTD shows a notably 
higher proportion of attacks result  in injury or death in recent times – the attention 
terrorism currently receives and the fears and costs associated with it are not matched by 
the intensity of violence.  Whilst some have suggested this is a result of the changing 
nature of the threat, even the concept of a terrorist organisation based in one country 
perpetrating attacks in another is not a new phenomenon.  The 1972 'Munich Massacre' 
and the 1988 bombing of Pan Am flight 103 are notable pre-9/11 examples.  
This, of course, is to ignore the singular, psychological, effect of the 9/11 attacks.  In 
terms of sheer scale and the technology of attack, this incident is unprecedented.  The 
death toll from these attacks was greater than the sum of deaths from all transnational 
attacks  in  the  previous  decade  (Sandler,  2003),  for  example.   The  use  of  civilian 
airliners and the iconic images of the Twin Towers themselves, no doubt further raised 
the  profile  of  transnational  terrorism and individuals'  perceptions  of  the  risk  that  it 
poses.  
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This  significantly  increased  profile  is  the  context  in  which  the  literature  base  has 
expanded extensively.  In recent  years,  work has focused on a wide array of topics 
including;  the  long-  and  short-term effects  of  terrorism on  macro-  and  micro-level 
economic indicators; impacts on tourism, investment, education and employment; target 
selection and response to government counter-terror measures; the impact of terrorists' 
funding; effects  on the structure of the economy and the impact on stock and bond 
markets.  
Schneider, Brück and Meierrieks (2010) split the literature into four main areas; causes 
of  terrorism,  economic  effects  of  terrorism,  economic  effects  of  counter-terrorism 
policies  and  the  interaction  of  actors  of  security  and  insecurity.   For  the  research 
presented in this thesis, the last area is the most immediately relevant as it deals with, 
amongst other things, the strategic interaction between terrorists' decision-making and 
the counter-terrorism policies of governments.  
Despite  not,  initially,  seemingly  like  an  economic  problem,  many  of  the  questions 
associated  with  terrorism can  be  discussed  in  simple  economic  terms.   Like  many 
studies in economics, it begins with the assumption that terrorists are rational actors. 
Whilst this thought may not sit comfortably with those who view terrorists as amoral, 
murderous monsters, it provides a solid base from which to build a theory on the causes 
of terrorism and the activities of terrorists.  In this respect, the study of terrorism begins 
much like the study of any other field in economics.  Terrorists have some goal they 
wish to achieve and choose activities they believe will bring about attainment of this 
goal. 
What do terrorists wish to achieve?  I begin with the assumption that they have some 
kind of political goal – regime change, secession or repatriation, for example.  In this, 
however, I defer to the definition provided by Enders and Sandler (2006): “Terrorism is  
the premeditated use or threat to use violence by individuals or subnational groups in  
order to gain a political or social objective through intimidation of a large audience  
beyond  that  of  the  immediate  victims.” This  definition  enables  a  differentiation  of 
terrorism from more general forms of crime.  Throughout the work presented in this 
thesis, the potential to use violence as a tool to attain political goals is of paramount 
importance to the analysis.  
3
By carrying out attacks, terrorists hope to generate 'utility' by making the attainment of 
these political goals more likely.  Incidents may, for example, weaken the resolve of an 
incumbent government and result in political concessions.  Terrorists are also subjected 
to direct and opportunity costs, however.  In order to carry out an attack, resources must 
be  spent  on  weapons,  for  example.   This  can  result  in,  say,  foregone  non-terrorist 
consumption,  whilst  terrorists  themselves  may  have  to  forego  non-terrorism related 
income streams, due to training times and so on.  
Using  basic  economic  intuition,  it  can  then  be  stated  that  terrorists  will  ‘produce’ 
terrorism up to the point where the marginal cost and marginal benefit of engaging in 
these violent acts are the same.  Thus, should something happen to materially change 
the  costs,  opportunity  costs  or  returns  from  engagement  in  terrorism,  it  would  be 
expected  that  optimal  devotion of  resources  to  terrorism would change accordingly. 
Should a government increase counter-terrorism, for example, the costs of engaging in 
terrorism  may  increase,  which  should  result  in  a  reduction  in  terrorism.   A sharp 
increase in the availability of weapons, on the other hand, should have the effect of 
reducing the costs of terrorism and should induce an upsurge in violence.  
Taking this as the 'original' frame of reference, it is possible to see adaptions of this 
simple  logic,  even in  recent  literature;  Berman and  Laitin  (2005)  use  a  club-goods 
model to discuss group outcomes, in the context of suicide attacks, for example.  Arce 
and Sandler (2007) use a signalling model to overcome implicit information asymmetry 
under  a  terrorist  threat.   Whilst  these  developments  provide  a  much more  accurate 
portrayal of the nature of terrorism than the simple model shown above, this “Crime and 
Punishment” based modelling still has important implications for the work in this thesis 
and in the literature, more broadly.
Adverse economic conditions, for example, may decrease opportunity costs of potential 
terrorists due to reduced non-terrorist employment or income.  Despite this suggestion, 
however, some countries in the world are exceptionally poor and have not suffered a 
terrorist threat, whilst Northern Ireland and Spain are comparatively wealthy and have 
suffered  endemic  terrorism throughout  the  latter  half  of  the  20th Century.  "Relative 
Deprivation” aims to explain this phenomenon; it is not the existence of poverty, per se,  
that can cause terrorism but when one section of society is, or at least perceives itself, to 
be unfairly worse off than another.  These feelings can relate to feelings of economic, 
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political or social marginalisation, all of which are of paramount importance for this 
work.  
This notion stretches back to the work of Gurr (1970) but empirical findings have been 
mixed  and  heavily  debated;  Kruger  and  Maleckova  (2003)  dispute  the  findings, 
showing that  individuals who engaged in terrorism in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict 
were more likely to come from higher income backgrounds.  Bueno de Mesquita (2005) 
corroborates this finding but points to the selection of well-educated individuals to carry 
out attacks.  Burgoon (2006), however, shows that strong social welfare programmes 
significantly reduce terrorism, via a reduction of inequality.  In the specific context of 
Northern Ireland, Thompson (1989) and White (1993) show no significant relationship 
between  unemployment  and  terrorism  yet  Honaker  (2010)  shows  a  significant 
relationship with the expected signs, by decomposing unemployment and violence by 
religion.  
In opposition to the suggestion that the economic situation of a country can facilitate 
terrorism, recent work has shown that political variables tend to be more important. 
Abadie  (2006)  shows  that  when  political  variables  are  accounted  for,  economic 
variables tend to  become a less  significant  driver  of terrorism.   Krueger  and Laitin 
(2008) and Feldman and Perälä (2004) also support this claim.  As such, whilst  the 
simple model provides a naïve basis for the economic study of terrorism, it is already 
immediately obvious that the empirical literature shows a much more complex picture 
that  suggests  a  requirement  for  further  development  of  these  models.   The  three 
substantive chapters of this thesis aim to answer some of these outstanding questions. 
Firstly,  the  analyses  presented  here  differentiates  between  terrorist  typologies  and 
secondly, it introduces the potential for new strategic choice and interactions that have, 
hitherto,  not  been  considered  in  the  literature.   Such  differentiations  are  further 
considered in the next section. 
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Chapter 2: Domestic Terrorism
In  this  chapter,  I  aim  to  discuss  differences  in  types  of  terrorism.   The  research 
presented in Chapters 3, 4 and 5 focuses, specifically on a kind of terrorism I refer to as  
‘domestic terrorism’.  I fully define domestic terrorism later in this chapter but it can be 
broadly considered as terrorism carried out in order to affect material change to policies 
or  regimes  within  a  country  or  some  sub-region  of  that  country.   Throughout  this 
chapter,  I  aim  to  discuss  the  application,  or  lack  of,  of  economic  methods  to  the 
understanding of domestic terrorism.  
I  begin  this  section  with  a  brief  overview  of  domestic  terrorism,  including  some 
background  statistics  about  the  prevalence  of  domestic  terrorism  and  its  relative 
anonymity in the literature and then provide a formal definition of the phenomenon. 
Following this, I describe the features that I believe uniquely define domestic terrorism 
from  other  forms  of  terrorist  threat  and  discuss  the  current  shortcomings  of  the 
background literature in respect to accounting for these features.  In this section, I also 
compare different kinds of domestic terrorist threats; nominally, 'unitary', 'binary' and 
'triangular' threats, all of which I define later in this chapter.  
I then intuitively augment the simple economic model discussed in Chapter 1 to account 
for some of the unique features of domestic terrorism and conclude with an overview of 
the  relevant  literature,  including  a  brief  discussion  on  its  potential  application  to 
domestic terrorism.  I  close this  chapter with three sub-sections that provide a brief 
overview of each of the substantive chapters of this thesis.
Domestic terrorism affects, or has affected, a significant number of countries at different 
stages of development throughout the world and is responsible for a large majority of 
terrorist  attacks  (Enders and  Sandler, 2008).   Despite  this,  when  compared  with 
transnational terrorism, it has been relatively understudied in a literature that stretches 
back for in excess of half a century.  As such, the study of domestic terrorist threats, due 
to  their  notable  structural  differences  from  transnational  terrorism,  provides  a  rich 
theoretical  and  empirical  background  that,  hitherto,  has  not  been  fully  studied  or 
exploited.  
Domestic terrorism, typically, arises when an organisation has some strategic goal to 
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materially affect the economic, political or social status quo of a country, or some sub-
region of a country.  Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA), for example, holds a long-term 
strategic aim of an independent Basque state, whilst Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias 
de  Colombia  (FARC)  aims  for  the  implementation  of  a  Marxist-Leninist  state  in 
Colombia.  
A particularly  pertinent  and  common  feature  of  such  terrorist  activity  is  that  such 
organisations  are,  or  at  least  perceive  themselves  to  be,  marginalised  from  normal 
democratic  or  political  processes.   UMkhonto  we  Sizwe  came  to  prominence  as  a 
military  representative  organisation  of  Black  South  Africans  who  faced  political 
exclusion due to Apartheid.  A first-past-the-post and an, effectively, two-party electoral 
system had the result of excluding the large Catholic minority, nominally represented by 
the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA), from the Executive of the 1921 – 1972 
Parliament of Northern Ireland from the 1930s onwards.  In both of these cases, decades 
of, largely peaceful opposition to the status quo eventually led to eruptions of terrorist 
violence.  
In these situations, the use of violence is, therefore, more likely to be politically, rather 
than  ideologically,  motivated.   Perhaps,  a  stronger  statement  would  suggest  that 
violence and political engagement are effectively tactical substitutes, or even tactical 
compliments, in many domestic terrorist conflicts.  The choice of strategic action is 
therefore, based more in terms of expected political returns from action, rather than on a 
violent  or  peaceful  ideology.   Terrorism,  therefore,  is  used  as  a  means  to  achieve 
political  objectives,  or  as  a  method  to  generate  political  recognition  of  a  cause, 
especially when traditional political methods are deemed to be unavailable or to have 
failed.
The  motivations  and  reasons  for  action,  therefore,  exhibit  differences  from  those 
typically  found  in  the  literature  of  transnational  terrorism.   As  such,  many  of  the 
findings and policy recommendations of this literature may not be directly relevant to 
domestic  threats.   The  common  finding,  for  example,  that  a  unilateral  increase  in 
counter-terrorism in one country can deflect terrorism to another doesn't seem directly 
applicable to domestic terrorism.  Instead, given that the nature of terrorism is political, 
rather than ideological, the effect of changes in government strategies could change the 
incentives of a terrorist organisation to engage in peace-making, for example.  
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This suggestion,  that terrorist  organisations could devote resources to peace-making, 
represents a significant departure from a vast majority of the literature, yet should be 
seen as an intrinsic part of the process under domestic terrorist threats.  Each of the four 
terrorist  organisations  mentioned  above  are,  or  were,  linked  with  a  nominally 
democratic political wing; ETA with Batasuna, FARC with Unión Patriótica, the PIRA 
with Sinn Féin and uMkhonto we Sizwe with the African National Congress (ANC).   
Against  the  backdrop  of  increased  media  attention  and  perceptions  of  risk  from 
transnational terrorism, it perhaps isn't too surprising that the literature predominantly 
looks at transnational terrorism.  Despite this domination, nonetheless, both Rosendorff 
and Sandler  (2005) and Enders and Sandler  (2008) show that  domestic  terrorism is 
responsible for significantly more terrorist incidents than transnational terrorism.  The 
latter present data showing that domestic terrorism is almost eight times more likely to 
occur than transnational terrorism.  
Despite being responsible for almost 90% of terrorist incidents, a cursory glance at the 
large  literature  reviews  of  Sandler  and  Siqueira  (2009)  and  Schneider,  Bruck  and 
Meierrieks  (2010)  reveals  a  significant  limitation  in  research  that  looks  directly  at 
domestic terrorism.  Of in excess of 250 citations in Schneider, Brück and Meierrieks, 
only ten pertain to domestic conflict, for example.  Of these ten papers, only three deal 
with the strategies employed by terrorists in domestic conflict, such as their interactions 
with  government.   Rosendorff  and  Sandler  (2005)  suggest  that  this  outcome  has 
occurred  under  the  assumption  that  governments  are  'self-reliant'  in  dealing  with 
domestic terrorists.  This assumption implies that because government counter-terrorism 
under a domestic threat does not deflect attacks to other countries, for example, it does 
not merit direct modelling or analysis.  
This thesis challenges this view and suggests that, hitherto, the chance to understand 
and use the very rich modelling background inherent in domestic terrorists has been 
spurned.  Thus, the work presented here aims to rectify a large oversight in the literature 
by  providing  contributions  on  three  important  questions  that  relate,  directly  and 
uniquely,  to  the  structure  of  domestic  conflicts.   Firstly,  by  which  mechanisms  do 
violent  terrorists  begin  on  the  long  road  towards  peace;  secondly,  on  how  rival 
organisations strategically interact with each other and, finally, by offering an empirical 
analysis of violent domestic conflict.
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Further suggestions as to the predominance of transnational terrorism in the literature 
relate  to  media  profile  and  data  unavailability.   The  commonly  used  International 
Terrorism: Attributes of Terrorist Events (ITERATE) database, Mickolus  et al (2008), 
for example, includes only data on transnational terrorism and whilst the GTD, START 
(2011)  provides  data  on  domestic  incidents,  it  has  only  been  available  since  2006. 
Despite this, however, country-specific data has been available for a significantly longer 
period of time; “An Index of Deaths from the Conflict in Ireland”, Sutton (1994), which 
is used in Chapter 5, has been available for almost two decades, for example.
“The Troubles” was largely a domestic conflict with goals that directly related to the 
status of Northern Ireland.  The Sutton database shows that approximately 95% of the 
deaths directly related to the conflict occurred in Northern Ireland.  Despite this, the 
Provisional  Irish Republican Army (PIRA) perpetrated attacks in  Belgium, England, 
(West)  Germany  and  the  Netherlands.   Similarly,  Loyalist  terrorist  organisations 
perpetrated attacks in the Republic of Ireland.  
Under  some assumptions,  this  could  be  regarded as  transnational  terrorism;  indeed, 
ITERATE (Mickolus et al, 2008), codes them as such.  Despite claiming responsibility 
for deaths in other sovereign states,  however, the PIRA exclusively attacked British 
targets.  These do not appear to be the strategic actions of an organisation seeking to 
escalate a conflict beyond its domestic strategic aims.  It would, therefore, be a mistake 
to regard The Troubles as a transnational conflict.  Although the differentiation may be 
obvious in the case of Northern Ireland, it  is less clear cut when, for example,  The 
Taliban attack American soldiers based in Afghanistan.  
Despite  such  potential  grey  areas,  formally  identifying  what  constitutes  domestic 
terrorism is important for the work presented in this thesis.  Therefore, I draw what may 
seem like a subtle differentiation between what defines 'domestic' from 'transnational' 
terrorists.  Rather than being based on whether an organisation attacks inside or outside 
its country of origin, it is based on that organisation's strategic aims.  In other words,  
what defines a domestic terrorist is the goals of that organisation, not the locations of its  
attacks.  
On  this  basis,  the  likes  of  the  PIRA,  ETA and  FARC  are  regarded  as  'domestic' 
terrorists, despite perpetrating attacks outside of their country of origin.  The Taliban, 
9
whilst  attacking  ‘foreign’  targets,  is  also  regarded  as  domestic,  therefore,  as  their 
principle aim is based on seizing local political control.  Similarly, however, the British-
born  extremists  who  attacked  the  London  Underground  in  2005  are  regarded  as 
transnational terrorists, despite carrying out attacks in their country of origin.  
More formally, I define a domestic terrorist organisation as: An organisation willing to  
engage in acts of terrorism in order to affect material change to economic or political  
policy or regime within its country, or region, of origin.  By taking this definition, it is 
easy  to  see  that  in  recent  years,  sub-national  paramilitaries  operating  in  domestic 
conflicts have been a common feature of the political landscape.  Whether regarded as 
insurgents  (Afghanistan,  Iraq)  or  terrorists  (Colombia,  Nigeria,  Northern  Ireland, 
Spain), it is a pattern of conflict that occurs regularly and results in high casualties and a 
high frequency of incidents.  
It would not be a stretch to state that there is a significant paucity of evidence on the  
causes and consequences of domestic terrorism, with empirical work particularly rare. 
Burgoon (2006) and Krieger and Meierrieks (2009) both show that strong social welfare 
infrastructure  significantly  reduces  domestic  terrorism,  fitting  with  opportunity  cost 
based modelling.  Bloomberg and Hess (2008b) also show that higher domestic output 
significantly  reduces  the  prevalence  of  terrorism.   Sambanis  (2008)  does  not 
significantly find this link, however.  To this author's knowledge, there is currently no 
work that would allow inference of the effects of non-economic variables.  
In this mismatch of the threat of domestic terrorism to its coverage in the literature and 
its perception amongst wider society, I find my motivations for this thesis.  Whilst there 
may be some credence to a suggestion that, 'terrorism is terrorism is terrorism,' domestic 
terrorist conflicts tend to exhibit features that define them from transnational threats, 
specifically from a research perspective.  
They tend to display high-frequency, low-intensity violence, which is divergent to the 
infrequent 'spectacular' attacks of transnational organisations, for example.  The largest 
single attack during The Troubles in Northern Ireland, for example, occurred in Omagh 
in 1998 and led to the deaths of 29 individuals, whilst the largest single attack due to 
ETA killed 21 in Barcelona in 1987.  To put this in context, the Northern Ireland conflict 
itself resulted in in excess of 3,500 deaths and was built against a background of some 
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2,000 fatal incidents and many thousands more incidents that resulted in injury and or 
destruction.  Similarly, Basque separatists are responsible for almost 850 deaths and 
countless other violent incidents.  Technology of attack also tends to be low in domestic 
conflicts, relying on homemade explosives and small arms, which helps to explain the 
low intensity, high frequency of violence.  Another outcome of such low technologies is 
that the scale of fatalities and injuries cannot often be accurately predicted.  
Whilst the above examples may provide stark empirical and methodological concerns, 
one must also be careful in attempting to draw policy inference for domestic terrorism 
from  the  wider  literature.   Perhaps  the  single  largest  defining  feature  of  domestic 
terrorism is that it facilitates a situation in which terrorist organisations can have both 
political  and  military  wings.   ETA had  strong  ties  to  Batasuna;  FARC  to  Unión 
Patriótica and the  African  National  Congress  to  uMkhonto  we Sizwe.   In  Northern 
Ireland,  the  PIRA had strong ties  to  Sinn Fein  but  these  ties  also  existed  between 
Loyalist  paramilitaries  and  political  parties;  the  most  obvious  example  being  the 
Progressive Unionist Party (PUP) and the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF).
The failure of the literature, hitherto, to account for the potential arising of this situation 
is, perhaps, the single biggest weakness of the wider terrorism literature.  By ignoring 
the potential for a terrorist organisation to devote some proportion of its resources to a 
political wing, the literature essentially removes a strategic choice that is fundamental to 
domestic terrorists.  
Various theoretical works have discussed the impact of government counter-terrorism 
policy on terrorist strategy, for example but this work has rarely, if ever, accounted for 
peace-making as  a  strategic  choice.   When peace-making is  included as  a  strategic 
choice, government action can lead to substitution of resources and new strategic mixes 
from terrorist organisations, rather than changes in devotion of resources to behaviour 
designed to achieve strategic aims.  
Thus, in comparison to the traditional modelling set up where terrorists face a choice 
between actions aimed at  achieving their  goals (violence) and some non-goal  based 
consumption, this work allows terrorists to choose between two behaviours designed to 
bring about their aims.  It is my belief that this innovation is both more realistic as a 
modelling technique and as a rational framework for the study of domestic conflict – 
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not least because it reflects both of the potential avenues through which terrorists can 
attempt to achieve their goals.  Rather than spending money on terrorism or consuming 
some other good that is unrelated to the attainment of strategic goals, terrorists devote 
all of their resources to achieving their political goals.  
Further defining features of domestic conflict are; firstly, that paramilitary organisations 
have a legitimate claim of representing society, or some portion of the society in which 
they operate.  Loyalists and Republicans in Northern Ireland claimed to represent the 
Protestant and Catholic communities, respectively, whilst ETA claims to represent the 
Basque peoples, FARC the rural poor in Colombia, uMkhonto we Sizwe black South 
Africans and so on...  Secondly, domestic conflicts have a tendency towards peaceful 
outcomes  in  the  long-term,  with  the  political  wings  of  paramilitary  organisations 
playing active and important roles in democratic parliaments.  It is accepted that recent 
work has shown that transnational organisations also tend towards non-violence in the 
long-run  (Blomberg,  Engel  and  Sawyer,  2010),  but  this  work  suggests  that  these 
organisations tend to disappear entirely, rather than to evolve into democratic political 
actors. 
Whilst ETA calling an end to its armed struggle within the last six months is a very 
recent  example  of  the  potential  to  transition from violence  to  peace,  uMkhonto we 
Sizwe laid down arms in 1990, leading to Nelson Mandela's election as president of 
South Africa in 1994.  The PIRA called a ceasefire in 1994, leading to the 1998 Belfast 
(Good  Friday)  Agreement.   While  transnational  terrorist  organisations  also  have  a 
tendency  to  decrease  their  violence  in  the  long-term,  the  feature  of  paramilitaries 
actively engaging in democratic politics seems unique to domestic terrorism.  
As such, two primary concerns are already raised as to the application of transnational 
research, or what I denote as 'catch-all' terrorism research, which follows the 'terrorism 
is  terrorism is  terrorism'  dictum.  The first  is  that suitable policies for dealing with 
domestic  terrorism  have  yet  to  be  actively  considered  in  the  literature.   This  is 
particularly relevant in the case of interactions between governments and terrorists as 
governments'  actions  can  deter  or  encourage  peaceful  engagement  by  the  terrorist 
organisation's  political  wing;  this  is  a  phenomenon not  explicitly  touched on in  the 
wider literature.   
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Secondly, there is significant suggestion that the theoretical and empirical frameworks 
used in the economics of terrorism literature may not be well-suited to the study of 
domestic conflict.  Due to the low-intensity, long-duration of domestic conflicts, data 
variation issues are likely to be prevalent, suggesting that typical time-series and panel 
formations  may  be  unsuitable.   This  is  especially  pertinent  when  dealing  with  the 
emergence of rival terrorist organisations and the potential for rapid-retaliation tit-for-tat 
violence.   Similarly,  the  roles  of  voters  and of  domestic  terrorists  ability  to  devote 
resources to their political wings is typically ignored in the theoretical literature, yet 
provides important contexts for the strategic interactions in domestic conflicts.
Whilst  the  differentiations  may  seem  subtle,  they  provide  extremely  important 
information, both in determining appropriate policies to deal with domestic terrorists 
and in the discussion of likely perpetrators of particular incidents.  Typically, much can 
be  deduced about  the nature of  an attack from the technologies  used,  for  example. 
Despite this potential for reasonable deduction, there have been cases of high profile 
individuals 'calling it wrong'.  
In 2004, for example, ten bombs exploded on commuter trains in Madrid and resulted in 
a death toll of 191 individuals.  In the immediate aftermath, all of the major political 
players in Spain laid the blame at the feet of ETA.  The combined death toll of all ETA 
attacks in almost 50 years of armed struggle amounts to approximately 850 deaths, with 
the single largest attack killing 21 individuals.  It seems incredible that an organisation 
engaged in a low-level war of attrition with the Spanish and French governments could 
pull off an attack of this scale.  
Of greatest note in this episode, perhaps, was the response of the then Spanish Prime 
Minister, José María Aznar, who maintained ETA's guilt even when evidence that it had 
been the work of Islamic extremists became available.  Aznar's response to the Madrid 
bombings is frequently cited as an important factor in his surprise election defeat later 
that same week, as were the attacks themselves.  
The 2011 attacks in Oslo and  Utøya in Norway also provided a stark illustration of 
public misconception.  Whilst resulting in a comparatively high death toll, the attacks 
involved low technologies of attack and bore hallmarks of domestic terrorism.  Many 
politicians and commentators immediately concluded that the attacks were the work of 
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transnational terrorists, however.  Speculation surrounded a reproduction of supposedly 
offensive cartoons of  the Prophet  Mohammad as a  motive.   In  the aftermath,  some 
discussion was given to how the misperception of the initial attack in Norway facilitated 
the more deadly attacks at an Arbeiderpartiet (Labour Party) youth camp, due to the 
delay in the deployment of police and army forces, who had suspected a further attack 
in Oslo.  
In the United Kingdom, Labour Member of Parliament for Glasgow South, Tom Harris 
used social-networking website Twitter to announce his suspicions.  He wrote, “We'll 
still have the apologists for terrorism saying it was caused by 'foreign policy' or by 
'disrespect to the Prophet.”  Perhaps unwisely, Harris later defended his stance as being 
a valid assumption to have made in the context, due to the predominance of Islamic 
terrorism, even when further details emerged and it became obvious that the attacks 
were  not  the  work  of  a  transnational  organisation.   Mr  Harris  is,  perhaps  unfairly, 
condemned by his profile as a member of the British parliament.  His views, which 
assumed that  only a  transnational  organisation could  be  behind a  terrorist  attack  in 
Western Europe, were reflected by certain sections of the media and in wider society.  
From these two examples, however, it is easy to see a stark illustration of the dangers of 
a relatively singularly focused literature and of the biased view many people hold about 
the nature of terrorist threats.  The danger of the direction of popular concerns and of a 
research  base  that  is  dominated  by  one  particular  form  of  terrorism  is  that  it  can 
engender  a  feeling  that  domestic  terrorism no  longer  poses  the  real,  immediate  or 
significant threat that it does.  
Whilst  some  authors  have  attempted  to  bridge  this  gap,  the  lack  of  a  defined 
methodology  for  the  study  of  domestic  terrorism and  the  dearth  of  specific  policy 
suggestions remain significant concerns.  In this respect, the findings presented in this 
thesis are important, not only in their conclusions and associated policy implications but 
in  providing a significant  contribution to the methodology of the study of domestic 
conflicts.  Chapters 3 and 4 show the validity and outcomes of including peace-making 
in  theoretical  models,  whilst  Chapter  5  shows  that  duration  analysis  is  a  valid 
econometric method for the study of low-intensity conflicts.   
Despite the short-comings of the literature discussed,  however, the simple economic 
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model of terrorism discussed in Chapter 1 can easily be extended to account for action 
and reaction in domestic conflicts.  This model still implies that any increase in counter-
terrorism should, ceteris paribus, reduce the level of terrorism.  I postulate that it is the 
mechanism that differs between domestic and transnational terrorism. In the domestic 
context,  the  substitution  away  from  violence  still  sees  resources  devoted  to  other 
behaviours designed to achieve the long-term goals of an organisation, rather than to 
some unrelated form of consumption, as is typical in the transnational literature.  
This, of course, is still excessively simplistic.  Significant work has shown, for example, 
that counter-terror polices have a habit of 'deflecting' rather than preventing terrorism. 
Following  the  examples  of  Sandler  and  Enders  (2004),  the  introduction  of  metal 
detectors in airports  reduced terrorist action against aircraft  but led to a substitution 
towards  attacks  on  other  targets,  such  as  trains.   Similarly,  one  country  with  high 
counter-terrorism may deter attacks against that country at  the expense of attacks in 
other countries.  
This type of logic can be extended to domestic conflicts.   Early in its  campaign in 
Northern Ireland the IRA, for example, made a strategic decision to target civilians as 
well as security forces.  This occurred in response to increased troop numbers, which 
presumably had the effect of increasing the costs of attacking the British army.  This 
deflection  of  attacks  towards  civilian  populations  was  instrumental  in  the  rise  of 
Loyalist paramilitaries, which this thesis suggests increased the duration of that conflict. 
Other  work,  notably  Enders  and  Sandler  (2006)  shows  that  security  measures  can 
actually increase terrorist actions; whilst immediately appearing to be counter-intuitive, 
this  can be explained in  a  rational  framework.   A government attempting to appear 
tough on terrorism, for example, may engender community support for this organisation
1
, or increase terrorists' incentives and returns from an attack.  
Any increase in what the literature deems 'aggression' can reduce the outcomes from 
1 A pertinent example occurred in Dublin in the aftermath of the Easter Rising in 1916.  Although 
frequently forgotten, the rebellion was unpopular  in Dublin, not least because it resulted in the 
destruction of much of the city.  Following the failure of the uprising, many leaders were executed, 
including James Connolly.  Connolly had been seriously injured during the rebellion and was tied to a 
chair in front of the firing post as he was unable to support himself.  The image of British troops 
executing a man so seriously injured that he couldn't stand to face the firing squad, designed to show 
toughness in the face of the Nationalist threat, led to a significant change in attitudes in and around 
Dublin and acted as a huge fillip to the cause of Irish independence.  
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non-terrorism related activity, also increasing the incentive to attack.  Frey (2004) notes 
this  effect,  with  its  transmission  via  gained  political  legitimacy;  in  the  context  of 
Northern  Ireland,  the  introduction of  internment  and diplock courts,  not  to  mention 
perceptions of the treatment of the Hunger Strikers all conferred political legitimacy on 
Republican aims.
Frey and Luechinger (2003) and Frey (2004) also show the potentially negative effects 
of offering 'carrots'  rather than 'sticks'  to terrorists.   Whilst  they note the impact  of 
inviting Sinn Féin into political talks in Northern Ireland, a suggestion is made that 
terrorists  could  exploit  these  steps.   Terrorists  could,  for  example,  pretend  to  be 
peaceful,  only  to  unleash  a  wave  of  further  violence  against  an  unsuspecting  or 
unprepared government, such as the ETA attack on Barajas Airport in Madrid in 2006. 
This  notion  provides  some of  the  background to  the  signalling  model  presented  in 
Chapter 4.  This notion is further developed by Addison and Murshed (2005), who show 
that  groups  with  varying  degrees  of  militancy  will  respond  differently  to  different 
incentives.  
Arce  and  Sandler  (2007)  have  used  signalling  models  to  overcome  inherent 
informational asymmetries in terrorist threats.  This model introduces both 'peaceful' 
and 'militant' terrorist types, which provides an important context and notation for the 
work in Chapter 4.  Outcomes show that peaceful types may mimic violent types by 
launching large attacks in the first period, in order to induce government concessions. 
Similarly, however, militant types may limit the scale of their first period attacks, in 
order to trick the government into reducing counter-terrorism measures.   
This branch of the literature stretches back to Sandler, Tschirhart and Cauley (1983), 
who proposed a model of the negotiation process between terrorists and government. 
Sandler and Lapan (1988) proposed the first model to look at the effects of defence 
allocation.  A major limitation of Sandler and Lapan (1988) is that it treats the terrorist 
as  a  non-strategic  player,  however.   Powell  (2007a,  2007b,  2007c)  provides  an 
important contribution, accordingly, by introducing both terrorists and governments as 
strategic players who respond to each other.  This interdependency of choice variables 
has been expanded by the likes of Bier, Oliveros and Samuelson (2007) and Zhuang and 
Bier (2007).  Chapters 3 and 4 of this thesis build on these notions.  
These  models,  too,  support  what  may  seem  like  counter-intuitive  outcomes.   For 
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example, it is shown that increased counter-terrorism can result in increased terrorism 
but also that decreased terrorism can actually increase counter-terrorism, although these 
results are explained in the context of mixed strategies.   Other interesting outcomes 
show that governments have an incentive to move first, such as making their counter-
measures public information and that it may actually be optimal to leave some targets 
undefended, due to the low cost of attacks focused on these targets.  This is typified by 
the work of Farrow (2007).
Siquiera and Sandler (2007) and Bueno de Mesquita and Dickson (2007) both introduce 
the influence of domestic politics on government counter-terror measures; this work 
provides an important  context  for  the model  presented in  Chapter  3,  where I  allow 
society to influence the actions of both terrorists and governments.  Another important 
notion for this work is introduced by Epstein and Gang (2007), who show rent-seeking 
terrorist leaders who maximise outcomes through the attraction of followers.  Although 
the focus of this work is on different terrorist  factions, the notion of popularity and 
competition  as  a  driver  of  outcomes  is  still  important.   Crenshaw  (2001)  models 
competition amongst groups and shows that it can lead to an escalation of violence, 
although this work is disputed by Siquiera (2005).
Signalling models  have intermittently appeared in  the literature and are intrinsically 
important to the work presented in Chapter 4.  This work can be traced back to Lapan 
and Sandler (1993) and Overgaard (1994).  In these models, small terrorist organisations 
may have an incentive to engage in large, spectacular attacks, in order to convince a 
government to make political concessions, whilst large organisations may attempt to 
avoid government wrath by pretending to be small.  The aim of these signalling models 
is to overcome the implicit informational asymmetry that arises in the models by the 
likes of Shapiro and Siegal (2007), which follow principle-agent problems.  Perhaps the 
most relevant signalling model, however, is Arce and Sandler (2007), who enable two 
different kinds of terrorist organisation – nominally, a peaceful organisation who uses 
violence to raise awareness of a cause and a violent organisation that believes only in 
destruction.
Early  major  empirical  contributions  come  from  Brophy-Baermann  and  Conybeare 
(1994), who apply rational expectations in the Israeli-Palestine conflict and Lee (1988) 
who  looks  at  the  interactions  between  terrorists  and  government  counter-terrorism. 
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Most pertinently for Chapter 5 of this thesis, Jaeger and Paserman (2006) examine the 
dynamic relationship  between violence committed by Israel  and Palestinian  factions 
during the Second Intifada.  Although this work uses incidence rather than duration, it 
stands  as  a  precedent  study  into  the  spatial  and  temporal  interaction  of  rival 
organisations in violent conflicts.  
Other empirical studies of terrorist strategy can be found in the work of the likes of 
Barros, Gil-Alana and Passos (2006), who study the timing of ETA attacks, Berribe and 
Lakadawalla (2007) who look at the location of terrorist attacks in Israel and Blomberg, 
Engel  and  Sawyer  (2010),  who  look  at  the  life-span  of  terrorist  organisations.   A 
common feature  of  these  three  final  papers  is  that  they  all  use  duration  modelling 
techniques, which are also applied in the work presented in Chapter 5.  
Despite the earliest use of duration techniques in the literature being Atkinson, Sandler 
and Tschirhart (1987), at the time of writing, this author is aware of approximately ten 
papers in the terrorism literature which adopt this technique.  This is despite the fact that 
duration analysis is singularly well suited to the study of a number of forms of terrorist 
threat, particularly domestic terrorism.  In this respect, this work represents a significant 
contribution to the literature, not only in the sense of the use of a relatively uncommon 
modelling technique but as the first to apply this technique to the interaction of rival 
organisations.  
The final consideration of this introduction is to note that not all  domestic conflicts 
follow the  same pattern of  conflict.   Whilst  accepting that  such definitions  rely  on 
general assumptions, domestic threats can, broadly, be split into three main categories. 
The first grouping I refer to as 'unitary conflict' and involve attacks that are carried out 
by individuals or small-cells; typically, these are one-time only attacks, such as those in 
Norway in 2011 or the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995.  Motives in these situations 
tend  to  be  disparate  and  due  to  the  one-time-only  nature  of  attack,  strategy  and 
engagement  with  security  forces  are  impossible  to  study.   Accordingly,  the  work 
presented here lies in two further subdivisions of domestic terrorism conflict, which I 
henceforth call 'binary conflict' and 'triangular conflict'.  
In these forms conflicts, the motives of the terrorist organisations tend to be similar and 
involve some change or other to the status quo; nationalism (PIRA in Northern Ireland), 
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secession (ETA in Spain), equality (uMkhonto we Sizwe in South Africa) or political / 
economic regime change (FARC in Columbia).  The differentiation between 'binary' and 
'triangular'  relies only on whether or not some rival paramilitary organisation to the 
revolutionary arises; for example, Loyalist paramilitaries in Northern Ireland.2 
As  such,  I  define  binary  conflict  as  a  conflict  that  occurs  between  the  incumbent 
government and some revolutionary domestic terrorist.  I define triangular conflict as a 
situation involving two rival paramilitaries and government security forces.  A notable 
outcome commonly observed in the qualitative literature of triangular conflicts is the 
suggestion that paramilitary organisations engage in conflict with each other3, as well as 
engaging the security forces, which is the context of the model presented in Chapter 4.  
The first of these subdivisions more readily fits with the general and even transnational 
literature in the sense that it pits a violent armed force against a government adversary. 
That said, the literature does not provide a notion as to how these conflicts tend towards 
peace in the long-term and any interactions with support bases tends to focus on the 
funding  of  the  organisation,  not,  explicitly,  the  local  popularity  of  the  campaign 
(Siquiera and Sandler,  2006).   The implicit  outcome of Siquiera and Sandler is that 
community support can sustain, rather than end, a conflict.  Triangular conflict is more 
complex,  however,  as  one  must  account,  not  only  for  the  actions  of  terrorists  and 
governments but also the potential interaction between the terrorist organisations.  
Thus, this thesis makes three particularly important and relevant contributions to the 
literature in the growing field of the economics of security and terrorism.  Firstly, as 
discussed at length throughout these introductory chapters, this is the first major body of 
work  that  facilitates  the  devotion  of  all  of  terrorists'  resources  towards  goal-
achievement,  by introducing peace-making as  a  strategic choice.   The most  notable 
impact  of  such an innovation is  that  it  changes,  slightly, the  nature  of  the research 
question traditionally asked in the literature.  
2 A recent suggestion is that, in fact, the Northern Ireland conflict isn’t so much ‘triangular’ conflict as 
two ‘binary’ conflicts; one fought between Loyalists and Republicans and one fought between 
Republicans and Security Forces.  This is based on the relative lack of interaction between Loyalists 
and Security Forces and suggestions of collusion between the British Army and Loyalist 
paramilitaries.  Despite this suggestion, I maintain the ‘triangular’ nomenclature throughout this 
thesis.
3 This engagement can take the form of direct engagement, where members of one organisation kill 
members of another or the form of a 'proxy' conflict, where members of one organisation attack the 
civilian population that supports its rival.  
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By including non-goal related consumption alternatives, the literature has essentially 
asked the question, "Why do people become terrorists." The work presented here, by 
assuming political, rather than ideological goals, asks, "How do terrorists act optimally, 
in order to achieve their goals." This innovation represents one of the most important 
aspects  of  domestic  conflicts  and  suggests  that  violence  and  peace-making  are 
essentially substitutes, or perhaps even compliments, in the struggle to achieve long-
term strategic goals.  
Secondly, and in addition to the novel introduction of peace-making, the game theory 
models  in  Chapters  3  and 4  aim to  exploit  some of  the  other  defining  features  of 
domestic violence.  These innovations help to explain interactions that have, hitherto, 
been under-discussed or  ignored entirely,  in  the  literature.   Chapter  3,  for  example, 
builds on notions of terrorist popularity introduced by the likes of Siqueira and Sandler 
(2006) and Epstein and Gang (2007).  By interacting the notion of popularity with a 
suggestion that domestic terrorists represent sub-sections of the society in which they 
operate,  I  provide  the  first  contribution  on  how  communities  can  affect  terrorists' 
strategic choices and the first suggestions for the process by which domestic terrorist 
threats have a tendency to end peacefully.  
Similarly, in Chapter 4, I advance the signalling frameworks used by the likes of Lapan 
and Sandler (1993), Overgaard (1994) and Arce and Sandler (2007).  This builds upon 
the notion of direct interaction between rival terrorist organisations in domestic threats 
but  also  exhibits  some technical  innovations,  when compared  with  other  terrorism-
related  models.   Specifically,  I  introduce simultaneous  interaction  between strategic 
players in a Bayes-Nash extensive form game that follows the signalling phase.  This 
stands  in  contrast  to  the  sequential  models  previously  presented  in  the  terrorism 
literature, in which the third period action is essentially a non-strategic and pre-stated 
response to the government's interpretation to the signal.
Finally, the  empirical  work presented in Chapter 5 overcomes some of the inherent 
difficulties  in  the  study  of  terrorist  strategy  in  domestic  conflict,  particularly  those 
relating to the scale and timing of attacks, the low-intensity of violence and the nature of 
strategic interaction amongst rival organisations and security forces.  These results are 
also of intrinsic interest.  Specifically relating to the conflict in Northern Ireland, it is 
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the  first  work  to  confirm  the  qualitative  writings  about  Loyalist  and  Republican 
strategies.  More generally, it provides evidence that terrorist organisations deviate from 
their  underlying strategies to engage with rival  organisations,  which is an important 
finding that could, potentially, be applied to continuing conflicts in Colombia or Iraq, 
for example.  More so, however, these results also show the validity of the methodology 
itself,  which extends the scope of the literature by effectively introducing a method 
seldom used in the economics of terrorism literature and by being the first  paper to 
apply such methods to terrorist strategy and interaction.  
The structure  of  the  remainder  of  this  thesis  is  as  follows;  in  the  next  part  of  this  
chapter,  I  provide a synopsis of each of the three papers that make up the research 
component of this work.  In Chapters 3, 4 and 5, I present the background, methodology 
and  findings  of  these  papers.   Finally,  in  Chapter  6,  I  present  my  conclusions  and 
suggestions  for  further  research.   Following  the  main  chapters,  I  include  a  full 
bibliography and appendices.  
2.1 Synopsis of Chapter 3: On the Impact of Voters under Violent Domestic Threat
A major limitation of the research in the field of terrorism is that it has offered no real 
explanations  as  to  why  domestic  terrorist  conflicts  have  tended  towards  peaceful 
resolutions.  Northern Ireland and South Africa are obvious and pertinent examples4 of 
domestic  conflicts  that  have  come to  peaceful  resolution.   2011 also  saw ETA,  an 
organisation with links to the currently banned Batasuna political party, call a 'definitive 
cessation of its armed activity'.  The number of terrorist organisations which have, or 
have had,  political  wings are  too numerous to  list,  yet  frequently,  the literature has 
ignored the potential  for terrorist  organisations  to  devote resources  to their  political 
wings, as well as, or even rather than, their military wings.  
This work, therefore, makes a novel contribution by introducing 'peace-making' into a 
terrorist's  utility  function.   This  is  intuitively  understandable  in  the  context  of  an 
organisation  with  some  strategic  aim  of  changing  the  status  quo;  whilst  terrorist 
4 Of interest in both Northern Ireland and South Africa is that the political wings of militant 
organisations, Sinn Féin and the African National Congress (ANC) respectively, became major players 
in the assemblies and parliaments of these countries, following cessation of violence.  The ANC has 
provided the last four presidents of South Africa, whilst Sinn Féin is the single largest Northern Irish 
party, by the popular vote, in the Westminster Parliament and the second largest party by votes and 
seats in the Northern Ireland Assembly.  
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organisations obviously believe these goals can be achieved through violence, history 
also provides examples of organisations whose aims have been achieved through peace, 
such  as  the  ANC  /  uMkhonto  we  Sizwe  in  South  Africa.   These  interactions  are 
governed  by  terrorists'  preferences,  however;  in  a  situation  where  the  existing 
democratic  arrangements  would  prevent  their  participation  in  a  political  process, 
terrorists' returns are obviously such that they will not act peacefully.  
I build on the assertion that domestic terrorists believe they represent the society, or 
some sub-section of  the society,  in  which they operate.   Thus,  the political  support 
society shows for the terrorist's campaign, proxied by the vote-share of the terrorist's 
political  wing,  directly  affects  the  terrorists’ outcomes.   I  also  show  that  Voters' 
outcomes  are  related  to  the  interaction  between  the  terrorist  organisation  and  the 
incumbent government in the region.  This builds on the work of Siquiera and Sandler 
(2006), who show how terrorist organisations can rely, financially, on support from their 
community but also that support from their community is contingent on strategic choice. 
In  their  model,  the  greater  the  support  a  terrorist  garners,  the  greater  the  level  of 
resources  upon  which  it  can  draw.   Siquiera  and  Sandler  (2006),  however,  do  not 
include the possibility for peace, per se, but instead allows for consumption of some 
non-terrorism good  that  also  adds  positively  to  utility.   The  novelty  of  this  work, 
therefore, is to generate a relationship between the resources terrorists expend on peace 
and the returns from this choice, in the face of an interested public.  
To this end, I present a two-stage model in this chapter that aims to show the impact of 
Voters' preferences on the outcomes and strategic interaction of a Revolutionary terrorist 
organisation and an Incumbent government.  I show Voters who are averse to violence 
but who may broadly support the Revolutionary’s aims.  Both the Revolutionary and 
Incumbent concern themselves with their popularity amongst Voters.  
The Revolutionary is not, intrinsically, a vote maximiser.  Instead,  ceteris paribus, the 
Revolutionary  is  better  off  for  each  strategic  choice combination,  the more votes  it 
receives.  The Revolutionary, therefore, concerns itself with the preferences of Voters 
and with its own outcomes from engagement in acts  of violence and peace-making, 
which it uses to achieve its long-term goal.  An Incumbent government aims to end 
terrorist violence in the location and optimally chooses peace-making and counter-terror 
spending, whilst also accounting for its own popularity amongst the population.  The 
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Incumbent, again, does not explicitly aim to maximise votes but is better off for each 
combination of resource spend the more votes it receives.  Voters are shown to broadly 
support the Revolutionary's aims but are shown to be averse to terrorism, due to the 
high associated social and economic costs.
The outcomes of this model show that the presence of Voters changes the equilibrium 
choices of both Revolutionary and Incumbents but does not significantly change the 
nature  of  their  strategic  interaction.   Furthermore,  it  supports  conditions  that  show 
Voters have the expected result of decreasing equilibrium spending on both terrorism 
and counter-terrorism.  
Voters,  however,  can  also  have  the  impact  of  increasing  terrorism  in  equilibrium. 
Although this  may seem,  initially,  counter-intuitive,  the model  shows self-interested 
voters  who  gain  through  the  strategic  interactions  of  both  Revolutionary  and 
Incumbents.  
2.2  Synopsis  of  Chapter  4:  A Signalling  Model  of  the  Terrorist  Interaction  in 
Triangular Conflict
This paper further builds on the introduction of peace-making into terrorist's utility but 
introduces the interaction of two rival organisations in order to overcome another of the 
limitations of the background literature – that this kind of interaction can have profound 
effects on the duration and outcomes of a conflict.  Whilst signalling models have been 
employed before in the literature - Lapan and Sandler (1993), Overgaard (1994) and 
Arce and Sandler (2007) - the nature of these models does not explicitly overcome the 
nature of informational asymmetry that can occur in triangular conflict.  
The formation of triangular conflicts is not uniform; the nature of 'rivals' can be unique 
to the conflict but the defining features of triangular conflict remain the same across all 
major examples.  The explicit defining features of triangular conflicts are that there are 
at least two terrorist organisations that have motives that are, somehow, divergent.5 The 
third player is a set of government security forces, who seek to end the conflict through 
counter-terrorism action.  
5 In this case, I define 'motive' broadly, such that even organisations with approximately convergent 
goals, such as anti-Israeli organisations in the Middle East or FARC and ELN in Colombia, can be 
rivals.  In the case of FARC and ELN, for example, whilst both organisations are broadly socialist, 
their theological background diverges.
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Present examples include the conflicts in Colombia, Iraq and Northern Ireland, as well 
as occasional anti-Israeli rivalries in the Middle East.  In this particular case, I look at 
the interaction of two terrorist organisations, one designated the Revolutionary and one 
designated the  Vigilante.   This  special  case  of  triangular  conflict  provides  the  most 
intuitive  background  to  the  use  of  signalling  models  but  the  outcomes  are  more 
generally applicable to conflicts that include two revolutionary forces.  
I present a Revolutionary organisation with some long-standing strategic goal; although 
I do not explicitly define what this goal is, typical goals in triangular conflict include 
nationalism, secession and political/economic regime change.  The Vigilante is depicted 
as  a  pro-status  quo  organisation  that  aims  to  prevent  the  attainment  of  the 
Revolutionary's goal.  Whilst this may not be the explicit aim of rival organisations in 
every triangular conflict, the nature of interaction remains similar – insurgents in Iraq, 
for  example,  aim both for their  own strategic  goals  and to  prevent  rivals  achieving 
theirs.  
The Vigilante in this model has a pre-stated aim that is known to the Revolutionary; to 
meet  Revolutionary  violence  with  violence  but  to  engage  peacefully  with  a 
Revolutionary, should the Revolutionary be willing to do so.  The nature of asymmetry 
is defined by the fact that the Revolutionary can have a dichotomous leadership type; 
nominally,  Peaceful  (P-Type)  and  Militant  (M-Type).   A  peaceful  Revolutionary 
believes  its  goals  can  be  achieved through the  use of  both  peace  and violence.   A 
militant  Revolutionary  believes  that  its  goals  can  only  be  achieved  through  armed 
struggle.  The Vigilante does not observe the Revolutionary's type.  
The  Revolutionary  uses  a  peaceful  overture  in  period  one  of  the  game,  such  as 
supporting a parliamentary candidate, calling a ceasefire or decommissioning, to send a 
signal  to  the  Vigilante  as  to  the  nature  of  their  leadership.   The  Vigilante,  as  a 
reactionary force, attempts to interpret this overture and respond according to its pre-
stated strategy. In period two of the model,  the Revolutionary and the Vigilante act 
simultaneously, choosing to act peacefully or violently towards its opponent.  Thus, in 
period two, a second informational asymmetry is introduced as neither group knows 
how its rival will act.  These simultaneous-move interactions, following the signalling 
phase, represent the second major departure of this model from the previous literature. 
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The literature, hitherto, has tended to three-period, sequential games, which does not 
tally closely with the nature of triangular conflict.  
This model sets out conditions that support pooling equilibria in which the signalling 
phase is ineffective and a separating equilibrium in which the structure of the Vigilante's 
beliefs leads to differences in the equilibrium behaviour of the Revolutionary.   This 
model  has  the  expected  finding  that,  when  a  very  strong  signal  is  required,  the 
Revolutionary is likely to support violence even where it is not committed to it.  
This point shows that a nominally peaceful Revolutionary can be induced to devote all 
resources  to  violence,  due  to  the  involvement  of  the  Vigilante.   This  offers  some 
explanation of  the  duration of  triangular  conflicts;  the  Troubles  in  Northern  Ireland 
lasted for almost thirty years, the Colombian armed conflict has continued for almost 
fifty years and the Iraqi insurgency is approaching its tenth year, for example.  
The most pertinent finding of this model, however, shows that the major driving force 
of the decision to signal is in the relative scales of the terrorist organisations.  Should 
the Revolutionary dwarf  the Vigilante,  any incentive to  interact  is  removed and the 
signal will not be sent; the action of Hamas towards rivals, for example, fits with this 
description.  
Alternatively,  however,  if  the  Vigilante  is  a  dominant  organisation,  a  militant 
Revolutionary is incentivised to pretend it is peaceful due to the scale of the threat of 
violent  Vigilante  action.   Although  not  necessarily  fitting  the  nature  of  triangular 
conflict,  the  interaction  of  ETA with  the  French  and  Spanish  governments  can  be 
understood  in  this  manner,  with  ETA  calling  a  number  of  ceasefires  that  were 
subsequently broken, in 1989, 1996, 1998 and 2006.  
When neither case is true, however, separation is facilitated; in Northern Ireland, for 
example, Republican organisations had greater access to resources and weapons than 
their Loyalist counterparts but Loyalists still provided a significant enough threat for 
Republicans to, eventually,  interact in a peace process that led to the signing of the 
Good Friday Agreement in 1998.  
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2.3 Synopsis of Chapter 5: A Duration Analysis of The Troubles in Northern 
Ireland
The work in this chapter aims to apply empirical analysis to some of the results of the 
signalling  model  presented  in  Chapter  4.   That  said,  this  chapter  should  not  be 
considered as a direct implementation of this model, but more as an empirical analysis 
of the concepts introduced by interactions that occur following the signalling phase. 
Specifically, it aims to determine if rival organisations 'match' their strategies; acting 
violently when their rival is in a high period of militancy and acting peacefully when 
their rival is doing so.  More explicitly, this chapter askes the question; “do terrorist 
organisations deviate from their local and temporal strategies to engage with rivals?”
To this end, I employ a dataset from “The Troubles” in Northern Ireland, a conflict that 
began  with  street  riots  in  the  late-60s  and  eventually  ended  with  Republican  and 
Loyalist ceasefires in 1994 and the signing of the Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement in 
1998.   The  Troubles  displayed  nearly  all  of  the  features  I  discuss  in  Chapter  2  as 
defining  characteristics  of  domestic  conflict;  the  violence  was  low  intensity  - 
approximately 3,500 deaths in almost 30 years;  appears to display a rapid tit-for-tat 
retaliation structure that necessitates a daily time-series; suffers from low technology of 
attack, such that death tolls tend to be fairly unpredictable in scale, and was, at least 
partly, organised on a local, rather than national level.
This caused substantial data concerns for the study.  The Troubles resulted in 3,500 
deaths decomposed into approximately 2,000 events that matched the time-series and 
geographical requirements.  Due to the rapid retaliation, the local organisation of the 
Loyalist forces and the three main 'sides'  of the conflict (Republicans, Loyalists and 
Security  Forces),  there  are  almost  500,000  potential  date,  location  and  perpetrator 
spaces per equation to fill with approximately 1,300 and 600 incidents, respectively.  
To overcome this data sparsity, I  employ duration analysis, which allows each attack 
pair, or more correctly the duration between each pair of attacks, to act as a single 
observation.   I  use  the  average  violence  perpetrated  by  the  rival  organisation  and 
security  forces  in  each region, and violence by all  players  in  contiguous regions  as 
covariates.   I  use the Cox Proportional  Hazards model  for the baseline analysis,  as 
neither economic theory nor qualitative writings on The Troubles provide justification 
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for underlying distribution of terrorist violence.  As robustness checks, I employ other 
duration and control specifications.
I  use  these  techniques  to  specifically  test  the  suggestion  that  Loyalists  acted  as  a 
reactive  force,  aiming  to  deter  Republican  attacks  on  Northern  Ireland's  Protestant 
community.  Republicans are claimed to have operated a  broader  strategy, aimed at 
imposing  maximum physical  and  psychological  damage  and  may  or  may  not  have 
interacted with Loyalists.  The results presented in this chapter provide evidence of the 
theoretical outcomes, whilst showing that organisations operated different strategies in 
different locations and at different times.  The most interesting findings of this work, 
however, are in the spatial nature of the retaliation and of the targets of retaliation.  
I show that retaliation tends to be localised; violence by Loyalists in a location appears 
to cause violence by Republicans in that location and vice versa; neither are shown to be 
caused  by  violence  from  outside  this  region,  however.   This  strongly  reflects  the 
relatively 'local' organisation of Loyalist organisations.  The Ulster Defence Association 
(UDA), for example, operated as an umbrella leadership for a loose band of vigilantes, 
known as 'defence associations' when it first formed.  That Republicans also appear to 
retaliate  locally  is  an  interesting  finding,  not  least  because  the  qualitative  literature 
suggests  a  wider,  national  Republican  strategy.   This  validates  the  'matching'  of 
strategies shown in the signalling model in Chapter 4 – organisations deviate from their 
local and temporal strategies and are more likely to engage in militant behaviour when 
their rivals are in a period of high militancy.   
The results also show that retaliation takes place, entirely, within the civilian population. 
Republican attacks on security forces, for example, do not induce Loyalist retaliation. 
Loyalists appear to retaliate when Republicans perpetrate an attack against civilians, 
whilst  Republicans  are  shown  to  attack  civilians  when  Loyalists  are  engaging  in 
violence.  Most interestingly, Loyalist attacks have no significant impact on Republican 
attacks against security forces,  suggesting that retaliation escalates the conflict,  with 
Republicans attacking more frequently, rather than substituting between targets.  This 
fits with the suggestions made in Chapter 4 that the Vigilante can perpetuate a conflict it 
seeks to end, whilst also suggesting the potential for conflict escalation. 
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Chapter 3: On the Impact of Voters in Domestic Conflicts
3.1 Introduction
At Sinn Féin's 1981 Ard Fheis (party conference), the Republican political writer and 
member of the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA), Danny Morrison is widely 
reported to have said, “Who here really believes that we can win the war through the 
ballot  box? But will  anyone here object  if,  with a ballot paper in this  hand and an 
Armalite in the other, we take power in Ireland?”
This speech is widely suggested to have been the genesis of a Republican strategy that 
mixed  continued  violent  acts  of  terrorism  with  engagement  in  democratic  politics. 
Taking its name from the content of Morrison's speech, this “Ballot Box and Armalite” 
strategy saw Sinn Féin, nominally the political wing of the PIRA, stand candidates to 
the Westminster elections in 1983 and the Dáil Éireann elections in 1986.  
By 1994, the PIRA had called a ceasefire that eventually led to Sinn Féin becoming a 
major player at the multi-party talks that resulted in the signing of the Belfast (Good 
Friday)  Agreement in 1998.  Today, Sinn Féin is the largest Northern Ireland-based 
party in the Westminster parliament by the popular vote and the second largest party in 
the Northern Irish assembly.  
In 1961, the African National Congress (ANC) abandoned a 49 year long non-violent 
campaign and formed a military wing, uMkhonto we Sizwe, following the Sharpville 
Massacre.  This change in approach was described by Nelson Mandela as a 'defensive 
move'.  This move from peaceful action towards violence is strategically interesting; not 
least because it is suggestive of the role that political marginalisation can play in the 
strategic choices of organisations with largely political motives.  After almost 40 years 
of violence, uMkhonto we Sizwe put their arms aside in 1990 to facilitate political talks 
that eventually led to Nelson Mandela's election as president of South Africa in 1994.  
The reasons for these changes in strategic approach may, prima facie, seem obvious.  In 
1994 and 1998 in Northern Ireland, the PIRA had failed to attain their end goals, despite 
engaging in almost thirty years of open conflict with Loyalist paramilitaries and British 
security forces.  Indeed, the PIRA were only the latest in a long line to have engaged in 
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such 'wars' since the inception of the Northern Irish state 75 years earlier.  The ANC had 
been engaged in 'passive' activism for almost half a century without materially changing 
the apartheid status quo in South Africa.   Whilst  it  should not be surprising that an 
unsuccessful campaign is likely to result in strategic changes, that a campaign fails to 
achieve its goals in a given time frame should not be deemed a solitary reason.  
Neither  uMkhonto  we  Sizwe,  nor  the  PIRA,  for  example,  should  be  considered  as 
isolationist organisations acting, solely, in their own interest.   The PIRA held strong 
claims  to  representing  the  Catholic  Nationalist,  or  at  least  Republican,  minority  in 
Northern  Ireland,  from  whom  they  drew  their  support  and  amongst  whom  they 
operated.  UMkhonto we Sizwe, similarly, held claims of representation of the black 
South  African  population  who  had  been  politically  and  socially  marginalised  by 
Apartheid.  
In  other  words,  it  is  highly  likely  that  the  strategic  goals  of  domestic  terrorist 
organisations will closely reflect the desires of the societies from which they draw their 
support.  The model presented in this chapter aims to draw upon this relationship in 
order  to  discuss  the  impact  that  society  can  have  on  terrorist  strategy  and  on  the 
engagement  of  terrorists  and  governments  under  a  domestic  terrorist  threat.   This 
diverges from the literature which, hitherto, has predominantly looked at the impacts of 
society's desires upon government strategy.  This chapter extends this notion by also 
allowing these desires to affect terrorist strategy.  
A terrorist organisation acting contrary to the wishes of the society that they purport to 
represent is unlikely to achieve their long-term, strategic aims, due to a lack of public 
support for their aims.  Alternatively, however, a terrorist organisation that pays strong 
attention  the  wishes  of  that  society  is  likely  to  have  a  stronger  claim for  affecting 
material change.  
In recent times, the economics of terrorism literature has expanded rapidly.  Amongst 
the  plethora  of  questions  now  considered  are  three  topics  that  seem  particularly 
pertinent for this study.  Firstly, attention has turned to the impact of terrorist activity on 
electoral  outcomes.   Secondly,  the  impact  of  the  desires  of  voters  on  government 
counter-terrorism responses has also produced interesting and relevant results.   
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The link between voting behaviour and terrorist incidents has become well established 
in the economics of conflict literature.  Montalvo (2006) and Michavila (2005) both use 
a macabre natural experiment created by the Madrid bombings to show terrorism to 
have had a significant impact on the outcome on an election that took place three days 
later.  Berribi and Klor (2006, 2008a) show theoretical and empirical evidence that high 
incidence  of  terrorism  increases  vote  share  of  right  wing  blocs  in  Israel,  whilst 
Indridason (2008) shows that terrorism alters voters’ priorities and has an effect on how 
governments are formed.
There is significant debate in the literature over the extent to which voters’ preferences 
can affect the outcomes of terrorist operations.  Pape (2003, 2005) argues that voters’ 
reaction to terrorism can actually lead to politicians offering concessions to terrorist 
organisations.  The focus of this work, however, relates to the use of suicide attacks and 
its results are disputed by the likes of Moghadam (2006).  That said, this notion of the 
interaction  between  voters’  preferences  and  the  strategic  actions  of  government, 
provides the essential outline of the model displayed here, as it  provides a potential 
mechanism by which  terrorists  can  achieve  their  political  goals  through  the  use  of 
violence.
The third relevant  topic  looks at  the interaction between terrorists  and their  support 
bases.   In  this  respect,  this  work  most  closely  resembles  the  work of  Siqueria  and 
Sandler (2006), who show how both government and terrorist choices can affect their 
public  support,  although  they  show support  through  donations  to  terrorists  and  not 
electoral outcomes.  The key deviation this model makes from Siqueria and Sandler 
(2006) is that I aim to discuss the mechanism by which terrorist organisations become 
peaceful, rather than explaining how terrorist threats are sustained, which seems to be 
the implication of Siqueria and Sandler.  
A fourth, inchoate, strand of the literature is also pertinent for this work and discusses 
the impact of government counter-terrorism on support for terrorism.  Most work in this 
area focuses on the breaking of fundamental human rights (Pape, 2005) but Choi (2010) 
has also shown that, by closing the door on terrorist engagement in a political process, 
legitimacy can be conferred upon their cause.  This result is tempered by the warnings 
from Frey (2004), who shows the potential pitfalls that can occur by inviting terrorists 
into a political process if those terrorists are dedicated to violence.  
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The aim of  this  chapter  is  to  bring together  some of  the  notions  of  these  pertinent 
strands of the literature, in order to understand how societies can affect the equilibrium 
interactions  of  terrorist  organisations  and  governments  who  are  subject  to  the 
preferences of that society.  This model begins by exploiting the notion that domestic 
terrorist organisations share the goals of the society in which they operate and therefore 
have some legitimate claim to being a representative of that society.
A second key deviation made in this chapter is that previous work in this area tends to  
treat  terrorist  strategy  as  exogenous  to  the  political  process  that  it  is  supposedly 
affecting.   I  augment  this  notion by endogenising strategy;  thus,  the success  of  the 
political process is affected, in part, by the terrorist’s willingness to take part and to 
devote resources to peace, as well as by the actions of the government.
To this,  I add an assumption that society is  averse to terrorism, as it  imposes well-
documented social and economic costs.  The effect here is that, whilst individuals in 
society may be supportive of a terrorist's political aims, they do not intrinsically support  
the use of violence in order to achieve these goals.  Accordingly, society may turn its 
support away from an organisation it deems to be too violent.  It seems logical that a  
terrorist organisation who claims to act as a military and or political representative of 
this community is concerned with its popularity amongst that support base.  
The outcomes of this terrorist organisation are therefore related, in part, to their strategic 
choices in the face of a government ‘enemy’, which can lead to the achievements of 
their goals and in part by society’s aversion to violence, which impacts on the terrorist's 
popularity.   Society’s view of violence,  therefore,  acts as an important driver of the 
strategic  choices  of  the  terrorist  organisation  and  could  facilitate  a  diversion  of 
resources towards peace-making.  Enabling terrorist organisations to devote resources 
directly to peace-making represents the second major departure that this model makes 
from  the  background  literature  in  this  field,  where  typically,  terrorists  can  devote 
resources to violence or some other consumption not designed to achieve end goals.  
This  model,  therefore,  offers  three  augmentations  to  the  game  theory  of  terrorism 
literature.  First, it is the first model that looks directly at the interactions of domestic 
terrorist organisations and governments.  This facilitates the second augmentation of the 
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literature, which is the introduction of peace-making into terrorists’ utility functions.  In 
the transnational literature, such a development seems implausible as it would require a 
peaceful  coordination across a  number of  governments,  with different  priorities and 
different approaches to counter-terrorism.  In the domestic case, these conflicts typically 
involve  only  one  government,  which  can  then  choose  a  unilateral  response  to  the 
terrorist threat.  
Finally, this model is the first to look, directly, at how terrorist organisations’ outcomes 
are affected by their popularity.  Whilst the role of society is not a new development in 
this literature, previous literature (Siquiera and Sandler, (2006), for example) measures 
this impact through the level of resources a terrorist organisation has at its disposal.  I 
model the impact more directly, with a terrorist organisation linking the success of its 
campaign, in part, to its popularity in the society it claims to represent.  
Accordingly, I build on the work carried out by the likes of Siquiera and Sandler (2006). 
I  introduce  a  one-shot,  simultaneous  game as  the  baseline  model  presented  in  this 
chapter.   It  is  accepted that,  in reality,  prolonged conflict  could more accurately be 
modelled using models of repeated interactions.  The aim of the work, however, is to 
isolate the key interactions, specifically the influence of society, on the optimal strategic 
choices of the involved players.  A one-shot game, therefore, is the most appropriate 
method  of  modelling  this  influence,  particularly  as  it  more  easily  isolates  the  role 
society plays, in comparison to a baseline model.  
The rest  of this paper is split  into five sections: In the next section, I introduce the 
background discussion of the model and the assumptions made about the interactions of 
the strategic players.  In Section 3.3, I introduce a special case of a baseline model, 
which deals with the interaction between terrorists and a government.  In this special 
case, I linearise the peacemaking component of both players’ utility functions, in order 
to  facilitate an explicit  and exact  solution of the model  and of the equilibria  that it 
supports.  
In Section 3.4, I introduce a more general case of this model, where I adopt a Cobb-
Douglas  presentation  of  the  peacemaking  component,  under  an  assumption  of 
diminishing returns to scale.  In Section 3.5, I extend the model, by introducing the role 
of society.  In this extension, both the government and the terrorist organisation interest 
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themselves with their popularity amongst the society over which they hold rival claims 
of representation.  Finally, in Section 3.6 I discuss the conclusions of this model and 
offer suggestions for further research in this area. 
3.2 Developing the Model
In this section, I introduce a one-shot simultaneous game between a government and a 
terrorist organisation.  A Revolutionary terrorist organization exists in a location and has 
some  political  goal,  such  as  secession,  nationalism  or  economic  /  political  regime 
change  within  that  region.   This  organization  can  attempt  to  achieve  its  long-run 
strategic aims through interaction with an Incumbent government in a peace process, by 
unilateral  acts  of violence or by some optimal  mixture of the two.  The Incumbent 
government of the region under threat aims to interact with the Revolutionary in order 
to minimise terrorist violence and the impact of this violence, both of which impose 
well-documented economic, political and social costs.
The Revolutionary uses violence and peace, aiming to maximise political concessions 
from the Incumbent by using some optimal mix of its strategic choices.  To this end, I 
show a Revolutionary with both political  and military wings.   The ability to devote 
resources  to  both  wings  deviates  from  a  majority  of  the  economics  of  terrorism 
literature but commonly occurs in domestic conflicts.6
A key motivation in the use of terrorism is a belief that violence can garner political 
concessions from a government.  This may seem all the more pertinent when a group is, 
or  at  least  perceives  itself  to  be,  unfairly  economically,  politically  or  socially 
marginalised.  Thus, the greater this perception of marginalisation, the higher relative 
returns  to  violence  are  likely  to  be.   A Revolutionary  that  has  fully  integrated  into 
domestic politics, on the other hand, is likely to have relatively higher returns from 
peace.  
The  Incumbent  favours  the  status  quo  but  has  a  strategic  aim  of  minimising  the 
economic and social costs associated with terrorist violence.  It aims to avoid violence 
6     An example of this kind of behaviour can be observed in the strategies employed by the PIRA in 
Northern Ireland, who operated a solely violent strategy from 1969 until 1983.  From 1983 until a 
ceasefire in 1994, it operated a strategy called “The Armalite and Ballot Box”, which mixed terrorism 
and political activity.  From 1994, the PIRA’s official strategic stance is to engage only in democratic 
politics.  
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either by engaging with the Revolutionary in a political peace process or by engaging in 
counter-terrorism measures.  Broadly speaking, counter-terrorism measures are assumed 
to  be,  “appropriately  violent.”   This  may  include,  for  example,  the  deployment  of 
peacekeeping troops or the collection of intelligence.  
The peace process is shown to be interactive; this means that for a Revolutionary to gain 
from investment  in  peace-making,  they  require  that  Incumbents  also  engage  in  the 
process.   In  this  model,  terrorism  is  assumed  to  be  a  violent  response  to  real  or 
perceived  political  and  social  inequality,  such  as  Apartheid  in  South  Africa  or  the 
horizontal  inequalities generated by the Parliament  of Northern Ireland.   As such, a 
Revolutionary who unilaterally engages in peace-making fears looking weak in front of 
the community it represents and does not gain from such an expenditure of resources. 
Incumbents  are  shown  to  gain  only  interactively  from  peace-making,  as  non-
engagement  by  Revolutionary  indicates  a  devotion  of  resources  towards  terrorism, 
suggesting peace is an ineffective way of ending the threat.  Returns to violence are 
shown to be private.
At the beginning of the game, the Revolutionary receives a non-stochastic endowment 
from some non-strategic benefactor.  The Incumbent government exogenously earmarks 
a binding budget, which it devotes to dealing with the Revolutionary.  In both cases, 
these budgets are normalised to 1.  This game is set up as a one-shot, simultaneous 
move game with full information and full employment of resources.  
The  Revolutionary  concerns  itself  with  the  strategic  actions  of  the  Incumbent, 
specifically  the Incumbent’s  counter-terrorism action,  as this  reduces  the potency of 
terrorist  violence.   I  argue that,  subject  to  some “effectiveness factor”,  each unit  of 
spending by the Incumbent on counter-terrorism reduces the potency of militant action 
by the Revolutionary.  Spending on anti-terror intelligence, for example, could reduce 
the  probability  of  success  of  an  attack;  deployment  of  peacekeepers  could  reduce 
available targets or destroy resources and so on.  The only assumption made about the 
effectiveness factor is that it is greater than or equal to zero.  Incumbents are shown to 
be concerned with their strategic interactions with the Revolutionary, which are aimed 
at reducing the incidence and effectiveness of terrorism and, therefore, the associated 
social deadweight losses of terrorism.
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The model shows a Revolutionary organisation that can achieve its long-run strategic 
goals  through  the  use  of  terrorism,  from interaction  in  a  political  process  or  some 
combination of the two.  Returns to violence are tempered by the effectiveness of the 
Incumbent government’s counter-terrorism devotion but are private.  Returns to peace-
making are reliant on joint engagement by the Incumbent.  Thus, the Revolutionary is 
more willing to engage in violence when it does not believe that the Incumbent will 
commit strongly to peace.  That said, ceteris paribus, the Revolutionary gains more for 
each  unit  it  devotes  to  peace-making  when  the  Incumbent  increases  its  peaceful 
activities, suggesting a positive externality of peace-making. 
This  effect,  however,  is  reinforced by the motives behind Revolutionary action.   In 
essence,  this  model  assumes that  the  Revolutionary  believes  that  both  violence and 
peace-making can bring about some political concessions from the Incumbent.  This is 
based on a belief that violence will weaken the resolve of the Incumbent.  The gains 
from  violence,  therefore,  are  from  its  impact  on  political  outcomes,  not  from  the 
enjoyment of violence, itself.  Engagement in the peace process has a more obvious and 
direct impact on potential political outcomes.
The Incumbent's gains are based on the minimisation of the impact of Revolutionary 
violence.  Counter-terrorism is shown to generate positive utility for the Incumbent only 
in terms of its impact on the potency of Revolutionary violence.  Accordingly, at the 
marginal level, the Incumbent's returns are increasing in devotion to counter-terrorism 
but  decreasing  in  realised  terrorism.   A further  feature  of  this  function  is  that  the 
Incumbent  only  gains  from counter-terrorism in  situations  when  there  is  a  realised 
terrorist threat.  Spending to reduce a threat that does not materialise is regarded as a 
waste  of  resources.   The  Incumbent  does  not  support  the  strategic  goals  of  the 
Revolutionary but also gains from joint interaction in a peace process, as this represents 
a substitution of Revolutionary resources away from violence.
3.3 Solving the Model: The Special Case
In this  section,  I  introduce a  special  case of  the model  discussed above.   I  assume 
diminishing  returns  to  scale  from the  private  investment  in  terrorism and  counter-
terrorism but constant returns from peace-making.  This assumption of linear returns to 
peace-making  is  made  to  facilitate  an  explicit  simulation  of  the  model  and  of  the 
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equilibria that are supported.  In Section 3.4, this assumption is relaxed and the model is 
generalised. 
Given this assumption, the payoffs of this game are defined:
        (1)
 
       (2)
Where; r denotes Revolutionary terrorism and i denotes Incumbent counter-terrorism. 
PR and PI denote the respective devotions of the Revolutionary and the Incumbent to 
peace-making.  η is the effectiveness parameter of counter-terrorism spending.  
The assumption here is  that  terrorism and counter-terrorism both suffer diminishing 
returns  to  scale.   In  the case  of  terrorism,  this  is  most  easily  justified.   Taking the 
examples of the Omagh bombing in Northern Ireland in 1998, it is difficult to suggest 
that  it  would  have  received  significantly  less  media  coverage  had  it  killed  28 
individuals,  rather  than  29.   At  the  same time,  it  is  also  noticeable  that  it  received 
significantly more coverage than an incident that would kill one individual.  At the same 
time, an incident that kills one individual, such as the murder of P.C. Ronan Kerr in 
Northern Ireland in 2011 received significantly more coverage than the multitude of 
incidents that result in no deaths.  Indeed, it received significantly more attention than 
the many incidents in Northern Ireland in the 1970s and 1980s, which also resulted in 
only one fatality.  Accordingly, it seems likely that the impact of terrorism is decreasing 
in both the number of fatalities and the number of events.
In terms of counter-terrorism, the assumption made is more in terms of each unit of 
currency  spent  on  counter-terrorism.   At  the  lowest  end  of  the  spending  spectrum, 
spending  has  a  high  impact  as  low-level  threats  are  readily  deterred.   As  spending 
increases, however, there are likely to be fewer outstanding threats and those that do 
remain  are  likely  to  be  well  planned  and  thus,  more  difficult  to  avoid  or  deter. 
Accordingly, whilst the first units of currency are likely to have high marginal returns, 
in terms of avoided attacks, increasing spending at the top end of the spending spectrum 
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is unlikely to be so effective.  For now, no assumptions are made about the returns of 
peace.
The  resources  available  to  both  players  in  this  model  are  normalised  to  one. 
Furthermore,  for  both  players,  the  cost  of  terrorism  /  counter-terrorism  is  also 
normalised to one, with the cost of peace-making depicted as a relative cost. I denote 
these costs cR and cI, for the Revolutionary and the Incumbent respectively.  The nature 
of  this  game,  which  occurs  in  a  single  time period,  supports  a  full-employment  of 
resources  assumption.   All  resources  available  to  both  the  Revolutionary  and  the 
Incumbent are spent within the game.  Furthermore, in this situation, these resources can 
only be spent on terrorism / counter-terrorism and on peace-making.  Accordingly, both 
the budget constraints and the utility functions depicted in Equations (1) and (2) can be 
written entirely in terms of one strategic choice for each player, as PR and PI   can be 
rewritten in terms of spending on (counter-)terrorism, such that:
        (3)
        (4)
Thus, by combining the information in Equations (3) and (4) with the utility functions, I 
can redefine Equations (1) and (2) solely in terms of devotion to (counter-)terrorism, 
such that:
        (5)
 
       (6)
By taking the first order conditions of Equations (5) and (6) with respect to terrorism 
and counter-terrorism, respectively, I can then define the optimal choices of the strategic 
players.  The first order maximisations of Equations (5) and (6) yield:
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        (7)
        (8)
The second order derivatives of Equations (7) and (8) confirm that these values are 
maxima.7 
The  nature  of  strategic  interaction  is  easy  to  see  in  the  maximisations  depicted  in 
Equations (7) and (8).  The Incumbent's optimal choice of devotion to counter-terrorism 
obviously  has  some  impact  on  the  Revolutionary's  choice  and  vice  versa.   This 
relationship is formalised by rearranging Equations (7) and (8) for r and i, respectively 
and using these outcomes to simulate the best responses of the strategic players.  These 
rearrangements yield:
       (9)
      (10)
A quick review of Equations (9) and (10) provides some insight into the workings of 
this model, as well as revealing sensible comparative statics.  Whilst obvious that desire 
to engage in (counter-)terrorism would be increasing in the elasticities of these strategic 
choices, the price of peace-making of both a player and its opponent also increase the 
desire to opt for (counter-) terrorism.  Perhaps the most interesting comparative statics, 
however, is the non-linear response of a player’s strategic choice to that of its opponent. 
This  outcome suggests that,  when the level  of counter-terrorism is  initially  low, the 
Revolutionary will,  ceteris paribus, decreases terrorism in response to an increase in 
counter-terrorism.  At high initial levels, however, the Revolutionary increases terrorism 
in response to increased counter-terrorism.  This response is still quite intuitive; at low 
levels of counter-terrorism, the Revolutionary feels the impact as a direct reduction in 
its  returns  from terrorism.   Thus,  this  finding  fits  with  the  early  theory  literature, 
7  Taking the second order partial of Equation (7) with respect to r yields: , 
which is negative under the diminishing marginal returns to terrorism assumption (α<1). The second 
order partial of Equation (8) with respect to counter-terrorism yields: , which 
is also negative under the diminishing marginal returns to counter-terrorism assumption, γ<1.
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suggesting that terrorists reduce their militant activity should the costs of engaging in 
that activity increase.  At the upper end, however, the impact is felt through the peace 
process.  As this process is interactive, the large-scale devotion of resources to counter-
terrorism  significantly  reduces  the  Revolutionary’s  returns  from  peace-making, 
rendering terrorism the more attractive option.  Similar intuition can be applied to the 
Incumbent’s response.  
These  responses  are  characterised  in  Figure  1,  below.   As  can  be  seen,  both  best-
response curves exhibit a u-shape, which follows the discussion above.  Given the shape 
of  these  curves,  it  is  also  immediately  obvious  that  a  number  of  permutations  are 
feasible  for  the  characterisation  and  discussion  of  the  equilibrium outcomes  of  this 
model.8  This  text  presents  a  calibration  of  this  model  which  supports  two interior 
solutions.9,10  
These results represent an advance on a literature that, hitherto, has offered results that 
suggest that increased counter-terrorism can either reduce the incidence of terrorism, 
through  the  reduction  of  potency  of  terrorism or  increases  in  costs  of  engaging  in 
terrorism  or  can  increase  the  incidence  of  terrorism,  due  to  a  backlash  against 
perceptions of “heavy-handed” government responses.  This result brings together these 
two notions, suggesting that excessive government responses can lead to an escalation 
of a conflict it seeks to end, supporting the findings of Enders and Sandler (2006) and 
Frey and Leuchinger (2002), whilst also suggesting that counter-terrorism can be an 
effective anti-terrorist deterrent at low initial levels. 
Figure 1 characterises two interior Nash equilibria, as well as the corner-solution noted 
in Footnote 9.  This corner solution occurs in two situations; the first where the initial 
levels  of  terrorism and counter-terrorism are  low and the  second when these initial 
levels are exceptionally high.  Whilst the first of these results is, no doubt, intuitive and 
requires little explanation, the intuition of the second situation, where incredibly high 
8  In fact, broadly speaking, there are four outcomes of interest supported by this model; a situation in 
which there is no interior solution, a situation with one interior solution, a situation with two interior 
solutions and a situation with four interior solutions.  
9  An important note should be made about the corner solutions of this model, however.  By looking at 
Equations (7) and (8), the best response of terrorism to counter-terrorism when counter-terrorism is 
equal to one or zero is zero and the same for the response of counter-terrorism to terrorism. 
Accordingly, the only corner solution supported by this model is an “all-peace” scenario.  Therefore, 
when no interior solution prevails, all resources in this model will be devoted to peace.
10  The parameterisation that supports the outcome depicted here shows the relative price of peaceful 
activity to be relatively low (0.5), whilst the elasticities of terrorism and counter-terrorism are also 
fairly low (0.6 and 0.5 respectively).  Finally, this calibration shows a reasonably effective counter-
terrorism spend (1.2).
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violence leads to an “all-peace” outcome is not so obvious.  
In such a violent situation, however, both groups are likely to wish a political process, 
with the Revolutionary and Incumbent, respectively, fearing an ineffective campaign 
and massive losses.  Therefore, rather than an incredibly violent and short-lived conflict, 
this result suggests that in such situations, conflict will simply never arise as the costs of 
such extreme violence are too great to both parties.
Figure 1: Best responses of terrorism and counter-terrorism.
Both  interior  solutions  presented  in  Figure  1  suggest  a  relatively  high  devotion  of 
Incumbent resources to counter-terrorism.  At low levels of terrorism, counter-terrorism 
is an effective deterrent and so is likely to be relatively high, as it minimises losses from 
terrorist activity.  At high levels of terrorism, however, there is little incentive for the 
Incumbent to engage politically with a violent adversary, and so is also likely to result in 
high levels of counter-terrorism.  These outcomes are a product of the relatively high 
effectiveness  of  counter-terrorism  spending  in  that  parameterisation,  however.   In 
situations where counter-terrorism is less effective, it can be shown that when the level 
of terrorism is low, counter-terrorism is also likely to be low, although, of course, this 
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also has impacts on the Revolutionary’s response, as depicted in Figure 211. 
Figure  2:  Best  responses  of  terrorism and counter-terrorism when  counter-terrorism 
spending is less effective.
In  Figures  1  and 2,  only  the  “lower”  of  the  two equilibria  depicted  is  stable.  This 
suggests that situations of “all-peace” are unlikely in low-intensity conflicts  but that 
both  the  Incumbent  and  the  Revolutionary  can  be  incentivised  to  engage, 
predominantly,  in  peaceful  action.   In  Northern  Ireland,  for  example,  violence  has 
decreased markedly in the time since the Good Friday Agreement in 1998.  Despite this 
period  of  relative  peace,  however,  low-level  counter-terrorism remains  an  important 
policy, whilst self-styled “dissident Republicans” have engaged in a number of small 
terrorists attacks in recent years. 
The assumption that leads to the outcomes characterised here, specifically that returns to 
peace-making  are  constant  in  scale,  is  a  strong  assumption  to  make,  however. 
11  The parameterization here is identical as in Figure 1, except that the effectiveness parameter has been 
reduced from 1.2 to 0.9
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Accordingly, in the next section, I aim to relax this assumption and to generalise this 
model. 
3.4 Solving the Model: The General Case
In this section, I present the general case of this model and qualitatively discuss the 
implications of these outcomes.  As with terrorism, I make an assumption that returns to 
peace-making are also diminishing in return. To elucidate this assumption, I consider 
the devotion of resources to contesting an election. At the lowest levels of spending, the 
resulting publicity may sway the most marginal or indifferent voters. At higher levels of 
spending,  however,  the  easiest  voters  to  sway  have  already  changed  allegiance. 
Accordingly, each pound spent contesting the election is likely to sway fewer voters as 
the spend increases.  In the discussion that follows, I parameterise the returns to peace-
making, denoted β and ρ, for Revolutionary and Incumbent peace-making respectively 
and assume that β < 1 and ρ < 1.  Thus, the utility functions depicted in Equations (5) 
and (6) are rewritten:
     (11)
     (12)
As before,  partially  differentiating  Equations  (11)  and (12)  with  respect  to  r  and i, 
respectively now yields:
          (13)
      (14)
In this instance, the model cannot be explicitly solved as it could be in the special case. 
Accordingly,  I  characterise  the  outcomes  qualitatively,  by  implicitly  differentiating 
Equation  (13)  with  respect  to  counter-terrorism  and  Equation  (14)  with  respect  to 
terrorism, which yields the rather unattractive outcomes:
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Whilst attempting to interpret these equations may seem unappealing, they still provide 
intuition of significant interest – the denominator of both Equations (15) and (16) is the 
second order partial differentiation of the utility functions introduced in Equations (11) 
and  (12).  Under  the  maximisation  condition,  this  second  order  partial  should  be 
negative. Accordingly, following this logic, the denominators of Equations (15) and (16) 
will also both be negative, so long as Equations (13) and (14) depict local maxima.
In  order  to  characterise  the  best-response  function,  attention  therefore  turns  to  the 
numerators  of  Equations  (15)  and (16),  which  are non-linear.  The first  argument  in 
Equation (15)  is  the same as  the first  argument  in  Equation (13),  suggesting that  a 
comparison of the second arguments in Equations (13) and (15) can reveal the nature of 
interaction that results.  In Equation (13),  the optimisation condition ensures that the 
outcome must equal zero.  Therefore, when the second argument in Equation (15) is 
greater than that in Equation (13), the numerator of Equation (15) will be less than zero. 
This occurs when the Incumbent's devotion to counter-terrorism, i, is high. Similarly, 
however, when i is low, the numerator of Equation (15) is greater than zero, supporting 
the non-linearity depicted in the special case.
Combined with the negative denominator of Equation (15), these outcomes suggest that, 
when i is low, the Revolutionary's best-response is negative.  When i is high, the best-
response is  positive.   Thus,  when counter-terrorism is  low,  the  best-response of  the 
Revolutionary  is  to  switch  away  from  terrorism  towards  peace-making,  with  the 
opposite being true when counter-terrorism is high.  This supports the findings of the 
special case and suggests validation of that modelling approach.  Similar logic shows 
that the outcome of the special-case is also supported when we look at the incentives of 
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the  Incumbent  and  its  best-response  to  changes  in  the  Revolutionary's  behaviour 
depicted in Equation (16).  The outcome is, again, non-linear with devotion of counter-
terrorism decreasing when terrorism is low and increasing when it is high. 
A final outcome of the simple models relates to the Cobb-Douglas nature of peace-
making.  As Revolutionary peace-making appears positively in the utility function of the 
Incumbent and vice-versa, there is a suggestion of positive externalities from peace-
making.  Following externality theory, this suggests that there will be a socially sub-
optimal  devotion  of  resources  to  peace-making.   Similarly,  however,  that  counter-
terrorism appears negatively in the utility function of the Revolutionary and terrorism 
negatively in that of the Incumbent suggests an over-investment in non-peaceful means.
In the situation depicted in this model, it  is difficult  to elucidate, however,  why the 
Incumbent would be concerned about the outcomes of the Revolutionary or vice-versa. 
After all, the “society” affected by these socially suboptimal devotions consists only of 
two rivals who are unconcerned about the outcomes of the other player.  In a situation 
where  more  considerations  are  introduced,  however,  such  as  the  idea  of  a  civilian 
population,  these  socially  inefficient  outcomes  become  more  problematic.   Whilst 
neither player, in isolation, would be concerned about making their rival better off, the 
obvious negative impact of suboptimal peace-making for the individuals who live in a 
society is concerning.
As such, in the next section, I further extend this model, in an attempt to understand the 
role society can play in the determination of both peaceful and violent outcomes. 
3.5 Solving the Model: The Extended Case
In this section, the model presented in Section 3.3 is extended by introducing the impact 
of  individuals  who  live  in  this  conflict  affected  region.   To  this  end,  society, 
characterised as Voters, may broadly support the strategic goals of the Revolutionary but 
also oppose terrorism, due to its economic and social costs.  This notion hinges on the 
assumption that terrorists in domestic conflicts claim to represent and therefore draw 
their support from some section of the society in which it operates.12 As before, the 
12  This portion could represent the whole of society or some majority or minority within it.  Republicans 
in Northern Ireland, for example, claimed to represent the Catholic community who desired a United 
Ireland, ETA claims to represent the Basque peoples who desire an independent state, and so on.  
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Revolutionary can attempt to achieve its strategic aims by using violence, politics or 
some mixture of the two.  
Voters gain from any action that may bring about the goals of the Revolutionary but 
their returns from terrorism are discounted, due to the social and economic costs that it  
imposes.  This means that an individual in society can broadly agree with the strategic 
goals of the Revolutionary and even accept the possibility that these aims may, or can 
only, be brought about through terrorism, whilst still opposing the externalities imposed 
by violence.  Support for the Revolutionary, therefore, is based on agreement with its 
goals but not, intrinsically, with its methods.
Each individual in society is shown to have a personal aversion to violence that reflects 
his or her feelings towards terrorism.  I derive an “aversion factor”, denoted δ, which is 
defined as one minus the degree of aversion that individual holds.  For simplicity, I 
assume that aversion is uniformly distributed on the interval  ∈ [0, 1], although any 
distribution would yield similar intuition from this model.
Given this modelling set up, an aversion factor of zero shows complete opposition to 
acts  of  violence  by  the  Revolutionary;  an  aversion  factor  of  one  shows  complete 
support.  To elucidate this, discounting returns to terrorist violence by a factor of zero 
means that this individual gains nothing from that violence.  Apart from this personal 
discount factor, I show a society with homogeneous preferences that are exogenously 
determined.
The Revolutionary now acts as a political and military representative of the society it 
claims to  represent,  as well  as  a  self-interested body.   It  may face opposition from 
Incumbent governments or other organisations within that society with whom it must 
interact.  The Incumbent also draws its support from Voters and concerns itself with 
popularity, as well as its own outcomes.  As before, the Incumbent favours the status 
quo  but  also  garners  support  from  society  as  it  aims  to  minimise  the  negative 
externalities associated with terrorist violence.
Voters may broadly support the strategic aims of the Revolutionary but are opposed to 
violence, as defined by their personal discount factor.  Voters gain from violent terrorist 
action as they believe this can bring about the strategic goals of the organisation.  As 
with  the  Revolutionary,  the  more  marginalised  society  feels  from  the  democratic 
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process,  the  higher  their  relative  returns  to  violence,  as  they  believe  political 
engagement to be futile.  Voters also gain through the Revolutionary’s interaction in a 
peace  process,  as  they  believe  direct  political  talks  can  also  result  in  concessions, 
subject to the bilateral engagement of the Incumbent.
Incumbent counter-terrorism measures also positively impact on Voters' utility, subject 
to its effectiveness.  Society is averse to terrorist violence and so supports any efforts 
focused on reducing violence.  Finally, as the Incumbent’s engagement in the peace 
process can also lead to concessions, Voters support these peace-making efforts.  Peace-
making is also governed by a subjective discount factor as an individual who strongly 
favours violence is unlikely to support peace and vice versa.  Voters are unconcerned 
about the proportion of resources each player devotes to peace but, instead, gain from 
the whole process, which they view as a kind of “social good”.  
As would be expected, the relative returns for Voters to terrorism and counter-terrorism 
depend  on  society’s  “closeness”  to  each  of  these  organisations.   This  closeness  is 
measured using two exogenous factors that are common to society, denoted θ and φ for 
the  Revolutionary  and  the  Incumbent,  respectively.   Voters  are  self-interested  and 
concern  themselves  with  maximising  their  own  outcomes,  given  the  equilibrium 
outcomes in the first stage of this game.  
Therefore, the Revolutionary is now depicted as facing two primary concerns; the first 
is in selecting its optimal mix of peaceful and violence action, with which to achieve its 
strategic goals.  The second is in the garnering of support for its campaign from those it 
claims  to  represent.   I  proxy  this  effect  through  the  proportion  of  votes  the 
Revolutionary’s political wing receives in an election that occurs in the second period of 
the game.  Ceteris paribus, the more votes the political wing receives, the better off the 
Revolutionary is shown to be.  That said, the Revolutionary does not necessarily seek to 
maximise  popularity  but  instead  opts  for  an  optimal  strategic  mix,  given  its  own 
preferences and the response of Voters in the second period.  A better strategic mix and 
lower vote share could, therefore, still maximise the Revolutionary’s outcomes.
As before, the Revolutionary and the Incumbent engage in a simultaneous move game, 
this time in the first stage.  In the second period, society goes to the polls and votes in an 
election,  where  Voters  face  a  dichotomous  choice  between  the  Incumbent  and  the 
Revolutionary.  Voters choose who to support based on their preferences and aversion to 
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violence.  I use the earlier distributional assumption of this aversion factor to define a 
“marginal voter” who is indifferent between the Revolutionary and the Incumbent.
As society, otherwise, has homogeneous preferences, the marginal voter is characterised 
by his or her personal aversion factor, denoted δ*, where 0< δ*<1.  All individuals with 
an  aversion  factor  between  δ*  and  1  will  vote  for  the  Incumbent.   Revolutionary, 
therefore, receive a share of the vote 1 – δ*, whilst the Incumbent receives δ*.  Apart 
from the impact of Voters’ choice, I assume the utility functions of the Incumbent and 
the Revolutionary unchanged.
This game is solved using backwards induction.  Accordingly, I first look at the Voters’ 
problem.  Voters take as given the outcomes of the first period and vote to maximise 
their outcomes.  Voters are shown to gain equally from peace-making, regardless of 
which side instigates the process and gain from the whole process, rather than from the 
individual  contributions  of  the  Revolutionary  and the  Incumbent.   Peace-making  is 
governed by a discount factor, ε  ∈ [0, 1], as those who strongly support violence are 
unlikely to support peace.  That said, as shown below, ε is trivial to this analysis and so, 
no specific assumptions are made on its distribution.  The final feature of Voters’ utility 
is that they are only shown to gain from counter-terrorism spending when a terrorist 
threat is realised, otherwise they deem it as a waste of resources but they also gain more 
from counter-terrorism,  the greater  is  the level  of realised threat.  Therefore,  Voters’ 
preferences are defined:
      (17)
      (18)
Where; δ and ε are the discount factors of terrorist violence and politics, respectively 
and θ and φ are the “closeness” factors to Revolutionary and Incumbents, respectively.
Equations  (17)  and  (18)  are  solved  for  the  marginal  voter’s  discount  factor,  which 
generates the popularity of Revolutionary and Incumbents in the first stage of this game. 
Voters choose to vote for the Revolutionary if their return to Equation (17) is greater 
than from Equation (18).  This information can be used to then generate an inequality, 
which can be considered the threshold of aversion at which an individual will vote for 
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the Revolutionary:
      (19)
Solving  Equation  (19)  for  δ,  the  minimum  level  of  aversion  that  will  ensure  an 
individual will vote for the Revolutionary is generated:
      (20)
Thus, all of those in society for whom Equation (20) is not satisfied will choose to vote 
for the Incumbent; those for whom it is satisfied will vote for the Revolutionary.  The 
marginal voter is found at the point where Equation (20) is just binding.  This individual 
is said to have a discount factor δ*, which is used in the generation of the new utility 
functions for the first stage of this game.  
Apart from the impact of Voters’ preferences, I assume that the utility functions of the 
Incumbent  and  the  Revolutionary  are  unchanged.   As  popularity  is  determined  on 
Voters’ opposition to terrorist violence, the Revolutionary takes the election outcome as 
a judgement on its violent strategy - returns from the peace-process are unaffected by 
their  popularity.   Similarly,  as  counter-terrorism  has  the  express  aim  of  reducing 
violence, the Incumbent takes the election results to be an indication of the popularity of 
its  counter-terrorism  programmes.   Accordingly,  the  peace  process  in  this  model 
essentially acts as a “social good” for all three strategic players.  Therefore, the utility 
functions of the Revolutionary and the Incumbent for this model can now be written:
      (21)
      (22)
As interest here is on the impact of society on the equilibrium devotions to terrorism 
and counter-terrorism, I explore the special case, with β and ρ both set equal to one, in 
order  to  facilitate  an  explicit  solution  of  the  model.   Accordingly,  plugging  δ  into 
Equations (21) and (22), the first order conditions are generated as in the simple model 
and solved, such that:
48
     (23)
         (24)
Again,  the  nature  of  the  strategic  interaction  can  be  seen  from  the  inspection  of 
Equations  (23)  and  (24).   In  Equation  (23),  we  see  that  the  impacts  on  the 
Revolutionary’s  best  responses  are  derived  from the  “closeness”  factors.   Thus,  in 
situations where society feels very “close” to the Incumbent, society has the expected 
role of decreasing terrorist violence in response to increased counter-terrorism.  At the 
same time, however, the non-linear relationship from the simple model is maintained 
when society feels “closer” to the Revolutionary.  
Equation (24), however, depicts a marked change in the Incumbent's best response.  As 
Voters  favour  counter-terrorism  and  reward  the  Incumbent  for  increasing  counter-
terrorism, there is now an incentive for the Incumbent to change its counter-terrorism 
strategy positively in response to increased terrorism, when the initial level of terrorism 
is low.  As the level of terrorism increases, however, the incentive to increase counter-
terrorism is tempered by declining returns from peaceful engagement and from the costs 
that the high-level of terrorism impose on society and the Incumbent seeks to reduce its 
counter-terrorism spending.  
As in section 3.3,  Equations (23) and (24) are simulated,  with the results  shown in 
Figure 3.  The results presented here use the same parameterisation that generated the 
results depicted in Figure 1 for easy comparison.   The only assumption made in the 
analysis  that  follows  is  that  society  feels  closer  to  the  Revolutionary  than  to  the 
Incumbent.  This assumption is made under the notion that terrorist organisations are 
unlikely to be popular or successful in scenarios where the Incumbent is popular and 
where society feels very close to its aims.  Terrorism is more likely to arise in scenarios 
where  society  feels  dissatisfied  with  or  marginalised  by  the  Incumbent.
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Figure 3: Best Responses of Terrorism and Counter Terrorism in the Extended Case
As discussed in the previous section, the simple model exhibits two internal equilibria, 
which are now denoted as A and B in Figure 3.  Following the introduction of Voters, 
who are shown to oppose terrorism, two new equilibria are formed at C and D.  The 
feasibility and intuition of the equilibrium depicted at C is unsurprising; as Voters 
oppose terrorism, the Revolutionary’s incentive to engage in violence activity is 
decreased.  In response to such a decrease in terrorism, the Incumbent is also better off 
devoting resources to the peace process.  Accordingly, in equilibrium, fewer resources 
are spent on terrorism and counter-terrorism, with the peace process taking precedent.  
 
The equilibrium depicted at D is, however, less intuitive.  Under public scrutiny, the 
government chooses to respond to large levels of terrorist threat with a low level of 
counter-terrorism spending.  Whilst  this might seem like a bizarre suggestion that a 
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rational government matches high threat with low protection, this follows the precise 
logic  of  so-called  “failed  states”,  where  governments  may  make  early  attempts  to 
accommodate a large terrorist threat, potentially due to that government's own lack of 
legitimacy. 
Whilst this seems like a bizarre scenario, it is explained in the confines of this model – 
the non-linear impact of terrorism remains but this non-linear impact has a secondary 
impact, becoming more pronounced the more popular a political party is.  The level of 
terrorism  directly  reduces  returns  from  both  counter-terrorism  and  peace-making. 
Popularity,  however,  only  impacts  on  returns  to  counter-terrorism,  making  it  a  less 
desirable choice when terrorism is high.  
Whilst this may seem like a strange concept, the British government in Northern Ireland 
actively increased their dedication to peaceful politics in Northern Ireland following the 
Omagh  bombing  in  1998  and  continued  to  scale  down  military  operations  there, 
supporting the principle of this outline.  Similarly, despite ETA’s engagement in arms 
procurement  in  France  during  their  ceasefire  in  2006,  the  Spanish  government 
responded by continuing open political dialogue with the organisation, rather than by 
responding with increased counter-terrorism.  In the game theory of terrorism literature, 
such notions  are  also not  unheard of.   Pape (2003,  2005),  for  example,  shows that 
Voters’  fear  of  conflict  can  lead  to  politicians  offering  concessions  to  terrorist 
organisations when threat is high.  
Whilst depicted as a one-shot game, it may also be important to note that the equilibria 
depicted  at  points  C  and  D  in  Figure  3  are  unstable  and  remain  so  in  all 
parameterisations of this model.  Accordingly, one may not need to suspend too much 
belief to suggest that the all-peace Nash equilibrium corner solution is the outcome most 
likely to prevail in this scenario, which fits with the impact of popular opposition to 
terrorism, which prevailed in South Africa in the early-1990s and in Northern Ireland in 
the mid-1990s.  
3.6 Concluding Remarks
In the last twenty years, a number of terrorist threats, particular those associated with 
domestic or ethnic conflicts, have found their  way to peaceful,  or at  least  relatively 
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peaceful, resolutions.  This model looks at the role that the societies affected by these 
conflicts can have in achieving these peaceful outcomes.  By using voting outcomes as a 
proxy for public support of a campaign, I show how the incidence of violence can be 
reduced and how terrorists and governments can be encouraged to engage in a political 
peace process.  This finding fits with the background to a number of conflicts, including 
the Troubles in Northern Ireland and the end of Apartheid in South Africa.
Despite this intuitive outcome, however, I also show the distorting effect that a society 
opposed  to  terrorism  can  have,  both  in  terms  of  increasing  terrorists’ devotion  to 
violence  and  inducing,  prima  facie,  counter-intuitive  government  responses.   The 
increase in terrorism is a logical response for terrorists faced with a government that 
decreases  its  devotion  to  counter-terrorism  in  the  face  of  increased  terrorism,  as 
happened at different times in both Northern Ireland and Spain.  
Therefore, whilst I show the important and positive role that society can play in the 
resolutions of domestic conflicts, I also show a danger in the feedbacks between public 
support of governments’ counter-terrorism measures and the impact this can have on the 
optimal response of terrorists.  
The work depicted in this model could be advanced with the introduction of a non-
strategic third political party, nominally The Opposition, who rivals both the Incumbent 
and the political wing of the Revolutionary.  Thus, Voters may be enabled to jointly 
oppose, and personally discount, both terrorism and counter-terrorism, as it could be 
argued  that  both  impose  costs  on  society.   This  is  beyond  the  scope  of  the  work 
presented  here,  however,  which  aims  to  sketch  the  main  interactions  of  society, 
governments and politically motivated terrorists in domestic conflict and to understand 
the role of society in deriving the outcomes of these conflicts.  
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Chapter 4: A Signalling Model of Triangular Conflict
4.1 Introduction
Whilst there is a long historical time series of the application of economic thought to 
terrorism, including the seminal work of Schelling (1958) and Becker (1968) as adapted 
by Landes  (1978),  Sandler,  Tschirhart  and Cauley (1983) and Rapoport  (1992) it  is 
really only since the September 2001 attacks that researchers in economics have turned 
their  attention  to  the strategies  employed by terrorists,  specifically  to  the  choice  of 
targets and their strategic interactions with governments and the public.  
It  should,  perhaps,  be  unsurprising  that  a  significant  proportion  of  the  post-9/11 
literature,  at  least  implicitly,  focuses  on  the  actions  of  international  terrorists  and 
religious extremists.  Berman and Laitin (2005) use a rational choice model of terrorism 
and club goods to explain militant terrorist action, even when there is no individual gain 
from violence.   Bueno de  Mesquita  (2005)  models  the  interactions  between voters, 
government and a terrorist  organisation.   Perhaps the  most  opaque reference in  the 
nature of conflict considered in the literature comes from Behrens et al (2006), however, 
who model a game between “The West” and an international terrorist organisation.  
Important work has taken place that holds applications to domestic terrorism, however 
Siqueira and Sandler (2005, 2007) look at the interactions of terrorist  organisations, 
governments and grassroots support.  Still; work that focuses specifically and directly 
on domestic terrorist strategy is still comparatively rare, yet these conflicts often show 
features that do not appear in the transnational terror literature, such as interaction in 
political peace-processes and interaction with rival terrorist organisations.  I introduce 
both effects into this model.  
Despite  its  relative  scarcity  in  the  literature,  domestic  incidents  continue  to  occur 
throughout the world.  Norway and Germany both experienced events in 2011, whilst 
violence has continued in Columbia, Iraq, Spain and Northern Ireland in recent years. 
These experiences show the threat  that  domestic  terrorists  and extremists  still  pose. 
Despite this threat, the study of the actions and strategies of domestic terrorists does not 
match  the  transnational  terrorist  literature.   Indeed,  despite  pertaining  to  numerous 
conflicts in the Middle East, Western Europe and South America, study of triangular 
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conflict, in particular, has almost disappeared from the radar in recent years.
I define triangular conflict as a conflict involving two rival terrorist organisations and a 
set of government security forces.  More specifically, in this formation, I show rival 
terrorist organisations to have divergent motives – one seeking a change to the status 
quo,  one seeking to maintain it.   This need not  necessarily be the case;  anti-Israeli 
rivalries in the Middle East, for example, pitted groups against each other despite a 
common ‘enemy’.  
An earlier formation of this model introduced security forces as a non-strategic third 
player,  acting with a  certain probability in  each game to reduce terrorists’ expected 
resources.  The only effect of this addition, however, was to add an extra factor into the 
analysis, which slightly convoluted the main analysis.  As such, I ignore the role of 
security  forces  for  notational  neatness  and  intuitive  ease,  in  order  to  focus  on  the 
interaction between terrorist organisations.
This  paper  attempts  to  provide  a  theoretical  outline  of  the  interaction  of  terrorist 
organisations within triangular conflicts.   I  draw on the work of Lapan and Sandler 
(1993), Overgaard (1994) and Arce and Sandler (2007), who use signalling models to 
overcome informational asymmetry under terrorist threat.  This paper, however, presents 
two new contributions to the literature; both in its direct application to domestic and 
triangular conflicts and with the inclusion of imperfect information in the context of an 
extensive  form  game,  which  contrasts  with  the  sequential  move  signalling  games 
hitherto seen.
4.2 Introducing the Model
In this section, I introduce a signalling model of triangular conflict between a pro-status 
quo  vigilante  (The  Vigilante)  and  a  terrorist  organisation  with  some  revolutionary 
motives (The Revolutionary).  The Revolutionary leadership can believe that their long-
term aims can be achieved only through violence, or through the use of both peace-
making and violence.  The Vigilante aims to deter attacks against civilian targets by 
imposing costs  on the  Revolutionary  through violent  retaliation.   The Vigilante  has 
incomplete about the type of Revolutionary that it confronts.  The asymmetry occurs as 
Revolutionary is aware of the Vigilante’s stated strategy; when the Vigilante believes 
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that  the  Revolutionary  will  act  violently,  it  will  act  violently.   When  the  Vigilante 
believes that the Revolutionary will act peacefully, the Vigilante will follow suit.  
I  consider  a  two-period model  with dichotomous Revolutionary  type  set.   The first 
period of this model is the signalling phase, where the Revolutionary attempts to signal 
its type.  The second stage is a simultaneous game between the Revolutionary and the 
Vigilante.  In keeping with the nomenclature of Arce and Sandler (2007), I designate 
Revolutionary  leadership  types  {P,  M},  where  P refers  to  Peaceful-Types  and M to 
Militant-Types.  
Typical  goals  in  triangular  conflicts  include  secession,  independence,  nationalism, 
equality,  and  the  changing  of  economic  /  political  regime.   M-Types  believe  these 
changes can only be brought about through the use of violence.  P-Types believe that 
both peace and violence can be used.  For M-Types, any engagement in peace - be it 
through a signal or by devotion of resources to peace-making in the second stage - acts 
as a pure cost.  Alternatively, P-Types are politically motivated in the sense that they 
believe that their long-term strategy can be brought about via peaceful means, as well as 
through the attempt to gain political concessions through violence.  
The informational asymmetry provides an obvious incentive for M-Types to mimic P-
Types  by  signalling  in  the  first  period,  in  the  hope  of  convincing  the  Vigilante  to 
respond peacefully in the second period.  P-Types, however, may also have an incentive 
to mimic M-Types by not signalling.  If P-Types believe that they cannot hope to induce 
a  peaceful  response  from the  Vigilante  in  period  two,  regardless  of  how strong the 
signal, then they are likely to save the resources they would devote to signalling for the 
battle in the second period.  
In  period two,  the  Vigilante  and the Revolutionary engage in  a  simultaneous move 
game.   Upon  observing  the  Revolutionary’s  first  period  action,  the  Vigilante  must 
decide whether to devote its resources to peaceful or violent action.  Simultaneously, the 
Revolutionary must also choose its strategic action in the second period, devoting its 
remaining resources to either peace or violence.  Any devotion of resources to peace 
acts as a pure cost for M-Types.  P-Types, on the other hand, gain from both peace and 
violence and their decisions will be based on the Vigilante’s interpretation of the first 
period signal.
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The terrorist organisations receive an endowment at the start of the game, denoted R for 
Revolutionary and V for Vigilante.  In the first period, the Revolutionary chooses its 
signal, S, from the continuous set, [0, 1], where this set represents some proportion of 
resources, R.  As the signal is assumed costly but does not directly contribute to utility, 
this then facilitates the postulation; 0 ≤ S < R.  Thus, S is some proportion of resources 
that is devoted to the signal.
The game is illustrated in Figure 4 and the decision set is shown below:
1. Nature (N) selects the Revolutionary’s type from the set {P, M}
2. In the first period, the Revolutionary selects it’s signal from the set [0, 1]
3. Following the signal, the (Revolutionary) Vigilante devotes all (remaining) re-
sources to either peaceful or violent action.
Payoffs to action profiles in this model are expressed as ΠP and ΠM for P-Types and M-
Types respectively and as ΠV for Vigilante.  Payoffs are calculated as follows:
1. The Revolutionary and the Vigilante receive endowments, R and V respectively, 
at the start of the game.
2. The  Revolutionary  face  the  cost  of  sending  a  signal  in  the  first  period  and 
chooses either a signal of 0 or S, where S ∈ [0, 1] and is some proportion of Re-
volutionary’ resources, R.  Signalling, therefore, depletes the Revolutionary’s re-
sources in a linear manner, with remaining resources equalling δR, where δ = 1 – 
S.  Thus, when the Revolutionary does not signal, δ = 1.
3. Payoffs follow a generic pattern, with outcomes contingent on Vigilante action 
and the action and type of the Revolutionary.  As in Chapter 3, peace-making is 
shown as an interactive process.  For one side to gain from its investment in 
peace, it requires participation in the process from the other but always gains 
from its rival’s engagement, as this represents a substitution away from violence. 
Violence generates positive outcomes from unilateral action but this is tempered 
by negative outcomes from violence by a rival.
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a. P-Types gain a payoff that is a factor of remaining resources and their 
choice to act peacefully (γδR), which is subject to peaceful action from 
Vigilante, or violently (αδR).  They gain from Vigilante engagement in 
peace-making (βV) and lose out due to Vigilante violence (υV).
b. M-Types gain a payoff from peace that relates only to the action of the 
Vigilante (βV), as their own peace-making acts as a pure cost.  Like P-
Types, M-Types gain from unilateral engagement in violence (αδR) and 
lose from Vigilante violence (υV).
c. A Vigilante facing a P-Type opponent gains from its own peace-making 
(βV), subject to the participation in that process of its rival, from which it 
also gains (γδR).  The Vigilante also gains from unilateral violence, (υV), 
tempered by any Revolutionary violence, (αδR).
d. A Vigilante facing an M-Type opponent make no direct gains from its 
own peace-making, as it faces a rival committed only to violence.  Ac-
cordingly, in this scenario, gains are only made from unilateral engage-
ment in violence (υV), again tempered by any Revolutionary violence, 
(αδR).
This payoff structure is formalised in Equations (25), (26) and (27):
VRVR VRVVRP νλαδλβλγδλλ )1()1()()( −−−++=Π      (25)
VRV VRVM νλαδλβλ )1()1()( −−−+=Π      (26)
RVRV RVRRVV αδλνλγδλβλλ )1()1()()( −−−++=Π      (27)
Where:  λR  and  λV take  the  value  of  1  when  the  Revolutionary  and  the  Vigilante, 
respectively, act peacefully and 0 when they act violently.  δ takes the value of 1 when a 
signal is not sent and the value 1-S when it is.  From these Equations, the essential 
structure of the game is shown; the returns from peace-making are entirely contingent 
on interaction in that process by the rival organisation, whilst returns to violence are 
private.  
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Figure 4: Incomplete information about Revolutionary’ preferences
Despite this, the model also shows that both the Vigilante and P-Types are best off when 
they jointly engage in a peace process.  This hinges on the sensible assumption that P-
Types prefer to act peacefully than violently when the Vigilante acts peacefully (γ>α). 
As terrorism imposes well documented economic and social costs, I also assume that the 
Vigilante  is  better  off  acting  peacefully,  rather  than  violently,  when  P-Types  act 
peacefully (β>υ).   When your adversary chooses violence,  you are best of choosing 
violence,  regardless of type.   These outcomes show the importance of belief  in this 
model.  Payoffs to action profiles are documented in their familiar form in Tables 2 and 
3.  
In triangular conflicts, reputation is important.  The combatants declare themselves as 
the representatives of the warring communities.  Against this backdrop of reputation, the 
assumptions imposed on utility are eminently sensible - a unilateral decision to engage 
in peace against a violent adversary leaves the peaceful organisation looking weak in 
front of the community from which it draws its support.  This provides an incentive, 
even for peaceful organisations, to behave violently unless they have strong reasons to 
believe that the rival organisation will act peacefully.  
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Table  1:  Revolutionary  and  Vigilante  payoffs  when  Nature  selects  P-Type  
Revolutionary
Vigilante
Revolutionary
Peace Violence
Peace R
V
V
M
γδ
β
=Π
=Π
RV
V
V
M
γδν
ν
+=Π
−=Π
Violence R
VR
V
M
αδ
βαδ
−=Π
+=Π
RV
VR
V
M
αδν
ναδ
−=Π
−=Π
Table  2:  Revolutionary  and  Vigilante  payoffs  when  Nature  selects  M-Type  
Revolutionary
The set of critical beliefs in this model refers to the conditional probabilities, such that 
the Vigilante will act as if they are at node 1 or 3 following a first period signal of S, or 
if  they  are  at  node  2  or  4  following  a  signal  of  0.  Nature  selects  the  type  of 
Revolutionary with some probability at the start of the game.  The Vigilante attaches a 
belief, μ, to Nature having selected a P-Type Revolutionary and 1-μ that she selects an 
M-Type.   The  Vigilante  additionally  believes  that  the  Revolutionary  will  choose  to 
signal with probability θP if they are P-Type and θM if they are M-Type.  I refer to each 
of these conditional probabilities as χi at nodes i   [1, 2, 3, 4].  As can be seen from 
Equations (28) – (31) below, χ1 + χ3 = χ2 + χ4 = 1.
Following Bayes’ Rule, it can be shown that, given the signal S, the Vigilante believes 
that it is at node 1 with the probability:
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4.3 Signalling Equilibria
This model supports four potential equilibrium outcomes: a separating equilibrium in 
which P-Types signal and M-Types do not (denoted 0, S); two pooling equilibria, in 
which both players follow the same course of action in the signalling phase (S, S when 
both signal and 0, 0 when neither signals) and, finally, a separating equilibrium in which 
P-Types do not signal, but M-Types do (0, S).13
In these potential outcomes, we see the source of informational asymmetry.  Given the 
prior assumptions on the Vigilante’s beliefs, incomplete information raises a concern 
that M-Types may pose as P-Types, in order to induce a peaceful response from the 
Vigilante in the second period, with the S, S pooling equilibrium ensuing.  
A  second  concern  is  that  P-Types,  anticipating  post-signalling  violence  from  the 
Vigilante, mimic M-Types by not signalling and using all resources for violence in the 
second period.  Thus, the outcome is a 0, 0 pooling equilibrium.  In principle, a scenario 
also  arises  in  which  P-Types do not  signal  and M-Types do.   This  outcome seems 
13  This notation is used throughout the rest of the text and follows the convention that P-Types’ choice 
in the signalling phase is listed first and that of M-Types second.
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counter-intuitive, however and is not supported by the model, as will be shown below.  
In the sections below, I discuss each of these potential equilibria and the conditions that 
are required in order for them to ensue in this model.  In this discussion, I deal only with 
pure strategies following the signalling phase14 in order to clarify the discussion of the 
results.  When mixed strategies are allowed, the number of potential equilibria grows 
significantly and convolutes the discussion of results.  
4.3.1. S, 0 Separating Equilibrium
In this situation, the Vigilante set its belief that the Revolutionary is P-Type equal to 1 if 
the Revolutionary sends a signal of at least S*>0.  It then follows that the Vigilante will 
always interpret a decision not to signal as the action of an M-Type.  As violence is the 
dominant  strategy  in  subgames  involving  M-Types,  Vigilante  then  always  respond 
violently when a signal is not sent.  
Formally, this implies that, in all cases, χ2 = 0 and χ4 = 1 whilst χ1 = 1 and χ3 = 0 for any 
S≥S*.   For  the  version  of  the  model  presented  here,  I  make  the  assumption  that 
Vigilante and Revolutionary always act peacefully at Node 1.15
In discussing this  outcome, I  first  derive the conditions under which signalling will 
occur.  Firstly, therefore, I define δ*, which is the proportion of resources left following 
a signal of S*, such that δ* = 1 – S*.  S* is defined as an optimal signal – that is, the  
minimum signal that supports a P-Type signal but also ensures that M-Types will not 
signal.   It  is considered that any S>S* represents an inefficient excess spent on the 
signal.
P-Types then choose to send a signal, S*, if their outcome from signalling at this level 
and inducing peace, given the expense of inducing it, is greater than the outcome from 
saving these resources and interacting violently with the Vigilante in the subgame.  This 
occurs when: VRVR ναβγδ −≥+* , which simplifies to:
14  In order to properly facilitate this as a valid method of discussion, I assume that the best response of 
Player A to a mixed strategy from Player B is to respond with violence.  It should be noted that mixing 
is only a valid potential strategy in the portion of the game that deals with P-Types, as violence is a 
dominant strategy in the subgames that deal with M-Types.
15  This is intuitively understandable.  If Vigilante knew they were at node 1 and dealing with a P-Type 
Revolutionary, they would wish for a peaceful outcome.  The same goes for Revolutionary.
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Similarly, M-Types will choose to signal when: VRVR ναβαδ −≥+* , which can be 
simplified to:
*)1(
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−
+≤
V
R
                     (Condition 2)
Thus, this separating equilibrium occurs when P-Types send a signal of S* and M-Types 
do not signal.  Accordingly, this occurs under Conditions 1, ~2, where ~ denotes that a 
condition does not hold.  The condition for separation is, thus:
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As I have already shown the relationship between δ* and S*, I can rewrite Condition 3 
in terms of a condition on the range in which the scale of the signal must lie to ensure 
separation, such that:
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4.3.2. 0, S Separating Equilibrium
I now, briefly, turn attention to the case of separation in which M-Types signal and P-
Types do not.  It is easy to note that such an outcome is immediately counter-intuitive in 
this model as it requires the Vigilante to interpret the sending of a signal as an act of war 
and the choice not to send a peaceful signal as one of peace.  It is included here for  
completeness  of  discussion.   In  this  situation,  the  Vigilante  sets  its  belief  that 
Revolutionary is M-Type equal to 1 if the Revolutionary sends the signal of at least S*. 
It then follows that the Vigilante will always interpret a decision not to signal as the 
action of a P-Type.  As violence is the dominant strategy in subgames involving M-
Types, Vigilante then always respond violently when a signal is sent.  
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Formally, this implies that, in all cases, χ1 = 0 and χ3 = 1 whilst χ2 = 0 and χ4 = 1 for any 
S≥S*.  In this case, I again look only at the peace-peace and pure strategy outcomes,  
where P-Types and the Vigilante both act peacefully following the signalling phase.  As 
before, I first look at the incentives for a P-Type to signal.  A P-Type will signal when: 
VRVR βγναδ +≥−* .  As neither υV or βV are trivial and as δ*<1, this condition 
never holds.  Accordingly, P-Types will never signal in this scenario.
M-Types will choose to signal when: VRVR βαναδ +≥−* .  Following the logic in 
the previous paragraph, it is also easy to see that this condition will never hold and M-
Types will also choose never to signal in this scenario.  Accordingly, a 0, S separating 
equilibrium is infeasible in this model.  
4.3.3. Pooling Equilibria
Attention now turns to the case in which both Revolutionary types choose the same 
signal in the first period.  It should be noted that in either pooling equilibrium, the post-
signalling phases are representative of the incomplete information version of the battle 
of the sexes game.  Accordingly, a similar solution concept can be employed, in order to 
solve the outcomes of the game in the pooling equilibria.  The subgames that ensue at 
nodes 1 and 2 have two pure Nash equilibria; the case in which both P-Types and the 
Vigilante act peacefully and the case where both act violently.  As before, the subgames 
at nodes 3 and 4 exhibit an all-violence dominant strategy.  
This discussion then begins with a discussion of P-Type strategy at node 1, which is 
reached with a probability of χ1 in this model.  Should P-Types choose peace at node 1, 
then the pure strategy Nash equilibrium best response of the Vigilante is to respond with 
peace at this node.  However, as the signal now contains no new information, node 3 is 
also  reached  with  a  positive  probability,  χ3 =  (1  –  χ1),  where  violence  ensues. 
Accordingly, in the S, S pooling equilibrium, given a P-Type strategy of peace at node 
1, the Vigilante will choose to act  peacefully if expected returns from doing so are such 
that:  , 
which can be rewritten:
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  (Condition 5)
In exactly the same manner, the condition for Vigilante peace at node 2 can be written:
  (Condition 6)
As all beliefs in this model are common knowledge, in the situations where Conditions 
5 or 6 fail, the P-Types' best response is to act violently.  In either equilibrium, the best 
response of the Vigilante to a P-Type strategy of violence is always to act violently. 
Given these conditions, there are four permutations that can occur in this model; where 
both hold, when both fail and when Condition 5 holds, whilst Condition 6 fails.16
Accordingly, under Conditions 5, 6, P-Types act peacefully at nodes 1 and 2, M-Types 
act violently at nodes 3 and 4 and the Vigilante responds peacefully to both S and 0. 
Under Conditions ~5, ~6, the opposite outcome ensues, with both P-Types and M-Types 
acting violently in the subgames and Vigilante responding violently to both S and 0. 
Finally, under Conditions 5, ~6, M-Types still respond violently following either signal. 
P-Types, however, respond peacefully at node 1 and violently at node 2.  Finally, the 
Vigilante responds peacefully following S and violently following 0.  
Conditions: Type: Payoff:
Signal: S Signal: 0
5, 6 P-Type
M-Type
5, ~6 P-Type
M-Type
~5, ~6 P-Type
M-Type
Table 3:Revolutionary payoffs in pooling equilibria
Having discussed the solution to the subgames, attention now turns to the feasibility of 
each  of  these  equilibria.   Accordingly,  in  Table  3,  the  returns  to  each  type  of 
Revolutionary  are  displayed  for  the  three  feasible  strategic  mixes  discussed  in  the 
16  The situation where Condition 5 fails and Condition 6 holds is not considered as this would require 
Vigilante to have stronger beliefs that Revolutionary are P-Type following no signal than following a 
signal; or in the context of the model, to assume an act of peace to be an act of war and vice versa.
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previous paragraph.  Outcomes to each type of Revolutionary are also split by the signal 
they send, which provides information on the incentives each type has to signal, given 
the subgame outcomes.
Accordingly, an S-Pooling equilibrium can only occur under Conditions 5, ~6, although 
it should be noted that a 0-Pooling equilibrium can also occur in this situation, as can a 
situation  where  neither  of  these  equilibria  is  feasible.   Under  5,  ~6,  an  S-Pooling 
equilibrium occurs when the returns of both P-Types and M-Types are greater, having 
sent the signal than having not sent this signal.  This requires;  
and   for  P-Types  and  M-Types  respectively.   These  can  be 
rearranged:
  (Condition 7)
  (Condition 8)
Accordingly, an S-Pooling equilibrium only occurs under Conditions 5, ~6, 7, 8.  In any 
situation where the discounted return of peace-making, (γδ*) induced by the signal is 
greater  than  the  return  to  violence  (α)  for  P-Types,  they  will  choose  to  signal  as 
Condition 7 will always be negative in this scenario.  Neither pooling equilibrium is 
infeasible under Conditions 5, ~6, 7, ~8,  whilst  the model exhibits  three feasible 0-
Pooling  equilibria,  which  occur  under;  Conditions  5,  6;  Conditions  ~5,  ~6  and 
Conditions 5, ~6, ~7, ~8.  
This  final  result  depicts  a  P-Type Revolutionary  organisation that  devotes  all  of  its 
resources to acts of violence.  Here, we witness the potentially destructive effect that a 
pro-status quo Vigilante can have in a conflict it wishes to end.  When P-Types lose 
their belief that they can convince the Vigilante that they are peaceful, violence ensues. 
The  principal  effect  here  is  that  the  Vigilante's  beliefs  and  subsequent  actions  can 
actually perpetuate a conflict that it claims is seeks to end.  
Ceteris paribus, the conditions discussed above show that, given a set of beliefs, it is the 
relative scale of the organisations involved that drives the outcomes of the model.  The 
larger the Revolutionary organisation is, relative to the Vigilante organisation, the less 
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likely the Revolutionary is to signal.  That said, if the relative scale is too low, there is 
an incentive for M-Types to signal.  The implicit outcome here is that the Vigilante 
threat must be large enough to provide a significant deterrent to the Revolutionary for 
the Revolutionary to be willing to interact.  If the Vigilante organisation is too large, 
however, it poses such a threat to the Revolutionary in the second period that M-Types 
will be willing to mimic P-Types by sending a signal and attempting to induce peace in 
the second period.  
Superficially, this result is supported by data on paramilitary membership and weapons 
caches from the Northern Ireland conflict.  The Republican organisations, jointly, were 
larger and had greater access to weaponry and expertise than their Loyalist counterparts 
but the Loyalist forces still provided a significant presence in the conflict.  Contrarily, 
the  enormous  Hamas  organisation  has  simply  crushed  a  number  of  small  rivals 
operating in the Middle East.
The conditions also show the role that the relative sizes of the parameters of peace and 
violence of the Revolutionary organisation play in the signalling decision.  The larger 
the return to peace, γ, relative to the return to violence,  α,  the more likely a P-Type 
organisation is to signal, whilst a high return to violence reduces the likelihood of a 
signal.  
4.4 Concluding Remarks
Due to the Bayes-Nash nature of the subgames in this model, we witness a large number 
of potential conclusions and outcomes.  In the formation above, I show conditions that 
support  pooling  equilibria  both  on  and off  the  signal  and a  separating  equilibrium, 
where types signal their true nature.  I show how the role of both beliefs and relative 
resources  are  important  in  the  derivation  of  outcomes.   This  is  most  specifically 
poignant in outcomes where P-Types devote all resources to the pursuit of violence.
The three main results supported by the model presented here provide an interesting 
snapshot of triangular conflict.  Under the conditions for pooling equilibrium, we see 
that  Vigilante  beliefs  and  actions  can  deter  a  nominally  peaceful  Revolutionary 
organisation from devoting any resources to peaceful action.  This provides a notion of 
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how  the  presence  of  a  pro-government  Vigilante  can  perpetuate  conflicts  they  are 
seeking  to  end.   Despite  this,  I  also  show  the  conditions  that  support  a  peaceful 
resolution between the warring factions in triangular conflicts, which occurs when a P-
Type leadership is present and separation possible.  
We see these results illuminated in the context of Northern Ireland, for example.  In 
1986,  Sinn  Féin  recognised  the  legitimacy  of  Dáil  Éireann,  the  parliament  of  the 
Republic  of  Ireland  and  stood candidates  for  election  to  both  the  Irish  and  United 
Kingdom parliaments.  This began the IRA strategy known as “the Armalite and the 
ballot  box”,  a  strategy  fought  both  on  political  and  violent  fronts.   Despite  these 
peaceful overtures, the IRA did not cease violence for another 8 years, suggesting that in 
these years, signalling took place but was ineffective.
Following  the  IRA ceasefire  on  31  August  1994,  however,  the  Combined  Loyalist 
Military Command (CLMC) called their own ceasefire 43 days later, suggesting that the 
earlier  ceasefire  had  differentiated  P-Types  and  M-Types.   These  ceasefires  led, 
ultimately, to the signing of the Good Friday Agreement in 1998, which serves as an 
illustration  of  how  peace  can  be  brought  about,  through  the  use  of  a  signal  of 
appropriate scale.  
Most interestingly, this model shows that the incentives to signal and to separate are 
based on the relative scales of the organisations involved.  If the Revolutionary is too 
forceful,  the  Vigilante  cannot  provide  an  effective  deterrent,  removing  the 
Revolutionary’s incentive to interact in a peace process.  If the Vigilante is too powerful, 
however,  the  deterrent  it  provides  is  great  enough  to  incentivise  an  M-Type 
Revolutionary to act peacefully in the signalling phase.
 
It should be noted, however, that this is not a complete model of triangular conflict. 
This model focuses only on the interaction, within a triangular conflict, of the illegal 
paramilitary organisations.  Further work could look at the role of government security 
forces as a strategic player in the conflict  but this is beyond the scope of the work 
presented here.  
The model could also be expanded to account for a continuum of Revolutionary types 
that can vary across time.  This version works on an assumption that the Revolutionary 
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is either entirely P-Type or M-Type at any given time.  This seems a poor reflection of 
reality,  where  the  Revolutionary  leadership  would  have  some  continuum  of 
peacefulness,  based on the internal  wrangling of  the organisation and the beliefs  of 
those in the upper echelons of power.  The degree of peacefulness at any time would be 
reflected by the scale of signal sent.  
This would constitute a further major piece of work but would provide a more accurate 
portrayal  of triangular  conflict.   This  model  still  goes  some way to capturing these 
effects, however.  The Revolutionary’s incentives to act peacefully or violently in the 
subgames and its incentive to signal is based, in part, on the relative scale of returns to 
peace, γ and violence, α.  A Revolutionary with a strongly peaceful leadership would 
expect a higher return to peaceful action than violence, increasing both the likelihood of 
choosing to signal and of acting peacefully in the post-signalling phase.  
Whilst more simplistic than explicitly focusing on the peacefulness of a Revolutionary 
leadership, the effect captured here is strong and provides an interesting rationale of the 
structure of the Revolutionary leadership.  In this respect, this model provides a strong 
outline of the interaction between two of the major players in triangular conflicts, whilst 
offering explanations for the duration of these conflicts - almost thirty years in Northern 
Ireland and on-going in both Iraq and Columbia, for example - but also a suggestion as 
to how they can, end with a peaceful resolution.
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Chapter 5: A Duration Analysis of The Troubles in Northern Ireland
5.1 Introduction
On 14 July 1969, Francis McCloskey, a Catholic civilian, died after being struck with 
batons by members of the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) during street disturbances 
in Dungiven, County Derry, Northern Ireland.  This death was a precursor to a low-
intensity triangular conflict between Republican paramilitaries, Loyalist paramilitaries 
and  British  Security  Forces.   Colloquially  known  as  “The  Troubles”,  this  conflict 
claimed the lives of in excess of 3,500 people over almost thirty years.  
The Troubles provide a rich background and a reliable source of data for the study of 
triangular conflict.  Darby (1995) traces the conflict back to the plantation of Ulster in 
1609 and concludes that the problems identified at this time were not only territorial but 
also cultural and religious, between the 'planted' Protestant landowners from England 
and Scotland and the Catholic  Irish.   These divisions remained prevalent up to  and 
following  the  Anglo-Irish  agreement  that  partitioned  Ireland  in  1921.   Whilst  the 
problem is  initially  described  as  English-Irish,  in  the  context  of  the  Northern  Irish 
conflict, it came to be, broadly, a Protestant-Catholic problem.  
Fitzduff and O’Hagan (2000) focus on a theme of inequality as a background to the 
conflict, noting the effects of discrimination against Catholics.  This inequality led, first 
of all, to the non-violent Northern Ireland Civil Rights Movement.  The Parliament of 
Northern  Ireland,  seeing  this  movement  as  a  threat  to  the  'Protestant  state',  reacted 
aggressively.  This “hostile response” led to an “eruption of violence on the streets”; it 
was this violence that ultimately led to the formation of vigilante organisations and the 
commencement of the paramilitary violence that characterised The Troubles.
Darby (2003) notes that during the Troubles, the model of violence changed – what 
began with rioting between the two main communities in the 1960s gradually moved 
towards a, “triangular, low intensity conflict,” between the British Army, Republican 
Paramilitaries and Loyalist Paramilitaries.  The British Army entered Northern Ireland 
in  1969,  with  a  brief  to  restore  peace  but  quickly  became a  target  for  Republican 
terrorist  attacks.   During  the  early  1970s,  a  number  of  paramilitary  organisations 
formed.  The Ulster Defence Association (UDA) acted as an umbrella organisation for a 
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loose band of Loyalist vigilantes, whilst the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) 
began a series of bombing and shooting attacks.  
Whilst  the  initial  aim  of  the  Civil  Rights  movement  was  equality,  the  Republican 
movement's long-term strategic goal was of the reunification of Ireland.  Loyalists, on 
the other hand, wished to maintain the status quo of the union with the United Kingdom. 
Although often illegal, Loyalist paramilitaries acted as pro-government, or at least as 
pro-status quo, vigilantes and attempted to impose costs on Republican organisations 
through a series of retaliative attacks.
This strategy is discussed widely in qualitative literature with the likes of Taylor (1996), 
O'Brien (1995) and Dillon (1992) stating that the long-term aim of Loyalist terrorist 
forces was to protect the Protestant community in Northern Ireland from Republican 
attacks.  O'Brien, in particular, claims that the stated political goal of the UDA was to 
stop Republican violence.  Should Republicans cease to be violent, the UDA would lay 
down their  arms.   This  suggestion  is  indicated  by  the  Combined  Loyalist  Military 
Command (CLMC) ceasefire in October 1994, which came only 43 days after the IRA's 
ceasefire in August 1994.  
The qualitative literature suggests a more varied Republican strategy, aiming to impose 
maximum physical and mental damage on 'the enemy'.  It states that interaction with 
Loyalists was not an important part of overall strategy.  Thus, whilst I still expect some 
'matching' of strategy, Republican action should not necessarily directly correlate with 
Loyalist  attacks  in  the  way  theory  and  qualitative  literature  suggests  Loyalists  will 
interact with Republicans.  
In the theoretical setting, presented in Chapter 4, organisations' actions are related to the 
actions of the other organisation.  For example, should Republicans engage in a long 
period  of  relative  peacefulness,  it  would  be  expected  that  Loyalists,  as  self-styled 
reactionary  forces,  would  also  engage  in  a  period  of  relative  peacefulness.   The 
transmission of  this  idea  into  reality  makes  duration  analysis  a  particularly  suitable 
method to study the interaction, as I look at the effect on the likelihood of an attack by 
one organisation, contingent on the level of action of its rival.  
At times of high violence by an adversary, the duration between the attacks of a group 
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are  likely  to  be  considerably  shorter  than  at  times  of  relative  peacefulness  by  the 
adversary.  Thus, it allows modelling of both the overarching strategy and the interactive 
strategy.   Furthermore,  unlike  probit  /  logit  models,  duration  analysis  allows  direct 
interpretation of the marginal effects, rather than simply the direction of causality.  I 
measure the relative peacefulness / violence of an organisation as the average level of 
violence perpetrated by that group between the pair of attacks of the other organisation 
that generates the duration variable.  
In considering this question, I begin with a simple hypothesis; ceteris paribus, a high 
level  of  militancy  by  organisation  A  will  decrease  the  duration  between  attacks 
perpetuated by organisation B.  In keeping with the nomenclature of duration analysis, 
this  translates to a higher  conditional  probability of organisation B attacking in any 
window of time when organisation A is in a period of militancy.  
Duration dependence, therefore, should appear to be negative; the longer since an attack 
by an organisation, the less likely it is for that organisation to attack in the next period. 
This  notion  is  intuitively  tractable  –  if  a  proportion  of  the  violence  perpetrated  by 
organisation A relates to the degree of militancy of organisation B, than the suggestion 
of a long duration is that organisation B is engaging in a period of relative peacefulness.  
As organisation B is engaging in a period of relative peacefulness, organisation A will 
not engage in retaliative attacks, which discourages organisation B from engaging in 
violence and so on...
To capture the organisational structure of paramilitary organisations, I introduce a naïve 
measure of spatial  spillovers.   Loyalist  organisations,  particularly,  were organised at 
local level, forming into 'battalions' that were split closely along the borders of Northern 
Ireland's  parliamentary  constituencies17.   Due  to  this  organisational  structure,  the 
qualitative literature suggests that Loyalist groups' actions are likely to be more locally 
organised.  
17  Whilst almost impossible to find a full list of Loyalist paramilitary battalions, I draw on the most 
violent UVF battalions during “The Troubles” to illuminate this suggestion.  Four notable battalions 
exist in Belfast – East Belfast, North Belfast, South Belfast and West Belfast.  Belfast’s electoral 
constituencies are split similarly.  Londonderry (Foyle Constituency) and Mid-Ulster (Upper Bann 
constituency) were also prevalent.
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5.2 Data
The data used in this work is sourced from Malcolm Sutton's “An Index of Deaths from 
the Conflict in Ireland”, Sutton (1994), which documents each death directly linked to 
the  conflict.   Pertinent  information  includes  the  name  of  the  organisation  that 
perpetrated the attack and the status of the victim, for example,  a Catholic civilian, 
Protestant civilian or a member of the security forces.  Most importantly for this study, 
however,  this  data  provides  the  exact  date  of  each  death  and  excellent  geographic 
information on the location of each attack, which facilitates mapping of the conflict to 
Northern Ireland’s eighteen Westminster parliamentary constituencies.  
I use a restricted sample of this data running from 1st January 1971 until 31st August 
1994.  Although the common suggestion is that the first death directly related to The 
Troubles was that of Francis McClosky in July 1969, his death occurred during a street 
disturbance, the kind of which was common in the late-1960s.  It was only in the early-
1970s that the pattern of violence changed from this kind of communal rioting to the 
terrorist incidents that characterised the conflict until its end.  
By the same token, the Ulster Defence Association (UDA) only commenced action in 
1971.  The beginning of UDA action closely defines the beginning of the triangular 
conflict in Northern Ireland, which this paper aims to study.  The PIRA ceasefire of 31st 
August 1994 presents a logical end point.  Violence dramatically declined on both sides 
of the conflict following this ceasefire, as shown below in Figure 5.
I look only at attacks that occurred between these dates and within the geographical 
boundaries of Northern Ireland.  I also do not include incidents where the ‘side’ of the 
perpetrator  organisation  was  not  known  or  incidents  that  could  not  accurately  be 
geographically  mapped  to  a  Westminster  parliamentary  constituency.   My  dataset 
includes some 2,900 deaths, which occurred across 9,009 days.  I present a daily time-
series due to the apparently rapid retaliation structures in place.18 Using the location 
data, I have been able to map each death from the conflict to latitudes and longitudes, 
18  As an example of rapid retaliation, I consider the first attacks to occur in Portadown.  Portadown is a 
town with a population of approximately 20,000 and is located in the Upper Bann constituency in 
County Armagh.  The first attack there took place on 12 July 1972, over two and a half years into the 
conflict.  A non-specific Republican organisation killed a Protestant civilian.  The second attack in 
Portadown also took place on 12 July 1972, when the UDA killed a Catholic civilian and a Protestant 
civilian in a bar shooting.
72
postcodes and electoral constituencies.   This has provided a panel formation of the 
information that is suited to duration analysis.  
Figure 5: Terrorist incidents in Northern Ireland by year (Source: GTD, START (2011))
I  construct  the  duration  of  'peace'  from Sutton's  (1994)  Index.   'Peace'  is  the  time 
elapsed between each pair of attacks attributable to the paramilitaries on each ‘side’ of 
the  conflict.   For  this  study,  I  have  broadly  grouped  ‘sides’ into  “Loyalist”  and 
“Republican”.19 The main Republican organisations included in the data are the PIRA 
and the INLA.  The main Loyalist organisations are the UDA, the UFF and the UVF. 
Data for the more minor groups is also available and is included in the analysis.  Finally, 
I derive a series of ten covariates from the data included in Sutton, five for each of the 
two duration series.  I fully define each of these covariates in Table 3 and include the 
summary statistics of these covariates in Table 4.  
Data  for  economic  and  geographic  controls,  such  as  population,  population  split, 
unemployment, GDP and a series of location specific dummy variables are also used. 
To capture changing strategies throughout the conflict, I use a further series of dummy 
variables;  the first  accounts for  the effects  following the Sunningdale Agreement  in 
1973, the second for the election of Bobby Sands in May 1981 and the final one from 
1986 onwards, which marks the beginning of the 'Ballot Box and Armalite' strategy.  
Finally, due to the changing nature of violence, which saw a rise in the early 1970s and 
19 Data variation issues prevent further disaggregation of ‘sides’ into their constituent ‘groups’.
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a general decline through the late-70s and 1980s, I include a quadratic time trend.
Table 4: Definitions of main covariates included in analysis
5.3 Econometric Methodology
In this section, I apply duration modelling techniques to my panels.  In the simplest 
sense, duration models look at the probability of changing state in some small window 
of time, contingent on having survived in the initial state up to the start of this window.  
More formally, the length of a spell, in this case, the period without a violent attack, is 
the  “realisation  of  a  continuous  random variable,  T,  with  a  cumulative  distribution 
function (cdf) F(t) and probability density function (pdf) f(t).” (Jenkins, 2005).  The cdf 
is also known as the failure function, with the survivor function defined: S(t) = 1 – F(t);  
t is the time elapsed since entry into this state.  Exit from this state is then defined by the 
timing the next violent attack.
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Duration Covariate Definition
Republican tlave Average  number  of  deaths  caused  by  Loyalist 
paramilitaries, per day.
tsave Average number of deaths caused by British Security 
Forces, per day.
trbave Average  number  of  deaths  caused  by  Republican 
paramilitaries, per day, in contiguous regions.
tlbave Average  number  of  deaths  caused  by  Loyalist 
paramilitaries, per day, in contiguous regions.
tsbave Average number of deaths caused by British Security 
Forces, per day, in contiguous regions.
Loyalist trave Average  number  of  deaths  caused  by  Republican 
paramilitaries, per day.
tsave Average number of deaths caused by British Security 
Forces, per day.
trbave Average  number  of  deaths  caused  by  Republican 
paramilitaries, per day, in contiguous regions.
tlbave Average  number  of  deaths  caused  by  Loyalist 
paramilitaries, per day, in contiguous regions.
tsbave Average number of deaths caused by British Security 
Forces, per day, in contiguous regions.
Duration Covariate Obs. Mean Std.  Dev. Min Max
Republicans 1261 127.549 419.453 1 9009
tlave 1261 0.030 0.197 0 6
tsave 1261 0.016 0.173 0 5
trbave 1261 0.076 0.176 0 2.75
tlbave 1261 0.050 0.135 0 1.364
tsbave 1261 0.025 0.147 0 3
Loyalists 690 234.364 680.598 1 7108
trave 690 0.050 0.160 0 2
tsave 690 0.017 0.182 0 4
trbave 690 0.100 0.230 0 3
tlbave 690 0.091 0.163 0 1.33
tsbave 690 0.028 0.110 0 1.33
Table 5: Summary Statistics for Duration Variables and Main Covariates
More formally, the failure and survivor functions are defined:
)Pr()( tTtF ≤=          (32)
)Pr()(1)( tTtFtS >=−=        (33)
The probability density function is then the slope of the failure function, which can be 
defined:
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As Δt is an infinitesimally small duration, Equation (34) is interpreted as the probability 
of exiting the current state in this tiny window of time.  From this, the hazard rate is 
defined.  The hazard rate is, in essence, the probability of a state change, contingent on 
the state having not changed up until that time.  In other words, the hazard rate shows 
the ‘transition intensity’.  The hazard rate is defined:
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The baseline hazard gives the conditional probability of a state change in a particular 
window of time, when all covariates are set equal to zero.  In this case, the baseline 
hazard  essentially  implies  the  underlying  strategy  of  a  terrorist  organisation.   The 
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introduction of covariates then allows us to examine their impact on the baseline hazard, 
or how the underlying terrorist strategy was affected by the covariates.
Furthermore, the baseline hazard also allows inspection of duration dependence.  In the 
literature, a series is said to exhibit positive duration dependence if the probability of 
exiting a state increases with time.  For example, a series would have positive duration 
dependence if the probability of failure at time t+1, conditional on having survived until 
time t is larger than the probability of failure at time s+1, conditional on having survived 
until time s for all s<t.  A series exhibits negative duration dependence if the probability 
of failure decreases in time.  
Neither economic theory, nor the qualitative literature, provides any strong justification 
for imposing the structure of duration dependence on this model.  As stated before, the 
baseline  hazard  functions  in  this  paper  proxy  terrorist  strategy;  this  distribution  of 
violence  is  not  discussed  in  the  qualitative  literature.   As  such,  I  use  the  Cox 
Proportional Hazards (PH) Model to parametrically estimate duration dependence.  
The PH specification is as follows:
)'exp()(),( 0 ii XtXt βθθ =      (36)
In  other  words,  the  probability  of  exit  at  a  particular  time,  conditional  on  having 
survived in a state until that time, is equal to a multiplicative relationship between the 
baseline hazard function and the covariates in the model.  The advantage of the Cox 
model is that it allows one to estimate the relationship between the baseline hazard and 
covariates without making any assumption about the shape of the baseline hazard.  
This is particularly important for this work as the interest is not in the shape of duration 
dependence itself but on the impact of the covariates.  This makes the Cox PH model 
particularly suited to this study.  I use the Breslow method for tied failures in the main 
analysis  for  computational  ease  and  derivation  of  the  Schoenfeld  residuals,  which 
allows testing of the proportional hazards assumption.   
In interpreting the output of the Cox model, the hazard rate is compared to 1.  If a 
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covariate has a hazard rate that is not significantly different to one, it is shown not to 
affect the baseline hazard.  Looking at the PH specification in Equation (36), this is 
sensible – the 'transition intensity' is the same as in the baseline hazard if the hazard 
ratio of a covariate is 1.  If it has a value greater than one, it increases the probability of 
exit, thus decreasing the duration of survival and if it has a value less than one, it has the 
effect of increasing the duration of survival.
I  apply the Cox model to two series.   The first  series is the duration between each 
Republican  attack  and  the  previous  Republican  attack  within  a  Westminster 
parliamentary constituency in Northern Ireland.  The second is the duration between a 
Loyalist  attack and the previous Loyalist  attack within a constituency.  I generate a 
series of five covariates of interest for each duration series.  These covariates are the 
average level of violence by each of the involved groups between each pair of attacks in 
the location and in contiguous regions.  
Thus,  for  Republicans,  I  test  the  impact  of  average  Loyalist  violence  in  the  region 
(tlave), average Security Forces violence in the region (tsave), and average Republican 
(trbave),  Loyalist  (tlbave)  and Security  Forces  (tsbave)  in  contiguous  regions.   For 
Loyalists, I replace average Loyalist violence with average Republican violence (trave) 
within the region and include the other four covariates.  I define contiguity as having a 
land border with another constituency.  
Given that the baseline hazard effectively measures the underlying strategies employed 
by the  terrorist  organisations,  any deviation from the baseline is  suggestive  of  how 
overall strategy is affected by the actions of rival and opposition groups.  It should not 
be unreasonable to expect that the duration between Loyalist attacks, say, will decrease 
when average Republican violence is high given the theory and qualitative literature.
It is plausible to expect that some incidents will be correlated over space and time.  As 
can be seen from Figure 5, deaths attributable to the conflict vary dramatically by year, 
whilst Figure 6 shows the number of deaths, per constituency, within my time-series, 
which also varies intensely.
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Figure 6: Deaths from the Conflict in Northern Ireland by Westminster Constituency 
To overcome these variations, I work with four main models.  Firstly, I look at a model 
where I introduce a series of year and location controls.  In controlling for location, I 
include a dummy variable for each of my geographic units20, population (pop) and the 
percentage of Catholics in the population (split).  In controlling for year, I include the 
log of unemployment (lnunemppc) and the log of GDP per capita (lngdppc) as well as a 
quadratic  time trend.   Finally,  I  introduce dummy variables  to account for potential 
structural  breaks  in  Republican  strategy (sunn,  sands and dail),  which represent  the 
Sunningdale Agreement in 1973, Bobby Sands' election to the Westminster parliament 
in 1981 and Sinn Féin's recognition of the Dáil Éireann in 1986.  
In the second model, I stratify by year and include the location controls.  In the third, I 
stratify by location and include the economic year-controls.  Finally, I stratify by both 
year and location, whilst excluding the location and year controls.  Stratification allows 
a new baseline hazard for each stratum but imposes that the effect of the covariates 
remains the same on each baseline hazard.  In effect, this allows terrorist organisations 
20    Abadie (2006) shows that geographic controls are important in terrorism studies and also suggests 
that they reduce the explanatory power of economic variables.
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to adopt different strategies in different locations and / or in different years but that their 
interaction with rival organisations remains the same across space and time.  
It should be noted that, using this modelling technique, the results presented here do not 
necessarily designate causality but rather, reflect a direct correlation of the activities of 
organisations.   The Cox PH model  does  not  readily facilitate  a  fuller  discussion of 
causality using, for example, Granger Prediction.  Accordingly, throughout this chapter, 
reference is made to qualitative literature, theory and, in the next section, more specific 
interactions, in order to infer the nature of the effects that I find.  
I  use  Stata's  inbuilt  'phtest'  to  test  the  proportional  hazards  assumption.   The  PH 
assumption that underpins the Cox model states that the hazard rate must stay constant 
over time.  This means that the hazard ratio between a treated and a non-treated group 
remains constant over time.  As the average level of violence changes for each new 
duration pair, graphical methods of testing this assumption are infeasible.  The 'phtest' 
is, essentially, a test of a nonzero slope of the Schoenfeld residuals that are derived from 
the Cox model.  The null hypothesis of a zero slope is tantamount to testing that the log 
hazard-ratio function is constant over time.  A rejection of this null hypothesis suggests 
deviation from the PH assumption.21
5.4 Results
The output from the key variables in these models is documented in Tables 6 (duration 
between Republican attacks) and 7 (duration between Loyalists attacks).  Full results are 
in Appendices 2 and 3.  A hazard ratio of 1 suggests that the covariate has no effect on 
the duration being discussed.  Thus, the test of the hazard ratio's significance is a test as 
to whether it is significantly different to 1.
These results use the Breslow method for tied failures for computation ease but these 
methods do not materially change the results presented here.  Similarly, results are also 
robust when using a variance-covariance estimator clustered on year and constituency. 
Two further  robustness  checks  also  support  these  outcomes.   In  the  first,  I  use  an 
accelerated failure time model using a Weibull distribution (presented in Appendix 7) 
21  A full discussion of the duration techniques discussed in this chapter and throughout this thesis can be 
found in Jenkins (2005)
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and  in  the  second,  I  introduce  a  quarterly  dummy variable22 to  account  for  annual 
intensity in the variation of violence (presented in Appendix 5).  This is important as, 
typically, paramilitaries held a “Christmas Ceasefire” for two weeks each December, 
whilst  there is  also typically  a peak in violence in the middle of the Orange Order 
marching season in July.   Neither of these robustness checks materially changes the 
results.
No strat.  Year 
and loc controls
Strat by year & 
loc controls
Strat by loc and 
year controls
Strat by year and 
loc
tlave 1.977*** 1.751*** 2.1289*** 1.758***
tsave 1.627*** 1.579*** 1.6729*** 1.526**
trbave 1.486** 1.239 1.382* 1.081
tlbave 2.065** 1.8079** 1.974** 1.590
tsbave 2.243*** 2.369*** 2.239*** 2.537***
log-likelihood -7302.677 -3706.554 -4625.126 -1590.513
***, ** and * show significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively
Table 6: Results for Cox PH model on the duration between Republican attacks
A final robustness check seeks to test the dynamic nature of the conflict by introducing 
the lagged average value of violence by each of the three “groups” in the region and in 
neighbouring  regions  in  the  three  months  before  each  attack  by  Republicans  and 
Loyalists.  Full results from these analyses are found in Appendix 6.   Whilst these 
results do not materially change the main findings of the models presented below23, they 
show  that  these  lagged  variables  are  insignificant  determinants  of  the  timing  of 
violence.24  This  suggests  that  the  interaction  of  the  organisations  is  very  much 
22  For Republicans, the only one of these dummies that is significant is the first quarter dummy, whilst 
none are significant for Loyalists.  As they do not materially change the outcomes of interest in this 
model, I present these results in an appendix, only.  
23 In fact, the only change is that Loyalists are no longer shown to interact with Loyalist organisations in 
neighbouring regions.
24 All of the lagged values in both duration series are shown to be insignificant drivers of the outcomes, 
with the exception of the lag of in-region violence by the security forces. Given the relative low-
intensity of this violence and the excessive hazard ratio and standard error presented, this is assumed 
to be driven by multicollinearity with other variables in the model – as in-region security forces 
violence tends to be comparatively low, a significant number of three month periods exist with no 
security forces violence at all. Accordingly, it seems likely that these zeroes will be correlated with the 
zeroes in the other variables in the model. Accordingly, no inference is drawn on the significance of 
this variable. 
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immediate.  Previous reputation of one organisation does not account for the strategic 
actions of another.  Instead, responses seem to occur as a direct response of current and 
local violence.
No strat.  Year 
and loc controls
Strat by year & 
loc controls
Strat by loc and 
year controls
Strat by year and 
loc
trave 4.302*** 4.051*** 4.999*** 3.868***
tsave 1.487* 1.377 1.566** 1.333
trbave 1.226 1.077 1.198 1.038
tlbave 4.402*** 2.623** 4.159*** 2.561**
tsbave 0.999 0.973 1.024 0.871
log-likelihood -3464.351  -1690.007 -2180.681 -799.770
***, ** and * show significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively
Table 7: Results for Cox PH model on the duration between Republican attacks
The universal PH tests reject the null in both the Republican and Loyalist models when 
I use the single set up that does not involve any stratification.  The PH tests do not reject 
the null in any of the three set ups using stratification.  This suggests that stratification is 
an appropriate tool to use in this situation.  Results from the PH tests can be seen in 
Appendix 4. 
As discussed in Section 5.3, the interpretation of the hazard ratios from the Cox PH 
model  should  be  tested  as  being  significantly  different  from one.   To  interpret  the 
marginal effects, we compare the hazard ratio to one.  For example, taking the first 
result presented in Table 5, we can see that the hazard ratio for the average number of 
deaths attributable to Loyalists, on the duration between Republican attacks is 1.977 and 
is shown to be significant at the 1% level.
What this hazard ratio means is that, should the average number of deaths attributable to 
Loyalists  increase  by  one,  the  conditional  probability  of  Republicans  shifting  their 
‘state’ from peace to violence changes  by 1.977 – 1, or 0.977.  In other words, should 
the average number of deaths attributable to Loyalists increase by one; the probability 
of a Republican state-change is 97% higher.  Whilst this is a startling statistic in itself,  
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the hazard ratio of 3.868 shown as Loyalists’ response to Republican militancy in Table 
7  is  even  stronger.   This  suggestion  fits  strongly  with  the  qualitative  literature, 
suggesting that Loyalists are much more responsive to Republican militancy than the 
other way around
Perhaps the most striking result is that I present evidence both of Loyalists interacting 
with Republicans and Republicans interacting with Loyalists.  Given the scale of the 
hazard ratio,  however,  it  appears  that  interaction plays  a  significantly larger  role  in 
Loyalist  strategy  than  Republican  strategy,  supporting  the  qualitative  literature  that 
Republicans  operated  a  much  broader  strategy.   More  importantly,  it  shows  this 
interaction to be localised within constituencies, representing the local organisation of 
Loyalist  paramilitaries.   This  notion  is  apparently  confirmed  by  the  fact  that 
Republicans interact with security forces, both within and extra-region, whilst there are 
no  significant  findings  which  suggest  Loyalists  do  the  same.   This  suggests  that 
Republicans  react  to  Security  Forces  action  across  a  broader  geographic  spectrum, 
reflecting their more national / centralised organisational structure.  
Another  interesting  feature  of  these  results  is  the  cross-border  spillover  of  Loyalist 
violence.   Loyalists  positively interact  with Loyalist  violence in contiguous regions. 
This is suggestive either of Loyalist infighting or rivalries, which are well documented 
in non-economic literature.  This outcome fits with the theoretical outcomes from Gang 
and Epstein (2007), who discuss 'rent-seeking' leaders concerned with their popularity 
and may suggest that Loyalists engaged in intra-group action in order to garner support 
from their local communities.  The dominant PIRA did not suffer the same issues in 
winning the hearts and minds of the Republican communities in which they operated, 
which explains why this result only pertains to Loyalist interaction.
Thus far, these results fail to show causality.  In essence, they show that Republican and 
Loyalist violence are positively correlated within regions.  In an attempt to shed light on 
the direction of causality, I introduce three 'sub-models' using restricted aspects of the 
dataset.  For these purposes, I split Republican attacks into attacks against 'civilian' and 
'military'  targets.  Due to the nature of the UDR as an amateur reserve force of the 
British army that was unique to Northern Ireland and the RUC as the civilian police 
service of Northern Ireland, I regard these, as well as the wider populace, as 'civilian'  
targets.  British Army and Territorial Army targets make up the 'military' targets.  
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Given earlier discussion about the similarity of results across the four specifications of 
the  baseline  model,  I  run  these  new  models  only  using  the  Cox  PH  model  with 
stratification by region and year and using the Breslow method for tied failure times. 
The models are as follows:
• Duration between total Republican attacks on military targets, using in-region 
averages  of  total  Republican attacks  on civilian  targets  (trnonarmyave),  total 
Loyalist attacks (tlave) and total Security Forces attacks (tsave) and bordering 
total  Republican  attacks  on  civilian  and  military  targets  (trarmybave  & 
trnonarmybave), total Loyalist attacks (tlbave) and total Security Forces attacks 
(tsbave) as covariates.
• Duration between total Republican attacks on military targets, using in-region 
averages  of  total  Republican  attacks  on  civilian  targets  (trarmyave),  total 
Loyalist attacks (tlave) and total Security Forces attacks (tsave) and bordering 
total  Republican  attacks  on  civilian  and  military  targets  (trarmybave  & 
trnonarmybave), total Loyalist attacks (tlbave) and total Security Forces attacks 
(tsbave) as covariates.  
• Duration  between  total  Loyalist  attacks,  using  in-region  averages  of  total 
Republican attacks on civilian and military targets (trarmyave & trnonarmyave) 
and total Security Forces attacks (tsave) and bordering total Republican attacks 
on civilian and military targets (trarmybave & trnonarmybave),  total  Loyalist 
attacks (tlbave) and total Security Forces attacks (tsbave) as covariates.
These models are designed to pick up on the intuition of both the qualitative literature 
discussed earlier in this paper and that of the signalling model presented in Chapter 4. 
This  application is  particularly strong when dealing with Republican attacks against 
Security Forces.  These attacks seem explicitly strategic, as they are aimed against the 
forces of the incumbent government.  As such, there are few strong reasons to suspect 
that Loyalist violence affects the frequency of these attacks.
Indeed, the only economic reason to suggest why such an interaction may occur is if 
Loyalist  violence imposes  such significant  costs  on Republicans  that  they substitute 
from civilian targets to military ones, which makes the assumption that Loyalists only 
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respond to attacks against civilians and that Loyalist retaliation is a successful deterrent. 
Despite the results from the baseline models in Tables 6 and 7, there is also little in the 
qualitative literature to suggest that Republicans' attacks on civilians would be affected 
by Loyalist violence but the notion is more intuitively tractable, especially in the context 
of the theory presented in Chapter 4.  
There is strong justification, however, to suggest that there should be definite causality 
between  Republican  attacks  on  civilians  and  Loyalist  violence.   The  stated  aim of 
Loyalists  was  to  protect  Northern  Ireland's  Protestant  community  from  Republican 
attacks,  which  provides  a  logical  and  tractable  suggestion  of  causality.   Although 
Loyalists also desired to maintain the union with Great Britain, it is not explicitly clear 
if it would be expected that Loyalists' attacks should also be correlated with Republican 
violence against military targets.  The results are shown below in Table 8.  
Republican Army 
Duration
Republican Civilian 
Duration
Loyalist Duration
trarmyave ------ 0.459
(0.336)
0.942
(0.716)
trnonarmyave 0.738
(0.950)
----- 4.899***
(1.930)
tlave 14.897*
(19.901)
1.624**
(0.309)
-----
tsave 0.481
(0.631)
2.156**
(0.814)
1.354
(0.353)
trarmybave 0.368
(0.629)
1.001
(0.949)
0.457
(0.358)
trnonarmybave 1.075
(0.603)
1.224
(0.634)
1.326
(0.416)
tlbave 0.969
(0.806)
2.336*
(1.139)
2.325**
(1.044)
tsbave 8.520***
(6.467)
4.086
(2.863)
1.336
(0.812)
***, ** and * show significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively; S.E.’s in parentheses.
Table 8: Results from Cox PH Model on Restricted Data Subsets 
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The first result of note is the confirmation that Loyalists interact only with Republican 
attacks  against  civilians.   This  shows  that  Republicans  can  act  without  Loyalist 
retaliation, so long as they only attack the military.  The findings of the baseline model 
of the duration between Loyalist violence are not violated here, suggesting that there is 
a definite causal relationship between Republican strategic action and Loyalist violence. 
Republican strategy is more difficult  to interpret.  The first thing to note is that the 
coefficient on 'tlave' is apparently affecting Republican attacks on security forces.  The 
size of the coefficient is extremely large, however, as is the standard error (19.901). 
This is the result of near multicollinearity relating particularly to the variable ‘tsbave’ 
but seems to occur between trarmybave, trnonarmybave and tsbave.  Inspection of this 
data reveals that the collinear variables have a tendency to be zero at the same time.
Most typically and not unexpectedly, this occurs when the duration between attacks is 
low, meaning reduced time in which attacks to occur between the two attacks generating 
the  duration  variable.   Given  the  nature  of  the  data,  I  assume  this  is  a  random 
correlation.  The easiest way to address this multicollinearlity is to drop one of these 
three variables and discuss the impacts.  
The result of dropping each of these variables is reported in Table 9.  The results show 
that  when  this  multicollinearity  is  accounted  for,  tlave  presents  a  more  sensible 
coefficient and standard error and is no longer significant.  These results suggest that a 
majority of this effect comes from tsbave.  It is worth nothing, however, that when tlave 
is removed, tsbave remains strongly significant, suggesting it does play an important 
role in determining Republican action.  
I  also  show that  Loyalist  violence  is  a  significant  driver  of  Republican  attacks  on 
civilians.  It is harder, here, to discuss causality.  Given the establishment of a definite 
underlying Republican strategy and using the suggestions of the qualitative literature, it 
appears that likely that both military targets and civilians were targeted by Republican 
strategy.  It is the attacks on civilians from this underlying strategy that draws a definite 
response  from  Loyalists.   Following  this  retaliation,  Republicans  may  or  may  not 
continue to retaliate.   Full results from these regressions can be found in Appendix 9. 
Whilst the interpretation of this result is imperfect, it does seem to shed at least a little 
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more  light  on  the  direction  of  causality.   The  result  from the  Loyalist  analysis,  in 
particular,  suggests  that  the  relationship  with  Republican  violence  against  civilian 
targets is more than a random correlation, given that Republican violence against the 
British Army does not appear to cause Loyalist violence.  The sensible hazard ratio on 
Republican attacks against civilians, however, slightly convolutes this interpretation, as 
it suggests that causality runs in both directions.  Full results from these analyses can be 
found in Appendix 10.
Dropping 
trarmybave
Dropping 
trnonarmybave
Dropping
tsbave
Dropping 
All
Dropping 
tlave
trnonarmyave 0.623
(0.784)
0.747
(0.956)
6.440*
(6.979)
4.919
(5.301)
0.940
(1.158)
tlave 12.128*
(15.776)
15.857**
(19.715)
9.471*
(12.367)
5.459
(5.960)
-----
tsave 0.393
(0.505)
0.462
(0.589)
0.842
(0.999)
0.687
(0.799)
0.608
(0.795)
trarmybave ----- 0.389
(0.644)
0.209
(0.357)
----- 0.910
(1.450)
trnonarmybave 0.981
(0.538)
----- 1.009
(0.568)
----- 1.632
(0.891)
tlbave 0.842
(0.688)
0.957
(0.793)
1.267
(1.018)
1.066
(0.856)
1.205
(0.954)
tsbave 8.857***
(6.675)
8.441***
(6.346)
----- ----- 7.084***
(5.125)
***, ** and * show significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively; S.E.’s in parentheses.
Table 9:  Results  from Collinearity  Explorations  for  the  variable “Republican Army  
Duration”.
That  said,  when  coupled  with  qualitative  writings  and  theory,  it  seems  possible  to 
suggest that the relationship between Republican violence against civilian targets could 
be an affectation of the data caused by the relationship between Loyalist violence and 
Republican violence against civilians; this suggests that both groups were most violent 
at the same times.  That Loyalists only react to Republican attacks on civilians and not 
to attacks on military targets,  however,  provides some argument when coupled with 
qualitative writings and theory.  This suggests that high Republican violence leads to the 
initial Loyalist retaliation, with a potential Republican response to Loyalist attacks.  
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5.5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, I examine the claims of the significant qualitative literature in respect to 
the  conflict  in  Northern Ireland.   By employing models  of  duration  and survival,  I 
confirm that Republicans and Loyalists appear to match strategy.  Should one group be 
engaged in  a  period  of  high  militancy,  this  has  the  effect  of  reducing the  duration 
between attacks by the other organisation.  I show that the presence of significant action 
from rival organisations causes both Republicans and Loyalists to deviate from their 
underlying strategies and to attack more regularly than they otherwise would.  More 
importantly, it is possible to interpret this deviation as a direct interaction between the 
groups.  
I also uncover evidence of the interaction between rival Loyalist groups that spills over 
from neighbouring constituencies.  Finally, we see a very strong interaction between 
Republican  violence  and  action  by  British  Security  Forces  that  spills  over  borders. 
Coupled with the findings that Loyalists only retaliate locally, we see an indication of 
the organisational structure of the organisations involved reflected in their strategies. 
This  seems  to  confirm  the  theoretical  idea  of  the  strategy  ‘matching’ of  involved 
organisations, introduced in Chapter 4.  
Finally,  I  also  show  that  the  strategies  employed  by  the  organisations  in  Northern 
Ireland vary by both location and year.   This  means that,  for example,  Republicans 
operated  a  different  strategy  in  Belfast  West  in  1972  and  1981  but  also  that  they 
operated different strategies in Belfast West and Belfast North in 1972.  This gives a 
confirmation of the changing pattern of violence as discussed by Darby.  
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Chapter 6: Conclusion
It has been more than half a century since Schelling first began sketching the strategies 
of conflict and over thirty years since the seminal work of Landes (1978) first began 
exploring  terrorism within  these  frameworks.   Throughout  this  long,  expansive  and 
impressive time series of research, the causes, impacts, interactions and strategies of 
terrorism have  all  be  explored  in  considerable  depth.   Light  has  been  shed  on  the 
economic and political conditions that can facilitate terrorism, on the consequences of 
terrorism and governments' counter-terrorism policies and, from a personal perspective 
most interestingly, on the interactions of strategic players.  
Despite this bulk of literature, however, there are still major limitations throughout the 
literature.  Not least in the preponderance of focus on transnational terrorism, despite 
domestic  terrorism  being  the  more  prevalent  form  of  violence.   The  three  studies 
presented in this thesis aim to focus on different theoretical and empirical aspects of 
domestic terrorism, and as such represent a major contribution to this literature.  This 
thesis is the first work, to the best of my knowledge to look at the interactions of rival 
terrorist organisations in domestic conflicts and the first to begin looking at how peace 
can be achieved under domestic terrorist threats.  It is also one of only a handful of 
terrorism papers to employ duration analysis and one of the first to study the impact of 
covariates  on  the  probability  of  violence,  rather  than  to  look  simply  at  duration 
dependence.  
In Chapter 3, I introduce peace-making directly into terrorists' utility function and build 
on the suggestions by Epstein and Gang (2007), and Siquiera and Sandler (2006), who 
note the impact of popularity on terrorists' outcomes.  The results of this model show 
that, when terrorist organisations and governments account for their popularity amongst 
the society they claim to represent, violence can be reduced when society is opposed to 
violence.  The strategic interaction between terrorists and governments are also shown 
to be interesting in this model; whilst governments can expectedly increase counter-
terrorism  in  the  face  of  a  terrorist  threat,  they  may  be  best  off  reducing  counter-
terrorism, in order to facilitate peace making.  Terrorists respond changes in counter-
terror, depending on the level of counter-terrorism.  At high levels of counter-terrorism, 
terrorists can be induced to increase violence, due to tiny returns from peace-making.
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As with much of the literature, however, this model also supports, prima facie, counter-
intuitive outcomes.  For example, a society that is opposed to violence can actually have 
the effect of increasing the equilibrium spending on terrorism.  This occurs due to the 
self-interest of voters and governments; they are interested, only, in their own outcomes. 
By ignoring the incentives of terrorists and the strategic responses between players, they 
can bring about the outcomes they are most opposed to, as their preferences slightly 
change the nature of this interaction.  
Whilst sketching out the role of voters in inducing peaceful outcomes under domestic 
terrorist threats, this work does not answer what is, perhaps, a more important question; 
why do domestic terrorists become peaceful in the first place?  Whilst it may be easy to 
create 'folk tale' style answers – the PIRA in Northern Ireland waged a 'war' without 
success for fourteen years before the beginning of the 'Armalite and Ballot Box' strategy 
– there is significant scope for a rich modelling background to answering this question.  
It is my belief that this, whilst representing a substantial body of work, is an important 
area of research and one of the most defining features of domestic conflicts.  Similarly, 
whilst these theoretical outcomes are interesting, there is also scope for empirical work 
in this area; for example, interacting Sinn Féin's electoral outcomes in Northern Ireland 
with the degree of PIRA militancy.  
Chapter 4 of this thesis seeks to understand how rival terrorist organisations operating in 
the same domestic conflict interact with each other.  Building on the signalling models 
of  the  likes  of  Arce  and  Sandler  (2007),  I  overcome  the  inherent  informational 
asymmetry that occurs between rival terrorist organisations.  I introduce an organisation 
with some revolutionary motive that can be achieved through either peace or violence, 
or violence only, depending on the nature of the leadership.  This revolutionary is forced 
to interact with another terrorist organisation that emerges in this conflict.  
The results of this model show that the presence of a second, rival, terrorist organisation 
has profound impacts on the modelling outcomes, not least because the rival can induce 
violence from a nominally peaceful revolutionary.  This phenomenon has the effect of 
potentially increasing the duration of the conflict.  This is particularly pertinent in cases 
such as Northern Ireland, where the rival was opposed to the aims of the revolutionary 
and sought to end the conflict.  
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Thus, this result shows that a rival can actually perpetuate a war that it seeks to end. 
Another interesting outcome is that what drives the incentives to signal relate to the 
relative scales of the organisations; a large revolutionary can simply crush emerging 
rivals, whilst a large rival poses such a threat that violent revolutionary may attempt to 
mimic peaceful ones, in order to avoid retaliation.  
There are two major limitations that arise from this work, however; firstly, whilst the 
Bayes-Nash subgames in period two represent an advance on the literature's tendency 
towards three-stage, sequential games, the dichotomous choice does not reflect the array 
of strategies and responses available to terrorists.  Similarly, the dichotomous leadership 
type of the revolutionary organisation betrays the dynamic nature of terrorist leadership. 
Of these limitations, the second seems more important.  Much can be inferred about the 
interaction of rivals in the subgames from the substantial literature that looks at  the 
interaction  between  terrorists  and  governments.   Recalibrating  this  model  with  a 
continuous leadership type, whilst relating the scale of the signal to peacefulness of the 
leadership  would  represent  a  significant  piece  of  work  but  may  provide  a  more 
interesting insight, not least because it may allow inference about how and why that 
organisation becomes 'peaceful'.  
Chapter  5  seeks  to  study some of  the  outcomes  discussed  in  the  signalling  model, 
although it should not be considered as an empirical implementation of Chapter 4.  The 
scope here is slightly more limited but can, perhaps, be interpreted as an implementation 
of the suggestion of the subgames – namely, that rival terrorist organisations aim to 
'match'  their  strategies.   Although  matching  has  other  modelling  connotations  in 
economics,  in  this  context  it  simply  means  that  when  one  organisation  is  acting 
violently, the other will also act violently.  When one organisation is acting peacefully, 
the other organisation should also act peacefully.  In order to capture the true nature of 
triangular  conflict,  I  also introduced violence related to the security  forces  into this 
work.  
Data  comes  from  The  Troubles  in  Northern  Ireland  and  the  results  support  the 
suggestion that rivals match their strategies – in the context of Northern Ireland, this is 
interpreted as retaliation, given the context provided by a glut of qualitative literature. 
More specifically, this work shows that interaction and retaliation is related only to the 
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killing of civilians25; Republican attacks against civilians induce Loyalist attacks against 
civilians and vice versa, suggesting a kind of 'proxy' war between rival paramilitaries. 
The results  also  show that  Republicans  interact  with  violence  related  to  the  British 
Army but that Loyalists do not, which should not be surprising to those familiar with 
the conflict.  Finally, I show that interaction takes place at a 'local' level within Northern 
Ireland; attacks in a region induce retaliative attacks in the same region.  Attacks in 
contiguous regions do not induce retaliation.  
Although the outcomes here are interesting in themselves, data issues, as is common in 
the terrorism literature, limited the scope of the work somewhat.  Duration analysis was 
employed as a means to overcome some of these issues and has been shown to be a 
suitable  tool  to  overcome a number of  other  issues that  arise in  domestic  conflicts, 
which  were  discussed  in  earlier  sections.   Another  limitation  is  that  the  conflict  in 
Northern  Ireland  pitted  rival  organisations  with  divergent  goals  against  each  other. 
Further work of interest would be similar applications to data from different conflicts; 
an  application  of  data  from  Iraq,  for  example,  could  allow  confirmation  that  this 
retaliation is not specific to Northern Ireland.  Application to Colombia would allow 
study of the interaction of rival organisations with broadly similar goals.  
Thus,  in  the  three  substantive  chapters  of  this  thesis,  I  have  provided  significant 
theoretical and empirical contributions to the domestic terrorism literature.  Given that 
the literature in this area is relatively sparse, it has been impossible to close all of the 
information gaps that  surround this  kind of conflict.   There is significant  work that 
remains to be carried out in this area, for example, the role that political institutions play 
in fostering domestic terrorists and the causes of the peaceful outcomes witnessed in 
South Africa, Northern Ireland and, now, possibly even Spain.  
25 Although denoted as civilians, this term actually relates to non-British Army targets; this therefore 
includes members of the RUC and the UDR.  The RUC was the civilian police force of Northern 
Ireland, whilst the UDR was a reserve force of the British Army, made up of part-timers exclusively 
from Northern Ireland.
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Appendix 1: Full List of Baseline Regression Covariates
Covariate Name: Definition:
tlave Average deaths per day attributable to Loyalist within a region, 
between two Republican attacks
trave Average deaths per day attributable to Republicans with a region, 
between two Loyalist attacks
tsave Average deaths per day attributable to Security Forces within a 
region between two Republican or Loyalist attacks
trbave Average deaths per day attributable to Republicans contiguous areas, 
between two Republican or Loyalist attacks
tlbave Average deaths per day attributable to Loyalists in contiguous areas, 
between two Republican or Loyalist attacks
tsbave Average number of deaths, per day, attributable to Security Forces in 
contiguous areas, between two Republican or Loyalist attacks
lngdppc Natural logarithm of GDP, measured as Gross Value Added, per 
capita for the whole of Northern Ireland
lnunemp Natural logarithm of unemployment for Northern Ireland
year Annual time trend
year2 Annual time trend = year^2/10
year3 Annual time trend = year^3/100
year4 Annual time trend = year^4/1000
sunn Dummy variable taking value of 1 for attacks that occurred before the 
Sunningdale Agreement was signed and zero otherwise
sands Dummy variable taking value of 1 for attacks that occurred between 
the Sunningdale Agreement and Bobby Sands’ election to 
Westminster and zero otherwise
dail Dummy variable taking value of 1 for attacks that occurred between 
Bobby Sands’ election and Sinn Fein’s recognition of The Dail in 
1986 and zero otherwise
pop Population of electoral constituency
split Percentage of Catholics in the population of the constituency
east Regional dummy variable for the East Belfast constituency
north Regional dummy variable for the North Belfast constituency
south Regional dummy variable for the South Belfast constituency
west Regional dummy variable for the West Belfast constituency
eantrim Regional dummy variable for the East Antrim constituency
ederry Regional dummy variable for the East Londonderry constituency
fst Regional dummy variable for the Fermanagh and South Tyrone 
constituency
foyle Regional dummy variable for the Foyle constituency
lagan Regional dummy variable for the Lagan Valley constituency
midulster Regional dummy variable for the Midulster constituency
newry Regional dummy variable for the Newry and Armagh constituency
nantrim Regional dummy variable for the North Antrim constituency
ndown Regional dummy variable for the North Down constituency
santrim Regional dummy variable for the South Antrim constituency
sdown Regional dummy variable for the South Down constituency
strangford Regional dummy variable for the Strangford constituency
tyrone Regional dummy variable for the West Tyrone constituency
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Appendix 2: Output from Cox Proportional Hazards Models with 
Duration between Republican Attacks as Duration Variable
Output from Cox proportional hazards model; Duration between Republican 
attacks; Breslow method for tied failures; Full year and location controls.
No.  of subjects =         1261                     Number of obs   = 
1261
No.  of failures =         1243
Time at risk    =       160839
                                                   LR chi2(32)     =    745.46
Log likelihood  =   -7302.6774                     Prob > chi2     =    0.0000
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
          _t | Haz.  Ratio   Std.  Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. 
Interval]
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
       tlave |   1.976532   .2308268     5.83   0.000     1.572163    2.484909
       tsave |   1.626694   .2524189     3.14   0.002     1.200114    2.204903
      trbave |   1.485565   .2837227     2.07   0.038     1.021701    2.160029
      tlbave |   2.065119   .6078143     2.46   0.014     1.159888    3.676836
      tsbave |   2.243208   .4546504     3.99   0.000     1.507818    3.337259
     lngdppc |   1.601091   .6525185     1.15   0.248     .7202979    3.558934
   lnunemppc |   2.301009   .9138572     2.10   0.036     1.056475     5.01161
        year |   3.071627    .810535     4.25   0.000     1.831281    5.152072
       year2 |   .1516859   .0530652    -5.39   0.000     .0764125    .3011107
       year3 |   2.729988   .5262519     5.21   0.000     1.871014    3.983312
       year4 |   .8397612   .0300075    -4.89   0.000     .7829598    .9006834
        sunn |    1.20816   .4456102     0.51   0.608      .586371    2.489295
       sands |   .8155083   .2561354    -0.65   0.516     .4406386    1.509296
        dail |   1.021908   .2100074     0.11   0.916     .6831018    1.528756
         pop |   1.000005   1.91e-06     2.52   0.012     1.000001    1.000009
       split |   .9813163   .0115216    -1.61   0.108     .9589923     1.00416
        east |   .3764515   .1533939    -2.40   0.017      .169382    .8366635
       north |   2.382834   .4393664     4.71   0.000     1.660131    3.420151
       south |   1.467019   .2940548     1.91   0.056     .9904159     2.17297
        west |   5.585971   1.558272     6.17   0.000       3.2333    9.650534
     eantrim |   .0721786   .0495316    -3.83   0.000     .0188054    .2770344
      ederry |   .5235574   .1401539    -2.42   0.016     .3098144    .8847632
         fst |   2.573095   .6400469     3.80   0.000      1.58024    4.189756
       foyle |   4.227478   1.450943     4.20   0.000     2.157419    8.283775
       lagan |   .3764236    .123468    -2.98   0.003     .1979158    .7159345
   midulster |   1.848761   .4312168     2.63   0.008     1.170418    2.920253
       newry |   5.574305   1.394147     6.87   0.000     3.414313    9.100771
     nantrim |   1.199233   .0528756     4.12   0.000     1.099951    1.307477
       ndown |   4.64e-21          .        .       .            .           .
     santrim |   .1035239   .0597679    -3.93   0.000     .0333897    .3209731
       sdown |   1.040837   .3342477     0.12   0.901      .554668    1.953134
  strangford |   .0709002    .047205    -3.97   0.000     .0192275    .2614403
      tyrone |   1.936386    .580093     2.21   0.027     1.076448    3.483299
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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Output from Cox proportional hazards model; Duration between Republican 
attacks; Breslow method for tied failures; Stratification by year with location 
controls.
No.  of subjects =         1261                     Number of obs   = 
1261
No.  of failures =         1243
Time at risk    =       160839
                                                   LR chi2(23)     =    491.34
Log likelihood  =    -3706.554                     Prob > chi2     =    0.0000
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
          _t | Haz.  Ratio   Std.  Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. 
Interval]
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
       tlave |   1.750969   .2231454     4.40   0.000     1.363956    2.247794
       tsave |   1.579474   .2574579     2.80   0.005     1.147532    2.174004
      trbave |   1.238964   .2671674     0.99   0.320     .8119094    1.890644
      tlbave |   1.807378   .5378903     1.99   0.047     1.008613     3.23872
      tsbave |   2.368919   .5184038     3.94   0.000     1.542684    3.637671
         pop |   1.000005   2.05e-06     2.33   0.020     1.000001    1.000009
       split |   .9597636   .0160208    -2.46   0.014     .9288714    .9916831
        east |   .1584494   .0869282    -3.36   0.001     .0540638    .4643817
       north |    2.14136   .4442112     3.67   0.000      1.42598    3.215629
       south |   1.250864   .2841671     0.99   0.324     .8013768    1.952464
        west |    8.24314   2.973672     5.85   0.000     4.064676    16.71704
     eantrim |   .0237739   .0261409    -3.40   0.001     .0027552    .2051396
      ederry |   .4380819   .1301044    -2.78   0.005     .2447709    .7840625
         fst |   3.403458   1.007391     4.14   0.000     1.905342    6.079501
       foyle |   6.937544   3.188142     4.21   0.000     2.818622    17.07555
       lagan |   .2209076   .0924977    -3.61   0.000     .0972295    .5019066
   midulster |   2.152354   .5893751     2.80   0.005     1.258435    3.681261
       newry |   7.775257   2.478353     6.43   0.000     4.162894    14.52226
     nantrim |   1.295658   .0753563     4.45   0.000      1.15607    1.452101
       ndown |   7.08e-21          .        .       .            .           .
     santrim |   .0615008   .0429396    -3.99   0.000     .0156522    .2416494
       sdown |   1.588608   .6283888     1.17   0.242     .7316716    3.449193
  strangford |   .0189459   .0212995    -3.53   0.000      .002092    .1715773
      tyrone |   2.886451    1.11354     2.75   0.006     1.355146    6.148116
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                            Stratified by year
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Output from Cox proportional hazards model; Duration between Republican 
attacks; Breslow method for tied failures; Stratification by location with year 
controls.
No.  of subjects =         1261                     Number of obs   = 
1261
No.  of failures =         1243
Time at risk    =       160839
                                                   LR chi2(14)     =    267.75
Log likelihood  =    -4625.126                     Prob > chi2     =    0.0000
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
          _t | Haz.  Ratio   Std.  Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. 
Interval]
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
       tlave |   2.128015   .2978582     5.40   0.000     1.617454    2.799738
       tsave |    1.67233   .2787619     3.08   0.002     1.206242    2.318512
      trbave |   1.381751   .2690507     1.66   0.097     .9433791    2.023827
      tlbave |   1.973731   .5748139     2.33   0.020     1.115298    3.492892
      tsbave |   2.239191   .4638074     3.89   0.000     1.492039    3.360485
     lngdppc |   1.085009   .4336222     0.20   0.838     .4957375    2.374733
   lnunemppc |   2.332901   .9397271     2.10   0.035     1.059302    5.137749
        year |   2.969181   .8004688     4.04   0.000     1.750488     5.03633
       year2 |   .1681566   .0601846    -4.98   0.000       .08338    .3391297
       year3 |   2.647182   .5236534     4.92   0.000       1.7964    3.900898
       year4 |   .8387524    .030754    -4.80   0.000     .7805906    .9012479
        sunn |   1.158981   .4260795     0.40   0.688     .5638276    2.382352
       sands |   .8462475   .2682083    -0.53   0.598     .4546937    1.574983
        dail |   1.020758   .2105933     0.10   0.921     .6812571    1.529449
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                             Stratified by con
Output from Cox proportional hazards model; Duration between Republican 
attacks; Breslow method for tied failures; Stratification by location and year.
No.  of subjects =         1261                     Number of obs   = 
1261
No.  of failures =         1243
Time at risk    =       160839
                                                   LR chi2(5)      =     30.82
Log likelihood  =   -1590.5128                     Prob > chi2     =    0.0000
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
          _t | Haz.  Ratio   Std.  Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. 
Interval]
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
       tlave |   1.758151   .3334585     2.98   0.003      1.21231    2.549757
       tsave |   1.526316   .2803683     2.30   0.021     1.064848    2.187768
      trbave |   1.080728   .2496465     0.34   0.737     .6872109    1.699584
      tlbave |   1.590392   .5145917     1.43   0.152     .8435037    2.998619
      tsbave |   2.536571   .6440165     3.67   0.000     1.542173    4.172158
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                         Stratified by yearcon
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Appendix 3: Output from Cox Proportional Hazards Models with 
Duration between Loyalist Attacks as Duration Variable
Output from Cox proportional hazards model; Duration between Loyalist attacks; 
Breslow method for tied failures; Full year and location controls.
No.  of subjects =          690                     Number of obs   = 
683
No.  of failures =          672
Time at risk    =       153097
                                                   LR chi2(33)     =    528.01
Log likelihood  =   -3464.3512                     Prob > chi2     =    0.0000
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
          _t | Haz.  Ratio   Std.  Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. 
Interval]
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
       trave |    4.30158    1.22299     5.13   0.000     2.463889     7.50991
       tsave |   1.487064   .3303192     1.79   0.074     .9621736    2.298294
      trbave |   1.226039   .2633451     0.95   0.343     .8047699    1.867828
      tlbave |   4.401734   1.773844     3.68   0.000     1.998021    9.697226
      tsbave |   .9986294   .5200663    -0.00   0.998     .3598451    2.771362
     lngdppc |   1.877729   .8755912     1.35   0.177     .7528613     4.68329
   lnunemppc |   2.997707   1.559425     2.11   0.035     1.081407    8.309774
        year |    7.96721   3.563899     4.64   0.000     3.315478    19.14549
       year2 |   .0317646   .0196589    -5.57   0.000     .0094436    .1068432
       year3 |   6.330666   2.155085     5.42   0.000     3.248505    12.33716
       year4 |   .7266092    .045424    -5.11   0.000     .6428179    .8213226
        sunn |   .6136675   .3869361    -0.77   0.439     .1783301    2.111746
       sands |   .6269479   .3683509    -0.79   0.427     .1982096    1.983071
        dail |    1.10129    .412949     0.26   0.797     .5281146    2.296547
         pop |   .9999979   3.61e-06    -0.60   0.552     .9999908    1.000005
       split |   1.002683    .011966     0.22   0.822     .9795024    1.026412
        east |   1.674093   .6887527     1.25   0.210      .747446    3.749554
       north |   4.357684   .8941149     7.17   0.000     2.914776    6.514878
       south |   2.110602   .4731807     3.33   0.001     1.360108     3.27521
        west |    2.67864   .8678309     3.04   0.002     1.419516    5.054617
     eantrim |   .5665775   .2231391    -1.44   0.149     .2618332     1.22601
      ederry |   .3120892   .1277777    -2.84   0.004     .1398859    .6962794
         fst |   .7162925   .2491648    -0.96   0.337     .3622405    1.416393
       foyle |   .1444492   .1016339    -2.75   0.006     .0363759    .5736106
       lagan |   .6446846   .2325259    -1.22   0.224     .3179322    1.307254
   midulster |   .6667393   .2151946    -1.26   0.209     .3541808    1.255125
       newry |   .6551523   .2355251    -1.18   0.239     .3238457    1.325398
     nantrim |   .3879604   .1553496    -2.36   0.018      .176988    .8504154
       ndown |   .3078949   .2119579    -1.71   0.087     .0798779    1.186802
     santrim |   .5110949   .1963523    -1.75   0.081     .2407061    1.085215
       sdown |   .3472097   .1575372    -2.33   0.020     .1426861    .8448938
  strangford |   .2869535   .1336551    -2.68   0.007     .1151715     .714954
      tyrone |   .2759465   .1461464    -2.43   0.015     .0977266    .7791789
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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Output from Cox proportional hazards model; Duration between Loyalist attacks; 
Breslow method for tied failures; Stratification by year with location controls.
No.  of subjects =          690                     Number of obs   = 
683
No.  of failures =          672
Time at risk    =       161711
                                                   LR chi2(24)     =    357.33
Log likelihood  =   -1690.0072                     Prob > chi2     =    0.0000
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
          _t | Haz.  Ratio   Std.  Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. 
Interval]
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
       trave |   4.050383   1.334866     4.24   0.000     2.123096    7.727207
       tsave |   1.377458    .342546     1.29   0.198     .8460615    2.242617
      trbave |   1.076596   .2597301     0.31   0.760     .6709641    1.727453
      tlbave |   2.623422   1.105576     2.29   0.022     1.148551    5.992196
      tsbave |   .9726027   .5342989    -0.05   0.960     .3313815    2.854583
         pop |          1   4.68e-06     0.01   0.991     .9999909    1.000009
       split |   .9899882   .0148392    -0.67   0.502      .961327    1.019504
        east |   1.221782     .62242     0.39   0.694     .4501533    3.316092
       north |   4.019656    .916519     6.10   0.000     2.571029      6.2845
       south |   1.842726   .4672543     2.41   0.016     1.121048    3.028986
        west |   3.157191   1.210367     3.00   0.003     1.489283    6.693058
     eantrim |   .5408894   .2404915    -1.38   0.167     .2262795     1.29292
      ederry |   .2528969   .1250291    -2.78   0.005     .0959666    .6664491
         fst |   .6896863   .2707101    -0.95   0.344     .3195544    1.488533
       foyle |   .1823813   .1449261    -2.14   0.032     .0384227    .8657101
       lagan |   .4839625   .2074976    -1.69   0.091     .2088629    1.121404
   midulster |   .9791205   .3490345    -0.06   0.953     .4868575    1.969112
       newry |   .8219089    .338298    -0.48   0.634     .3668334    1.841529
     nantrim |   .1721295   .0938787    -3.23   0.001     .0591036    .5012989
       ndown |   .1001369   .0890693    -2.59   0.010     .0175175    .5724228
     santrim |   .4873966   .2054744    -1.70   0.088     .2133226    1.113597
       sdown |   .3103503   .1687439    -2.15   0.031     .1069144    .9008825
  strangford |   .2278802   .1204753    -2.80   0.005     .0808528     .642271
      tyrone |   .3346991    .222449    -1.65   0.100     .0909757    1.231356
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                            Stratified by year
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Output from Cox proportional hazards model; Duration between Loyalist attacks; 
Breslow method for tied failures; Stratification by location with year controls..
No.  of subjects =          690                     Number of obs   = 
683
No.  of failures =          672
Time at risk    =       153097
                                                   LR chi2(14)     =    229.83
Log likelihood  =   -2180.6814                     Prob > chi2     =    0.0000
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
          _t | Haz.  Ratio   Std.  Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. 
Interval]
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
       trave |   4.999327    1.46087     5.51   0.000     2.819546     8.86429
       tsave |   1.565773   .3567959     1.97   0.049      1.00176    2.447338
      trbave |   1.198252   .2647509     0.82   0.413     .7771009    1.847648
      tlbave |   4.159486    1.69866     3.49   0.000     1.868203    9.260943
      tsbave |   1.023622   .5414718     0.04   0.965     .3629726    2.886723
     lngdppc |   1.296731   .5845815     0.58   0.564     .5359427    3.137484
   lnunemppc |   2.845773   1.517518     1.96   0.050     1.000678    8.092938
        year |    8.16687    3.81899     4.49   0.000     3.266006    20.42182
       year2 |   .0346042    .022285    -5.22   0.000     .0097939    .1222646
       year3 |   5.975643   2.114717     5.05   0.000     2.986437    11.95683
       year4 |   .7342507   .0477506    -4.75   0.000     .6463802    .8340664
        sunn |   .5652426   .3645899    -0.88   0.376     .1596604    2.001118
       sands |   .5668448   .3475925    -0.93   0.355     .1704129    1.885497
        dail |    .938654    .368694    -0.16   0.872     .4346723    2.026978
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                             Stratified by con
Output from Cox proportional hazards model; Duration between Loyalist attacks; 
Breslow method for tied failures; Stratification by location and year..
No.  of subjects =          690                     Number of obs   = 
690
No.  of failures =          672
Time at risk    =       161711
                                                   LR chi2(5)      =     23.30
Log likelihood  =   -799.76735                     Prob > chi2     =    0.0003
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
          _t | Haz.  Ratio   Std.  Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. 
Interval]
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
       trave |    3.86815   1.372527     3.81   0.000     1.929628    7.754132
       tsave |    1.33362   .3499387     1.10   0.273     .7974046    2.230413
      trbave |   1.038358   .2624772     0.15   0.882     .6326737    1.704177
      tlbave |   2.561241   1.138164     2.12   0.034     1.071997    6.119378
      tsbave |   .8714956   .5105516    -0.23   0.814      .276441    2.747438
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                         Stratified by yearcon
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Appendix 4: PH Test Results for Cox Proportional Hazards Models for 
Both Republican and Loyalist Equations
Test of proportional hazards assumption; Duration between Republican attacks; 
Breslow method for tied failures; Full location and year controls..
.  estat phtest
      Test of proportional-hazards assumption
      Time:  Time
      ----------------------------------------------------------------
                  |                      chi2       df       Prob>chi2
      ------------+---------------------------------------------------
      global test |                     97.84       32         0.0000
      ----------------------------------------------------------------
.  estat phtest, detail
      Test of proportional-hazards assumption
      Time:  Time
      ----------------------------------------------------------------
                  |       rho            chi2       df       Prob>chi2
      ------------+---------------------------------------------------
      tlave       |      0.00599         0.03        1         0.8678
      tsave       |      0.00442         0.02        1         0.8842
      trbave      |      0.01102         0.18        1         0.6744
      tlbave      |      0.00326         0.02        1         0.8872
      tsbave      |      0.00386         0.02        1         0.8918
      lngdppc     |      0.05861         4.33        1         0.0375
      lnunemppc   |     -0.02838         1.09        1         0.2966
      year        |     -0.00154         0.00        1         0.9551
      year2       |     -0.00916         0.11        1         0.7396
      year3       |      0.00998         0.13        1         0.7181
      year4       |     -0.00987         0.13        1         0.7217
      sunn        |     -0.00355         0.02        1         0.8945
      sands       |     -0.01331         0.24        1         0.6225
      dail        |      0.01774         0.41        1         0.5216
      pop         |      0.02268         0.64        1         0.4226
      split       |      0.03624         1.85        1         0.1732
      east        |      0.06426         5.71        1         0.0169
      north       |      0.02947         1.10        1         0.2953
      south       |      0.04299         2.34        1         0.1261
      west        |     -0.00847         0.10        1         0.7561
      eantrim     |      0.04119         1.97        1         0.1601
      ederry      |      0.07251         6.54        1         0.0106
      fst         |     -0.00361         0.02        1         0.8952
      foyle       |     -0.01234         0.21        1         0.6464
      lagan       |      0.00026         0.00        1         0.9926
      midulster   |      0.02705         0.96        1         0.3262
      newry       |     -0.00209         0.01        1         0.9380
      nantrim     |     -0.08958         9.73        1         0.0018
      ndown       |            .            .        1             .
      santrim     |     -0.02390         0.78        1         0.3759
      sdown       |     -0.01822         0.46        1         0.4953
      strangford  |      0.22675        56.14        1         0.0000
      tyrone      |      0.00581         0.05        1         0.8286
      ------------+---------------------------------------------------
      global test |                     97.84       32         0.0000
      ----------------------------------------------------------------
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Test of proportional hazards assumption; Duration between Republican attacks; 
Breslow method for tied failures; Stratification by year with location controls..  
.  estat phtest
      Test of proportional-hazards assumption
      Time:  Time
      ----------------------------------------------------------------
                  |                      chi2       df       Prob>chi2
      ------------+---------------------------------------------------
      global test |                     22.12       23         0.5128
      ----------------------------------------------------------------
.  estat phtest, detail
      Test of proportional-hazards assumption
      Time:  Time
      ----------------------------------------------------------------
                  |       rho            chi2       df       Prob>chi2
      ------------+---------------------------------------------------
      tlave       |      0.00313         0.01        1         0.9249
      tsave       |      0.00137         0.00        1         0.9633
      trbave      |     -0.00192         0.01        1         0.9349
      tlbave      |     -0.00263         0.01        1         0.9113
      tsbave      |      0.00222         0.01        1         0.9370
      pop         |      0.01718         0.34        1         0.5576
      split       |      0.01318         0.22        1         0.6423
      east        |      0.02472         0.82        1         0.3642
      north       |      0.01171         0.17        1         0.6838
      south       |      0.02125         0.54        1         0.4620
      west        |     -0.00356         0.02        1         0.8998
      eantrim     |      0.00099         0.00        1         0.9711
      ederry      |      0.03615         1.53        1         0.2164
      fst         |     -0.00119         0.00        1         0.9661
      foyle       |     -0.00628         0.05        1         0.8227
      lagan       |     -0.03301         1.55        1         0.2130
      midulster   |      0.00902         0.10        1         0.7479
      newry       |     -0.00030         0.00        1         0.9915
      nantrim     |     -0.03071         1.17        1         0.2793
      ndown       |            .            .        1             .
      santrim     |      0.00337         0.01        1         0.9077
      sdown       |     -0.00244         0.01        1         0.9290
      strangford  |      0.09151         8.91        1         0.0028
      tyrone      |      0.00545         0.04        1         0.8440
      ------------+---------------------------------------------------
      global test |                     22.12       23         0.5128
      ----------------------------------------------------------------
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Test of proportional hazards assumption; Duration between Republican attacks; 
Breslow method for tied failures; Stratification by location with year controls..
.  estat phtest
      Test of proportional-hazards assumption
      Time:  Time
      ----------------------------------------------------------------
                  |                      chi2       df       Prob>chi2
      ------------+---------------------------------------------------
      global test |                      7.64       14         0.9074
      ----------------------------------------------------------------
.  estat phtest, detail
      Test of proportional-hazards assumption
      Time:  Time
      ----------------------------------------------------------------
                  |       rho            chi2       df       Prob>chi2
      ------------+---------------------------------------------------
      tlave       |      0.00241         0.01        1         0.9369
      tsave       |      0.00303         0.01        1         0.9187
      trbave      |      0.00700         0.07        1         0.7867
      tlbave      |      0.00198         0.01        1         0.9325
      tsbave      |      0.00193         0.00        1         0.9466
      lngdppc     |      0.01611         0.32        1         0.5691
      lnunemppc   |     -0.00968         0.12        1         0.7261
      year        |      0.01087         0.16        1         0.6917
      year2       |     -0.01754         0.40        1         0.5252
      year3       |      0.01991         0.52        1         0.4715
      year4       |     -0.02117         0.59        1         0.4438
      sunn        |     -0.00473         0.03        1         0.8622
      sands       |     -0.00653         0.06        1         0.8118
      dail        |      0.01602         0.32        1         0.5693
      ------------+---------------------------------------------------
      global test |                      7.64       14         0.9074
      ----------------------------------------------------------------
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Test of proportional hazards assumption; Duration between Republican attacks; 
Breslow method for tied failures; Stratification by year and location..
.  estat phtest
      Test of proportional-hazards assumption
      Time:  Time
      ----------------------------------------------------------------
                  |                      chi2       df       Prob>chi2
      ------------+---------------------------------------------------
      global test |                      0.01        5         1.0000
      ----------------------------------------------------------------
.  estat phtest, detail
      Test of proportional-hazards assumption
      Time:  Time
      ----------------------------------------------------------------
                  |       rho            chi2       df       Prob>chi2
      ------------+---------------------------------------------------
      tlave       |      0.00043         0.00        1         0.9863
      tsave       |      0.00024         0.00        1         0.9934
      trbave      |      0.00084         0.00        1         0.9721
      tlbave      |      0.00205         0.01        1         0.9311
      tsbave      |     -0.00085         0.00        1         0.9751
      ------------+---------------------------------------------------
      global test |                      0.01        5         1.0000
      ----------------------------------------------------------------
102
Test of proportional hazards assumption; Duration between Loyalist attacks; 
Breslow method for tied failures; Full location and year controls..
.  estat phtest
      Test of proportional-hazards assumption
      Time:  Time
      ----------------------------------------------------------------
                  |                      chi2       df       Prob>chi2
      ------------+---------------------------------------------------
      global test |                     80.18       33         0.0000
      ----------------------------------------------------------------
.  estat phtest, detail
      Test of proportional-hazards assumption
      Time:  Time
      ----------------------------------------------------------------
                  |       rho            chi2       df       Prob>chi2
      ------------+---------------------------------------------------
      trave       |      0.00614         0.03        1         0.8555
      tsave       |     -0.00389         0.01        1         0.9182
      trbave      |     -0.00324         0.01        1         0.9194
      tlbave      |      0.01950         0.43        1         0.5113
      tsbave      |     -0.01106         0.11        1         0.7398
      lngdppc     |      0.08683         5.76        1         0.0164
      lnunemppc   |     -0.02076         0.31        1         0.5768
      year        |     -0.02838         0.54        1         0.4641
      year2       |      0.01154         0.09        1         0.7636
      year3       |     -0.00339         0.01        1         0.9294
      year4       |     -0.00269         0.00        1         0.9441
      sunn        |      0.04534         1.55        1         0.2127
      sands       |      0.04418         1.43        1         0.2320
      dail        |      0.06969         3.60        1         0.0579
      pop         |     -0.04779         1.47        1         0.2255
      split       |      0.07464         3.72        1         0.0539
      east        |      0.05649         2.06        1         0.1510
      north       |      0.02028         0.28        1         0.5951
      south       |      0.02943         0.59        1         0.4420
      west        |     -0.05307         1.92        1         0.1663
      eantrim     |      0.00162         0.00        1         0.9655
      ederry      |      0.02119         0.29        1         0.5909
      fst         |      0.00050         0.00        1         0.9892
      foyle       |     -0.06117         2.62        1         0.1054
      lagan       |      0.05436         2.04        1         0.1527
      midulster   |     -0.05354         1.89        1         0.1690
      newry       |     -0.04045         1.13        1         0.2886
      nantrim     |      0.09249         5.52        1         0.0188
      ndown       |      0.05626         2.08        1         0.1496
      santrim     |     -0.04911         1.73        1         0.1880
      sdown       |      0.03224         0.68        1         0.4086
      strangford  |      0.05513         2.09        1         0.1484
      tyrone      |      0.05903         2.21        1         0.1372
      ------------+---------------------------------------------------
      global test |                     80.18       33         0.0000
      ----------------------------------------------------------------
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Test of proportional hazards assumption; Duration between Loyalist attacks; 
Breslow method for tied failures; Stratification by year with location controls..  
.  estat phtest
      Test of proportional-hazards assumption
      Time:  Time
      ----------------------------------------------------------------
                  |                      chi2       df       Prob>chi2
      ------------+---------------------------------------------------
      global test |                     12.88       24         0.9680
      ----------------------------------------------------------------
.  estat phtest, detail
      Test of proportional-hazards assumption
      Time:  Time
      ----------------------------------------------------------------
                  |       rho            chi2       df       Prob>chi2
      ------------+---------------------------------------------------
      trave       |      0.00124         0.00        1         0.9685
      tsave       |      0.00046         0.00        1         0.9899
      trbave      |      0.00073         0.00        1         0.9804
      tlbave      |      0.00088         0.00        1         0.9765
      tsbave      |     -0.00015         0.00        1         0.9962
      pop         |     -0.01011         0.06        1         0.8047
      split       |      0.03474         0.74        1         0.3909
      east        |      0.03473         0.76        1         0.3838
      north       |      0.01427         0.15        1         0.7017
      south       |      0.01627         0.19        1         0.6652
      west        |     -0.02303         0.35        1         0.5565
      eantrim     |      0.03152         0.67        1         0.4135
      ederry      |     -0.02317         0.38        1         0.5359
      fst         |     -0.01845         0.25        1         0.6167
      foyle       |     -0.03804         0.80        1         0.3711
      lagan       |     -0.00034         0.00        1         0.9927
      midulster   |     -0.00405         0.01        1         0.9203
      newry       |      0.00180         0.00        1         0.9626
      nantrim     |     -0.01577         0.20        1         0.6552
      ndown       |     -0.00768         0.04        1         0.8332
      santrim     |     -0.02143         0.31        1         0.5786
      sdown       |     -0.00584         0.02        1         0.8835
      strangford  |      0.04158         1.03        1         0.3102
      tyrone      |      0.05716         1.80        1         0.1792
      ------------+---------------------------------------------------
      global test |                     12.88       24         0.9680
      ----------------------------------------------------------------
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Test of proportional hazards assumption; Duration between Loyalist attacks; 
Breslow method for tied failures; Stratification by location with year controls..
.  estat phtest
      Test of proportional-hazards assumption
      Time:  Time
      ----------------------------------------------------------------
                  |                      chi2       df       Prob>chi2
      ------------+---------------------------------------------------
      global test |                      0.70       14         1.0000
      ----------------------------------------------------------------
.  estat phtest, detail
      Test of proportional-hazards assumption
      Time:  Time
      ----------------------------------------------------------------
                  |       rho            chi2       df       Prob>chi2
      ------------+---------------------------------------------------
      trave       |      0.00356         0.01        1         0.9159
      tsave       |      0.00080         0.00        1         0.9831
      trbave      |      0.00308         0.01        1         0.9222
      tlbave      |      0.00503         0.03        1         0.8655
      tsbave      |     -0.00034         0.00        1         0.9920
      lngdppc     |      0.00904         0.05        1         0.8162
      lnunemppc   |     -0.00531         0.02        1         0.8888
      year        |     -0.00877         0.05        1         0.8230
      year2       |      0.00914         0.06        1         0.8141
      year3       |     -0.00903         0.05        1         0.8161
      year4       |      0.00877         0.05        1         0.8215
      sunn        |     -0.00028         0.00        1         0.9940
      sands       |      0.00290         0.01        1         0.9380
      dail        |      0.00480         0.02        1         0.8984
      ------------+---------------------------------------------------
      global test |                      0.70       14         1.0000
      ----------------------------------------------------------------
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Test of proportional hazards assumption; Duration between Loyalist attacks; 
Breslow method for tied failures; Stratification by year and location..
.  estat phtest
      Test of proportional-hazards assumption
      Time:  Time
      ----------------------------------------------------------------
                  |                      chi2       df       Prob>chi2
      ------------+---------------------------------------------------
      global test |                      0.00        5         1.0000
      ----------------------------------------------------------------
.  estat phtest, detail
      Test of proportional-hazards assumption
      Time:  Time
      ----------------------------------------------------------------
                  |       rho            chi2       df       Prob>chi2
      ------------+---------------------------------------------------
      trave       |      0.00037         0.00        1         0.9908
      tsave       |      0.00002         0.00        1         0.9995
      trbave      |      0.00025         0.00        1         0.9930
      tlbave      |      0.00003         0.00        1         0.9992
      tsbave      |      0.00009         0.00        1         0.9978
      ------------+---------------------------------------------------
      global test |                      0.00        5         1.0000
      ----------------------------------------------------------------
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Appendix 5: Output from Cox PH Model with Duration Between 
Republican and Loyalist Attacks as Duration Variable and 
Inclusion of Quarterly Dummies
Republicans:
No. of subjects =         1261                     Number of obs   =      1261
No. of failures =         1243
Time at risk    =       160839
                                                   LR chi2(8)      =     36.34
Log likelihood  =   -1587.7521                     Prob > chi2     =    0.0000
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
          _t | Haz. Ratio   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
       tlave |   1.729616   .3260179     2.91   0.004     1.195379    2.502615
       tsave |   1.558019   .2869837     2.41   0.016     1.085883    2.235436
      trbave |   1.067449   .2497367     0.28   0.780     .6748437    1.688462
      tlbave |   1.493061   .4884506     1.23   0.220     .7863386    2.834952
      tsbave |   2.586833   .6612258     3.72   0.000      1.56744    4.269193
          q1 |   .7959992   .0811887    -2.24   0.025     .6517687    .9721465
          q2 |   .9443482    .096093    -0.56   0.574     .7736017    1.152781
          q3 |   .8922826    .090182    -1.13   0.259     .7319348    1.087758
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                         Stratified by yearcon
Loyalists:
No. of subjects =          690                     Number of obs   =       690
No. of failures =          672
Time at risk    =       161711
                                                   LR chi2(8)      =     26.26
Log likelihood  =    -798.2881                     Prob > chi2     =    0.0009
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
          _t | Haz. Ratio   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
       trave |   4.014722   1.427881     3.91   0.000     1.999476     8.06111
       tsave |   1.316952   .3485625     1.04   0.298     .7839335    2.212384
      trbave |   1.092247   .2774908     0.35   0.728     .6638487    1.797103
      tlbave |   2.527236   1.130583     2.07   0.038     1.051605    6.073496
      tsbave |   .8069217   .4754341    -0.36   0.716     .2542775    2.560678
          q1 |   .8657535   .1299833    -0.96   0.337     .6450535    1.161964
          q2 |   .7836148   .1164356    -1.64   0.101     .5856315     1.04853
          q3 |   .8303115   .1195582    -1.29   0.197     .6261448    1.101051
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                         Stratified by yearcon
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Appendix 6: Output from Cox PH Model with Duration Between 
Republican and Loyalist Attacks as Duration Variable and 
Inclusion of Three Month Lags of all Independent Variables
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
          _t | Haz. Ratio   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
       trave |    3.70569   1.382531     3.51   0.000     1.783611    7.699069
       tsave |   1.346854   .3668902     1.09   0.274     .7896755    2.297166
      trbave |   .9867416   .2785833    -0.05   0.962     .5673965    1.716012
      tsbave |   .7912581   .4837139    -0.38   0.702     .2387589    2.622266
      tlbave |   2.060035   .9688791     1.54   0.124     .8194757    5.178609
       trlag |   1.286487   2.185782     0.15   0.882     .0460455    35.94378
       tslag |   20.20599   70.13684     0.87   0.386     .0224327    18200.29
      trlagb |   1.901477   1.715666     0.71   0.476     .3243909    11.14586
      tslagb |   7.205008   18.13306     0.78   0.433     .0519266    999.7222
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
No. of subjects =         1240                     Number of obs   =      1240
No. of failures =         1240
Time at risk    =       153001
                                                   LR chi2(10)     =     44.46
Log likelihood  =   -1574.5732                     Prob > chi2     =    0.0000
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
          _t | Haz. Ratio   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
       tlave |   1.702326   .3110784     2.91   0.004     1.189862    2.435505
      tlbave |   1.516469   .5662268     1.12   0.265     .7294701    3.152531
       tsave |   1.571275   .2958901     2.40   0.016     1.086327    2.272708
      tsbave |   2.208808   .5878793     2.98   0.003     1.311019    3.721408
      trbave |   1.087687   .2463399     0.37   0.711     .6977875    1.695448
       tllag |   10.92349   19.82438     1.32   0.188      .311578     382.962
       tslag |   95.15084   192.5815     2.25   0.024     1.801417    5025.866
      trlagb |   1.298484   1.090347     0.31   0.756     .2504241    6.732821
      tllagb |   .2115836   .2407081    -1.37   0.172     .0227569    1.967214
      tslagb |   4.086147   6.837419     0.84   0.400     .1538099    108.5535
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                           Stratified by strat
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Appendix 7: Output from Accelerated Failure Time Models with 
Duration between Republican and Loyalist Attacks as Duration 
Variable
Output from accelerated failure time models; Weibull distribution; Duration 
between Republican attacks; Full year and location controls..
No.  of subjects =         1261                     Number of obs   = 
1261
No.  of failures =         1243
Time at risk    =       160839
                                                   LR chi2(24)     =    774.35
Log likelihood  =   -2102.3675                     Prob > chi2     =    0.0000
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
          _t | Haz.  Ratio   Std.  Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. 
Interval]
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
       tlave |   2.046252   .2292657     6.39   0.000     1.642816    2.548762
       tsave |   1.818652   .2669341     4.07   0.000     1.363998    2.424852
      trbave |   2.221495   .3266898     5.43   0.000     1.665209    2.963615
      tlbave |    4.16508   1.027768     5.78   0.000     2.567926    6.755606
      tsbave |   1.923038   .3680897     3.42   0.001     1.321475    2.798446
         pop |   1.000006   1.79e-06     3.19   0.001     1.000002    1.000009
       split |   .9748911   .0059294    -4.18   0.000     .9633388     .986582
        east |   .2992162   .0881906    -4.09   0.000     .1679202    .5331719
       north |   2.314247   .4003567     4.85   0.000      1.64875    3.248364
       south |   1.381719   .2565729     1.74   0.082     .9601944    1.988292
        west |   6.059752   1.223912     8.92   0.000     4.078818    9.002755
     eantrim |   .0622747   .0378998    -4.56   0.000      .018892    .2052795
      ederry |   .5146536   .1347894    -2.54   0.011     .3080226    .8598988
         fst |   2.589725   .5530184     4.46   0.000     1.704062    3.935701
       foyle |    4.95967   1.148789     6.91   0.000     3.149868     7.80932
       lagan |   .3232482   .0912937    -4.00   0.000     .1858381    .5622605
   midulster |   1.931198   .4006969     3.17   0.002     1.285921    2.900276
       newry |   6.030211   1.147386     9.44   0.000     4.153095    8.755747
     nantrim |   1.199098   .0495159     4.40   0.000     1.105872    1.300183
       ndown |   3.85e-08    .000028    -0.02   0.981            0           .
     santrim |   .0635395   .0337996    -5.18   0.000     .0224001    .1802343
       sdown |   1.042751   .2695161     0.16   0.871     .6283091    1.730563
  strangford |   .0441595   .0271205    -5.08   0.000     .0132513    .1471597
      tyrone |   2.141984   .4870239     3.35   0.001      1.37176    3.344678
       _cons |   .0026222   .0010743   -14.51   0.000     .0011747    .0058534
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
       /ln_p |  -.1288376   .0215249    -5.99   0.000    -.1710256   -.0866497
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
           p |   .8791167   .0189229                         .8428    .9169983
         1/p |   1.137505   .0244846                      1.090515    1.186521
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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Output from accelerated failure time models; Weibull distribution; Loyalist 
between Republican attacks; Full year and location controls..
No.  of subjects =          690                     Number of obs   = 
690
No.  of failures =          672
Time at risk    =       161711
                                                   LR chi2(24)     =    499.98
Log likelihood  =   -1212.7586                     Prob > chi2     =    0.0000
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
          _t | Haz.  Ratio   Std.  Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. 
Interval]
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
       trave |   4.608694    1.23062     5.72   0.000     2.730793    7.777983
       tsave |   1.187256    .244083     0.83   0.404     .7935048    1.776394
      trbave |   1.148368   .1943876     0.82   0.414     .8241303    1.600171
      tlbave |   13.00924   4.667374     7.15   0.000     6.439659    26.28093
      tsbave |   .4511522   .2076847    -1.73   0.084     .1830116    1.112161
         pop |   1.000007   2.65e-06     2.74   0.006     1.000002    1.000012
       split |   1.011677    .007437     1.58   0.114     .9972054    1.026359
        east |   2.040762   .6263826     2.32   0.020     1.118223    3.724401
       north |   3.467039   .6780819     6.36   0.000     2.363094    5.086702
       south |   1.776593   .3780442     2.70   0.007     1.170737    2.695979
        west |   1.843682   .4602313     2.45   0.014     1.130326     3.00724
     eantrim |   .8176394   .2777823    -0.59   0.553     .4201237    1.591279
      ederry |   .3735973    .148525    -2.48   0.013     .1713978    .8143332
         fst |   .4199311   .1411083    -2.58   0.010     .2173457     .811344
       foyle |   .0930142   .0608064    -3.63   0.000      .025828    .3349711
       lagan |   .5691906   .1863115    -1.72   0.085     .2996653    1.081133
   midulster |   .6882099   .2085382    -1.23   0.218     .3800089    1.246373
       newry |   .5124625    .163729    -2.09   0.036      .273973    .9585537
     nantrim |   .3608209   .1382435    -2.66   0.008     .1702808    .7645709
       ndown |   .2205427    .139765    -2.39   0.017     .0636882    .7637068
     santrim |   .4593185   .1585591    -2.25   0.024     .2334935    .9035518
       sdown |   .2489424   .1011933    -3.42   0.001     .1122255    .5522124
  strangford |   .3442555   .1456761    -2.52   0.012     .1502049    .7890012
      tyrone |   .1965839   .0936889    -3.41   0.001     .0772464    .5002854
       _cons |   .0050434   .0022076   -12.08   0.000     .0021386    .0118934
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
       /ln_p |  -.2474403   .0287574    -8.60   0.000    -.3038037   -.1910768
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
           p |   .7807969   .0224537                      .7380057    .8260692
         1/p |   1.280743   .0368308                      1.210552    1.355003
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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Appendix 8: List of Extended Regression Covariates 
Covariate Name: Definition:
trarmyave Average deaths of members of the British Army, per day, 
attributable to Republican organisations within a region, between 
two Republican or Loyalist attacks
trnonarmyave Average deaths attributable to Republican organisations that 
were not members of the British Army, within a region, 
between two Republican or Loyalist attacks
trarmybave Average deaths of members of the British Army, per day, 
attributable to Republican organisations in areas contiguous 
to a region, between two Republican or Loyalist attacks
trnonarmybave Average deaths attributable to Republican organisations that 
were not members of the British Army, in areas contiguous 
to a region, between two Republican or Loyalist attacks
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Appendix 9: Output from Cox Proportional Hazards Models with 
Duration between Republican Attacks against Army and Civilians 
as Duration Variable
Output from Cox proportional hazards model; Duration between Republican 
attacks against the Army as duration variable; Breslow method for tied failures; 
Stratified by year and location.
No.  of subjects =          328                     Number of obs   =       328
No.  of failures =          314
Time at risk    =       126126
                                                   LR chi2(7)      =     17.37
Log likelihood  =   -300.66398                     Prob > chi2     =    0.0152
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
           _t | Haz.  Ratio   Std.  Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf.  Interval]
--------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
 trnonarmyave |    .737831   .9503601    -0.24   0.813     .0590977    9.211777
        tlave |   14.89698   19.90893     2.02   0.043     1.085221     204.493
        tsave |   .4809788   .6307266    -0.56   0.577     .0368054    6.285507
   trarmybave |   .3677372   .6294287    -0.58   0.559      .012841    10.53117
trnonarmybave |   1.074545   .6028635     0.13   0.898     .3578211    3.226884
       tlbave |   .9689155   .8059009    -0.04   0.970     .1897991    4.946268
       tsbave |   8.520339   6.462695     2.82   0.005     1.926721    37.67863
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                           Stratified by strat
Output from Cox proportional hazards model; Duration between Republican 
attacks against non-Army targets as duration variable; Breslow method for tied 
failures; Stratified by year and location.
No.  of subjects =          966                     Number of obs   =       966
No.  of failures =          949
Time at risk    =       151830
                                                   LR chi2(7)      =     18.24
Log likelihood  =   -958.48256                     Prob > chi2     =    0.0109
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
           _t | Haz.  Ratio   Std.  Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf.  Interval]
--------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
    trarmyave |   .4587264   .3361429    -1.06   0.288     .1090976    1.928823
        tlave |   1.623664   .3094574     2.54   0.011     1.117543    2.359003
        tsave |   2.155905    .814262     2.03   0.042     1.028348    4.519801
trnonarmybave |   1.223677   .6339871     0.39   0.697     .4432608    3.378114
   trarmybave |   1.005785   .9489379     0.01   0.995     .1582756    6.391408
       tlbave |   2.336071   1.139732     1.74   0.082      .897839    6.078182
       tsbave |   4.086393   2.862532     2.01   0.044     1.035311    16.12908
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                           Stratified by strat
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Output from Cox proportional hazards model; Duration between Loyalist attacks 
against all targets as duration variable; Split Republican targets as covariates; 
Breslow method for tied failures; Stratified by year and location.
No.  of subjects =          687                     Number of obs   =       687
No.  of failures =          670
Time at risk    =       161685
                                                   LR chi2(7)      =     25.50
Log likelihood  =   -795.49087                     Prob > chi2     =    0.0006
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
           _t | Haz.  Ratio   Std.  Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf.  Interval]
--------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
    trarmyave |     .94191   .7161079    -0.08   0.937     .2122582    4.179788
 trnonarmyave |   4.898712   1.930394     4.03   0.000     2.262852    10.60493
        tsave |   1.354536   .3534811     1.16   0.245     .8121942    2.259024
   trarmybave |   .4568147   .3580514    -1.00   0.318     .0983033    2.122814
trnonarmybave |   1.326239   .4163798     0.90   0.368     .7167742    2.453923
       tlbave |   2.325292   1.044041     1.88   0.060      .964481    5.606108
       tsbave |    1.33605   .8120207     0.48   0.634     .4059589    4.397072
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                           Stratified by strat
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Appendix 10: Output from Cox Proportional Hazards Model; 
Accounting for Multicollinearity of ‘tlave’
Output from Cox Proportional hazards model; Duration between Republican 
attacks against the British Army as duration variable; Breslow method for tied 
failures; Stratified of year and location; Full model.
No.  of subjects =          328                     Number of obs   =       328
No.  of failures =          314
Time at risk    =       126126
                                                   LR chi2(7)      =     17.37
Log likelihood  =   -300.66398                     Prob > chi2     =    0.0152
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
           _t | Haz.  Ratio   Std.  Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf.  Interval]
--------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
 trnonarmyave |    .737831   .9503601    -0.24   0.813     .0590977    9.211777
        tlave |   14.89698   19.90893     2.02   0.043     1.085221     204.493
        tsave |   .4809788   .6307266    -0.56   0.577     .0368054    6.285507
   trarmybave |   .3677372   .6294287    -0.58   0.559      .012841    10.53117
trnonarmybave |   1.074545   .6028635     0.13   0.898     .3578211    3.226884
       tlbave |   .9689155   .8059009    -0.04   0.970     .1897991    4.946268
       tsbave |   8.520339   6.462695     2.82   0.005     1.926721    37.67863
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                           Stratified by strat
Output from Cox Proportional hazards model; Duration between Republican 
attacks against the British Army as duration variable; Breslow method for tied 
failures; Stratified of year and location; ‘trnonarmyave’ dropped.
No.  of subjects =          328                     Number of obs   =       328
No.  of failures =          314
Time at risk    =       126126
                                                   LR chi2(6)      =     17.31
Log likelihood  =   -300.69217                     Prob > chi2     =    0.0082
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
           _t | Haz.  Ratio   Std.  Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf.  Interval]
--------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
        tlave |   14.41189   19.14514     2.01   0.045     1.066504    194.7509
        tsave |   .4739552   .6180908    -0.57   0.567     .0367854    6.106603
   trarmybave |   .3355473   .5605028    -0.65   0.513     .0127027    8.863646
trnonarmybave |   1.066032    .598468     0.11   0.909     .3547376     3.20356
       tlbave |   .9828356   .8148804    -0.02   0.983     .1935263    4.991395
       tsbave |   7.551125   4.126249     3.70   0.000     2.587496    22.03655
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                           Stratified by strat
Output from Cox Proportional hazards model; Duration between Republican 
attacks against the British Army as duration variable; Breslow method for tied 
failures; Stratified of year and location; ‘tsave’ dropped.
No.  of subjects =          328                     Number of obs   =       328
No.  of failures =          314
Time at risk    =       126126
                                                   LR chi2(6)      =     17.04
Log likelihood  =   -300.82654                     Prob > chi2     =    0.0091
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
           _t | Haz.  Ratio   Std.  Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf.  Interval]
--------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
 trnonarmyave |   .7026537   .9168776    -0.27   0.787     .0544536    9.066838
        tlave |   13.88896   18.50435     1.97   0.048     1.020019    189.1172
   trarmybave |   .2873355   .4768034    -0.75   0.452      .011115    7.427965
trnonarmybave |   1.163256   .6302725     0.28   0.780     .4022346    3.364118
       tlbave |   .9141369   .7597002    -0.11   0.914     .1793139    4.660243
       tsbave |   8.535328    6.62995     2.76   0.006     1.862242     39.1205
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                           Stratified by strat
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Output from Cox Proportional hazards model; Duration between Republican 
attacks against the British Army as duration variable; Breslow method for tied 
failures; Stratified of year and location; ‘trarmybave’ dropped.
No.  of subjects =          328                     Number of obs   =       328
No.  of failures =          314
Time at risk    =       126126
                                                   LR chi2(6)      =     17.02
Log likelihood  =   -300.83778                     Prob > chi2     =    0.0092
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
           _t | Haz.  Ratio   Std.  Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf.  Interval]
--------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
 trnonarmyave |   .6232893   .7835613    -0.38   0.707     .0530409    7.324339
        tlave |   12.12793   15.77551     1.92   0.055     .9475008    155.2366
        tsave |   .3926401   .5049199    -0.73   0.467     .0315778    4.882101
trnonarmybave |   .9811282   .5384082    -0.03   0.972     .3346699    2.876304
       tlbave |   .8422931   .6876127    -0.21   0.833     .1700505     4.17204
       tsbave |   8.857378   6.675467     2.89   0.004     2.022028    38.79924
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                           Stratified by strat
Output from Cox Proportional hazards model; Duration between Republican 
attacks against the British Army as duration variable; Breslow method for tied 
failures; Stratified of year and location; ‘trnonarmybave’ dropped.
No.  of subjects =          328                     Number of obs   =       328
No.  of failures =          314
Time at risk    =       126126
                                                   LR chi2(6)      =     17.35
Log likelihood  =   -300.67213                     Prob > chi2     =    0.0081
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
          _t | Haz.  Ratio   Std.  Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf.  Interval]
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
trnonarmyave |   .7456456   .9561523    -0.23   0.819     .0603982    9.205358
       tlave |   15.85654   19.71468     2.22   0.026     1.386425    181.3511
       tsave |   .4620505   .5887512    -0.61   0.545     .0380256    5.614386
  trarmybave |   .3894836   .6440458    -0.57   0.569     .0152388    9.954668
      tlbave |   .9570308   .7929938    -0.05   0.958     .1886349    4.855453
      tsbave |   8.441127   6.345524     2.84   0.005     1.934278     36.8368
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                           Stratified by strat
Output from Cox Proportional hazards model; Duration between Republican 
attacks against the British Army as duration variable; Breslow method for tied 
failures; Stratified of year and location; ‘tlbave’ dropped.
No.  of subjects =          328                     Number of obs   =       328
No.  of failures =          314
Time at risk    =       126126
                                                   LR chi2(6)      =     17.36
Log likelihood  =    -300.6647                     Prob > chi2     =    0.0080
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
           _t | Haz.  Ratio   Std.  Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf.  Interval]
--------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
 trnonarmyave |    .740521   .9507766    -0.23   0.815     .0597936    9.171069
        tlave |   14.79711   19.60618     2.03   0.042     1.102388    198.6183
        tsave |   .4780331   .6223263    -0.57   0.571     .0372669    6.131869
   trarmybave |   .3610513   .5931691    -0.62   0.535     .0144256    9.036561
trnonarmybave |   1.077235    .600355     0.13   0.894     .3613487    3.211401
       tsbave |   8.490559   6.386155     2.84   0.004     1.944048    37.08221
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                           Stratified by strat
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Output from Cox Proportional hazards model; Duration between Republican 
attacks against the British Army as duration variable; Breslow method for tied 
failures; Stratified of year and location; ‘tsbave’ dropped.
No.  of subjects =          328                     Number of obs   =       328
No.  of failures =          314
Time at risk    =       126126
                                                   LR chi2(6)      =      6.89
Log likelihood  =   -305.90223                     Prob > chi2     =    0.3311
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
           _t | Haz.  Ratio   Std.  Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf.  Interval]
--------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
 trnonarmyave |    6.44039   6.978547     1.72   0.086     .7701663    53.85671
        tlave |   9.471095   12.36718     1.72   0.085     .7326849    122.4287
        tsave |   .8419986   .9997366    -0.14   0.885     .0821576    8.629288
   trarmybave |   .2085122   .3565635    -0.92   0.359     .0073037    5.952745
trnonarmybave |    1.00997   .5678693     0.02   0.986     .3355128    3.040241
       tlbave |   1.267226   1.017451     0.29   0.768     .2626802    6.113371
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                           Stratified by strat
Output from Cox Proportional hazards model; Duration between Republican 
attacks against the British Army as duration variable; Breslow method for tied 
failures; Stratified of year and location; ‘trnonarmybave’, ‘trarmybave’ and 
‘tsbave’ dropped.
No.  of subjects =          328                     Number of obs   =       328
No.  of failures =          314
Time at risk    =       126126
                                                   LR chi2(4)      =      5.96
Log likelihood  =   -306.36548                     Prob > chi2     =    0.2019
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
          _t | Haz.  Ratio   Std.  Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf.  Interval]
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
trnonarmyave |   4.919119   5.301324     1.48   0.139      .595044    40.66544
       tlave |    5.45897    5.96023     1.55   0.120     .6423167    46.39512
       tsave |   .6874425   .7992695    -0.32   0.747     .0703994      6.7128
      tlbave |   1.066453   .8557393     0.08   0.936     .2212705     5.13996
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                           Stratified by strat
Output from Cox Proportional hazards model; Duration between Republican 
attacks against the British Army as duration variable; Breslow method for tied 
failures; Stratified of year and location; ‘tlave’ dropped.
No.  of subjects =          328                     Number of obs   =       328
No.  of failures =          314
Time at risk    =       126126
                                                   LR chi2(6)      =     13.55
Log likelihood  =   -302.57039                     Prob > chi2     =    0.0350
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
           _t | Haz.  Ratio   Std.  Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf.  Interval]
--------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
 trnonarmyave |   .9401815    1.15824    -0.05   0.960     .0840599    10.51562
        tsave |   .6077827   .7952024    -0.38   0.704     .0467805    7.896446
   trarmybave |   .9103582    1.45001    -0.06   0.953      .040126    20.65372
trnonarmybave |   1.632249   .8909828     0.90   0.369     .5599484    4.758006
       tlbave |   1.204446   .9536731     0.23   0.814     .2551591    5.685433
       tsbave |   7.083973    5.12548     2.71   0.007     1.715558    29.25151
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                           Stratified by strat
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